United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Antonio Brown (“Brown”) has asserted claims for
malicious prosecution (both under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
under state law) following his acquittal in a state-court
prosecution for sexual assault. Brown contends the charges
arose because a member of the Glendale Police Department
filed false police reports, lied in a search warrant
affidavit and while testifying before a state grand jury, and
concealed exculpatory evidence. The first trial against
Brown, in 2015, resulted in an acquittal on some counts, a
dismissal of some counts, and a mistrial on some counts, and
the 2017 retrial resulted in an acquittal on all remaining
counts.
Now
pending before the Court are two matters: (1) Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 23), which argues
that Brown's malicious prosecution claims are time-barred
in part (because he should have pursued relief after the 2015
partial verdict, instead of waiting until after the 2017
retrial) and overbroad in part (because a police officer
cannot be sued in a § 1983 action for lying before the
grand jury); and (2) the parties' stipulated motion to
permit disclosure of grand jury transcript (Doc. 28). These
matters are fully briefed and neither party has requested
oral argument. As explained below, the motion for judgment on
the pleadings will be granted in part and denied in part and
the stipulated motion to permit disclosure of the grand jury
transcript will be granted.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
The Factual Allegations In The Complaint
The
complaint was filed on April 4, 2018. (Doc. 1.) The following
factual summary assumes the truth of all allegations
contained therein. Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d
1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (when deciding
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c),
“‘a court must determine whether the facts
alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the
plaintiff to a legal remedy'”).
The
complaint alleges that, on April 3, 2014, Brown invited a
woman to his apartment and “engaged in consensual
sexual contact” with her. (Id. ¶ 14). The
next day, the woman falsely accused Brown of sexual assault.
(Id. ¶ 16.)
Detective
Lawrence Gonzalez of the Glendale Police Department
(“Detective Gonzalez”) served as the lead
investigator. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 18.) As part of
his investigation, Detective Gonzalez interviewed the alleged
victim. (Id. ¶ 18.) During this interview, the
alleged victim made equivocal statements about whether any
wrongful conduct had occurred. (Id. [“She also
said, ‘She is not sure if he thought she was playing or
being kinky or anything of that nature.'”].)
On the
evening on April 4, 2014, Detective Gonzalez “set up
and monitored a [telephonic] confrontation call”
between the alleged victim and Brown. (Id. ¶
20.) During this call, Brown “made multiple exculpatory
statements, and denied any coercive or non-consensual
acts.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Detective Gonzalez
filed a false police report stating Brown had made
inculpatory statements during the call. (Id.
¶¶ 21, 22.)
Detective
Gonzalez also obtained a search warrant for Brown's cell
phone during the investigation. (Id. ¶ 22.) In
his probable cause affidavit, Detective Gonzalez
“falsely claimed that on the confrontation call,
[Brown] admitted to having sexual intercourse . . . without
consent, ” even though “[a]bsolutely no such
statements are contained in the confrontation call.”
(Id.)
Detective
Gonzalez later testified before the grand jury. (Id.
¶ 23.) During this session, Detective Gonzalez
“falsely testified . . . that during the confrontation
call, [Brown] admitted to having sexual intercourse . . .
without consent.” (Id.) Detective Gonzalez
also “withheld exculpatory evidence, including that
[the alleged victim] was not sure if [Brown] thought she was
‘playing or joking' or being
‘kinky.'” (Id.)
Due to
Detective Gonzalez's misconduct, the grand jury charged
Brown with nine counts of felony sexual abuse. (Id.
¶ 24.) “In two trials, culminating on May 9, 2017,
[Brown] was acquitted of all charges.” (Id.
¶ 28.)
In
October 2017, Brown served a notice of claim on all of the
defendants. (Id. ¶ 2.) The notice-of-claim
document is included as an exhibit to the complaint.
(Id. at 13-21.)
B.
The Parties And Claims Identified In The Complaint
The
complaint identifies three defendants: (1) Detective Gonzalez
(as well as Detective Gonzalez's wife, who is named only
for purposes of preserving claims against the marital
community), (2) Rick St. John, who is named in his official
capacity as the Glendale Police Department's chief of
police, and (3) the City of Glendale. (Doc. 1 ¶¶
4-10.) These individuals and entities will be collectively
referred to as “Defendants.”
The
complaint asserts five causes of action. Each cause of action
is asserted against all three Defendants. Count 1 is a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “Malicious and
Selective Prosecution, Abuse of Process, Failure to
Train.” (Id. ¶¶ 29-41.) Count 2 is a
claim for “Conspiracy to Commit Violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.” (Id. ¶¶ 42-46.) Count
3 is a state-law claim for “Malicious
Prosecution.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-50.) Count
4 is a state-law claim for “Abuse of ...