United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JENNIFER G. ZIPPS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The
pending motion to suppress (Doc. 41) challenges a pretextual
traffic stop of Defendant Hector Medina-Rosas by Pima County
Sheriff's Deputy Carlos Ruiz. Deputy Ruiz testified that
on September 20, 2017, he was working as part of the Border
Interdiction Unit. The primary purpose of this unit is to
cooperate with federal agencies to stop vehicles that are
believed to be involved in drug and weapons trafficking.
Agent Ruiz testified that he was provided information about
Defendant's vehicle in relation to a weapons violation
investigation, and was asked to develop independent
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and to attempt to
search the vehicle.
After
an evidentiary hearing, at which Deputy Ruiz was the sole
witness, Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco issued a Report
recommending denial of the motion to suppress. (Doc. 60.)
Judge Velasco concluded that Deputy Ruiz had reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle for failure to
yield by moving to the right-hand lane, which is a traffic
violation. (Doc. 60.) In his Report and Recommendation
(R&R), Judge Velasco found: “Ruiz, intended, if
possible, to effect the stop. If he could not develop an
appropriate reason to stop [the defendant's vehicle], he
was not going to stop, but rather leave it alone and let it
proceed wherever it was going.” (Doc. 60, p. 2). Judge
Velasco concluded, “there is no doubt that Deputy Ruiz
would not stop the vehicle if no such cause existed.”
(Id. at 3.)
Defendant
filed his Objection to the R&R on October 5, 2018, and
the Government filed a Response on October 16, 2018. (Docs.
68, 71.) Defendant challenges Magistrate Judge Velasco's
legal conclusion that the traffic stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Defendant argues that Judge Velasco
erred by relying on Deputy Ruiz's testimony, which was
not credible because: (1) Deputy Ruiz omitted material facts
from his incident reports in order to obscure the actual
motivation for the stop (Doc. 68 at 3); (2) Deputy Ruiz's
testimony was inconsistent with his written report of the
incident; and (3) the conditions on the night of the stop did
not support Deputy Ruiz's claim that a violation of the
traffic laws occurred. (Doc. 68.) Defendant asserts Deputy
Ruiz's testimony should have been discounted in its
entirety and concludes that Deputy Ruiz had no independent
basis for making a traffic stop, and that he did so anyway,
manufacturing a traffic violation in his incident report.
Upon
independent review of the record the Court will adopt the
R&R (Doc. 60) and will deny Defendant's motion to
suppress. (Doc. 41.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of
the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
The Court reviews for clear error the unobjected-to portions
of the R&R. Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170
F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v.
Crabtree, 14 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998). If the
Court rejects the credibility findings of the magistrate
judge, a de novo hearing is required. United
States v. Ridgeway, 300 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002).
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Judge
Velasco found that Deputy Ruiz had reasonable suspicion to
stop Defendant's vehicle. The R&R states:
[Deputy Ruiz] observed the vehicle traveling north through a
construction zone. Deputy Ruiz drove up to a vehicle directly
behind the Jetta. The two vehicles in front [of] Deputy Ruiz
were traveling at about the same speed, although it appeared
the vehicle behind the Jetta was traveling too close. At that
time, Deputy Ruiz noticed at least two more vehicles came up
behind the first three cars. Altogether five or more cars
were on the inside passing lane. As Deputy Ruiz was pacing
the Jetta to determine its speed, all vehicles passed at
least one, if not two signs, stating that slower traffic must
keep to the right. In the course of this pursuit, Deputy Ruiz
could observe that there were no vehicles in front of the
Jetta obstructing his ability to proceed at a speed of 55
m.p.h. or to move into the right lane. Based upon his
observations, Deputy Ruiz concluded that the Jetta was
delaying the orderly flow of traffic and violating the
directive to move to the right.
(Doc.
60, p. 2.)
In
concluding that Deputy Ruiz had reasonable suspicion to stop
Defendant's vehicle, Judge Velasco reasoned that
Defendant was required to move to the right lane because he
and the four vehicles trailing him were traveling in the left
lane of a two-lane road at 45 miles per hour in a 55 mile per
hour speed zone. As the lead vehicle, Defendant was required
to yield the passing lane to the trailing vehicles. (Doc. 60
at 3.)
ANALYSIS
An
officer may conduct a traffic stop without violating the
Fourth Amendment if the stop is supported by reasonable
suspicion that a crime is, has been, or will soon be
committed. United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097,
1100 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic ...