United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DAVID
G. CAMPBELL, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant
Loren McReynolds asks the Court to release him until the
resolution of this case. His motion is presented either as a
review of Judge Burns' detention order under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(b), or as a renewed motion for release. Doc. 50.
The Court will deny the motion.
Defendant
is charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of
a firearm, two counts of structuring financial transactions
to evade reporting requirements, four Lacey Act counts, and
two violations of the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burro
Act. Doc. 1. One Lacey Act count and the two Wild and
Free-Roaming Horses and Burro Act counts are misdemeanors,
and the remaining seven counts are Class C and D felonies,
the most serious of which carry potential guideline sentences
of several years and maximum statutory sentences of 10 years.
Id.
Judge
Burns detained Defendant as a danger to the community. Doc.
31. She also found him to be a flight risk, but concluded
that there were conditions of release that would assure his
appearance at trial. Id. Judge McDonald previously
had detained Defendant as a flight risk and danger, but Judge
Burns agreed to rehear the issue after newly appointed
counsel asserted that Defendant's first attorney had a
conflict of interest. Docs. 16, 27.
A.
Timeliness of Motion.
Defendant
concedes that his motion is untimely under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 59(a), which requires objections to a
magistrate judge's decision within 14 days. His motion
was filed seven months after Judge Burns' decision. The
Court nonetheless retains discretion to review an untimely
objection, United States v. Tooze, 236 F.R.D. 442,
446 (D. Ariz. 2006), and will exercise its discretion to
review the decision in this case.
B.
Legal Standards.
The
Court reviews the detention decision de novo.
See United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1192-93
(9th Cir. 1990). The Court must “review the evidence
before the magistrate” and any additional evidence
submitted by the parties “and make its own independent
determination whether the magistrate's findings are
correct, with no deference.” Id. at 1193. The
Court is not required to hold a new evidentiary hearing, and
in this case concludes that the parties' briefing
provides a sufficient basis for de novo review.
See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76
(1980).
The
government contends that Judge Burns did not err in deciding
that Defendant should be detained as a danger to the
community. The government must prove that he is a danger by
clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
Clear and convincing evidence is proof that a factual
contention is “highly probable.” Colorado v.
New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
C.
Defendant Will Be Detained as a Danger to the
Community.
The
Bail Reform Act identifies four general factors to consider
in deciding whether a defendant should be detained: the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight
of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to
the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
1.
Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses.
The
indictment charges criminal conduct stretching over a
four-year period, from early 2013 to September 2017. Doc. 1.
The most serious charges are felon in possession of a
firearm. As will be discussed below, Defendant has several
previous felonies. He is now charged with possessing a
firearm on two separate occasions in 2016 and 2017. Doc. 1 at
2. The government's evidence suggests that Defendant
arranged for his girlfriend to purchase a rifle and then used
the rifle during the guided hunting trips at issue in this
case.
Defendant
is also accused of structuring financial transactions to
avoid federal reporting requirements. The government's
evidence suggests that Defendant made numerous deposits and
withdrawals of just under $10, 000 to avoid federal reporting
obligations. When asked by a bank teller why he was ...