United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
BERNARDO P. VELASCO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff
Shannon Martino filed the instant action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security. The Magistrate Judge has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to the parties' consent under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c). (Doc. 17.) The matter is now fully briefed
before this Court. (Docs. 18-20.) For the following reasons,
the Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
I.
Procedural History
On
August 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for disability
and disability insurance benefits (Administrative Record (AR)
221-24) and a Title XVI Application for Supplemental Security
Income (AR 225-30). Plaintiff alleged disability as of
January 1, 2008 due to permanent mental disability,
post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and
personality disorder. (AR 98.) Plaintiff's application
was initially denied on December 19, 2013 (AR 107), and upon
reconsideration on July 2, 2014 (AR 132). After requesting a
hearing (AR 168), on April 4, 2016, Plaintiff testified
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) (AR 72-96). The ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision on June 1, 2016. (AR 18-36.)
The Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiff's Request for Review
on September 11, 2017 (AR 18), making the ALJ's decision
the Commissioner's final for the purposes of review.
Plaintiff
filed the instant action on November 17, 2017. Plaintiff
first claims that the ALJ did not account for all of
Plaintiff's limitations when formulating the Residual
Functioning Capacity (RFC). (Doc. 18 at 2.) Specifically, the
ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff's limitations in the
areas of concentration, persistence, and pace; and
erroneously determined that Plaintiff's physical ailments
were not severe. Id. Second, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for
finding that Plaintiff's subjective symptoms were not
credible. Id.
II.
Summary of ALJ's Findings
The
burden of demonstrating disability lies with a claimant.
Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574
F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). To do so, a claimant must show
that a physical or mental impairment precludes substantial
gainful activity, and it is anticipated that this impairment
will either result in death or last continuously for at least
a year. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1).
An ALJ
determines whether a claimant is disabled through a five-step
sequential evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. A claimant must establish: (1) she has not
performed substantial gainful activity since the alleged
disability onset date (“step one”); (2) she has a
severe impairment(s) (“step two”); and (3) her
impairment(s) meets or equals the listed impairment(s)
(“step three”). Id. “If the
claimant satisfies these three steps, then the claimant is
disabled and entitled to benefits. If the claimant has a
severe impairment that does not meet or equal the severity of
one of the ailments listed[, ] . . . the ALJ then proceeds to
step four, which requires the ALJ to determine the
claimant's . . . RFC.” Dominguez v.
Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2015). “After
developing the RFC, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work.” Id.
Then, at stage five, “the government has the burden of
showing that the claimant could perform other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy given the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
experience.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920.
In this
case, at step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1,
2008. (AR 23.)
At step
two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe
impairments, including bipolar mood disorder and personality
disorder. (AR 24.) But, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's
back, knee, and shoulder pain caused no more than minimal
limitations, and therefore were not considered severe.
Id.
Then
the ALJ decided-at step three-that the Plaintiff's
impairments did not meet or equal the listed impairments
either singularly or in combination. Id. The ALJ
said Plaintiff had not demonstrated her mental impairments
met the criteria for either Listing 12.04 (Affective
Disorders including Bipolar) or Listing 12.08 (Personality
Disorders). Id. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
exhibited no marked restrictions in function and no periods
of decompensation, both of which are necessary for a
disability determination under paragraph B of the Listings
for mental impairments. (AR 25.) Nor did Plaintiff meet the
paragraph C requirements because there (1) were no periods of
decompensation, (2) was no indication a change of environment
would cause decompensation, (3) was no evidence that an
increase in mental demands would cause Plaintiff to
decompensate, and (4) was no record of a year-long history of
Plaintiff requiring a highly supportive living arrangement.
Id.
At step
four, the ALJ stated that given the limiting effects of her
ailments, Plaintiff's RFC permitted a “full range
of work at all exertional levels but with certain
nonexertional limitations.” (AR 26.) These restrictions
required that work needed to be “limited to unskilled
tasks learned in 30 days or less not performed as a member of
team or crew. Additionally, the assigned work must require no
more than occasional, brief, intermittent, incidental contact
with coworkers, supervisors, and public.” Id.
Based on this assessment, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
could perform past relevant work as a cleaner. (AR 29.)
Finally,
at step five, given Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and
work experience, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
disabled and that work for Plaintiff existed “in
significant numbers in the national economy” as a stock
clerk or dishwasher. (AR 30.)
III.
Plaintiff's Background, Statements, and Vocational
Expert's Findings
At the
time of the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was forty-five
years old. (AR 79.) She had a high school education (AR 80)
and previously worked as a janitor, waitress, and
receptionist. (AR 93.) After the onset of her alleged
disability, Plaintiff was incarcerated, but after she was
released she worked three jobs.[1] (AR 75, 77.) Despite the
short-term work, Plaintiff claimed she was disabled and
unable to maintain employment because of migraines, back
pain, and interpersonal difficulties. (AR 81-84.)
The
first time Plaintiff argued she suffered from debilitating
physical impairments (i.e. back and neck pain) was at the
administrative hearing. (AR 24, 84, 106, 131253-59.) At the
hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had difficulty lifting
objects with her right arm, “sometimes” had back
pain, and was “sometimes” unable to sit for long
periods. (AR 80.) However, she admitted she was able to lift
about 20 pounds if able to utilize both hands. (AR 85.)
While
she could not pinpoint a precise amount of time she could sit
or stand, she said that after standing about 20 minutes she
would need a break, and sometimes could not sit for long
periods. Id. Plaintiff also claimed she had
migraines approximately 2-3 times a week. (AR 84.)
Plaintiff
alleged that her back pain increased after falling of a
horse. (AR 86.) After the first fall, Plaintiff continued to
ride but fell off the horse again in September 2015, causing
more pain. Id. Plaintiff admitted that before the
2015 tumble off the horse, she was a quotidian runner. (AR
87.) After the fall, she stated she experienced shooting pain
down her legs that increased when she kneeled or bent down.
(AR 89.) This sensation had become more frequent in the
months leading up to the hearing. (AR 90.)
At
home, Plaintiff stated that she lived with three dependent
children, ages seventeen, twelve, and seven, as well as a
disabled husband with heart disease. (AR 79.) She contended
she cleaned her house “a lot, ” cooked, watched
television, and read. (AR 85.) While doing these activities,
however, she claimed that she was “up and down”
approximately every 10-15 minutes because of her pain. (AR
85, 90.)
As far
as her mental impairments, Plaintiff was first diagnosed as
bipolar and borderline personality in 2008-2009. (AR
308-377.) Further, she was deemed seriously ...