United States District Court, D. Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes United States District Judge.
Sheida Hukman alleges that Defendant Alaska Airlines
Incorporated violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by refusing to hire her on account of her national
origin, retaliating against her for engaging in protected
activity, and interfering with her relationship with her
former employer. On November 7, 2018, the Court granted
Defendant's motion to dismiss on all of Plaintiff's
claims. (Doc. 19.) The Court based its decision on three
independent reasons. First, it concluded that Plaintiff
failed to timely file her charge with the EEOC. (Id.
at 2-4.) Second, the Court determined that, even if Plaintiff
had timely filed her EEOC charge, her complaint failed to
comply with Rule 8. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she
was discriminated against in retaliation for reporting that
other employees were practicing the “Art of
Invisibility, ” which is so “sufficiently
fantastic to defy reality as we know it.” (Id.
at 4.) Finally, the Court found that even if it could
extricate allegations regarding national origin
discrimination from those involving invisibility, the
allegations were insufficient to state a claim for relief.
(Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of
that order. (Doc. 20.) For the following reasons,
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
for reconsideration should be granted only in rare
circumstances. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909
F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mere disagreement with a
previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration.
See Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F.Supp. 1572,
1573 (D. Haw. 1988). A motion for reconsideration ordinarily
will be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a
showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have
been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable
diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g). Further, the motion must
“point out with specificity the matters that the movant
believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, any
new matters being brought to the Court's attention for
the first time and the reasons they were not presented
earlier, and any specific modifications being sought in the
Court's Order.” Id. Finally, “[n]o
motion for reconsideration . . . may repeat any oral or
written argument made by the movant in support of or in
opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order.”
Id. The court may deny a motion for reconsideration
if it fails to comply with these rules. Id.
argues that the Court manifestly erred in finding that she
failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC. Title VII makes
it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
. . . any individual . . . because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Before bringing a Title VII
claim in district court, a plaintiff must exhaust her
administrative remedies by timely filing a charge with the
EEOC, thereby affording the agency an opportunity to
investigate the charge. See B.K.B. v. Maui Police
Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). Timely
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a statutory
requirement to filing suit under Title VII. See Sommatino
v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).
Under § 2000e-5(e)(1), a plaintiff has three hundred
days after the date on which the alleged unlawful practice
occurred to file a charge with the EEOC. In failure to hire
claims, accrual of a claim begins on the date that the
plaintiff received notice that she was not hired. See
Lukovsky v. City and Cty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1046
(9th Cir. 2008).
Court found Plaintiff's claim untimely because, according
to her complaint, she learned that she was being denied the
position on February 22, 2017, and therefore she was required
to file her EEOC charge no later than December 19, 2017,
which she failed to do. (Doc. 19 at 3-4.)
challenges this finding, arguing that the Court incorrectly
calculated the deadline for filing her charge with the EEOC.
In support, Plaintiff attaches an October 2017 letter, which
purportedly reflects the date her application was rejected.
(Doc. 20-6.) But Plaintiff fails to explain why this letter
was neither mentioned nor attached to either her complaint or
her response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Nor does
Plaintiff explain why this matter could not have been brought
to the Court's attention earlier. The Court did not
manifestly err by not considering allegations not before it.
Moreover, after reviewing the contents of the letter, the
Court is unconvinced that it evidences the date of
Plaintiff's rejection. Rather, the letter states that
Defendant conducted a thorough review of Plaintiff's
concerns about the application process, but found no evidence
supporting her allegations.
Plaintiff's argument for reconsideration pertains only to
the portion of the Court's order finding that
Plaintiff's EEOC charge was untimely filed. Plaintiff
does not ask the Court to reconsider its independent and
alternative conclusions that, even if Plaintiff's EEOC
charge was timely filed, her complaint fails to comply with
Rule 8 or to allege sufficient facts plausibly entitling her
to relief. Thus, even if the Court erroneously determined
that Plaintiffs EEOC ...