United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
At
issue are Plaintiff's Motion Under FRCP 52(b) to Amend
Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment (Doc. 254), to which
Defendant filed a Response (Doc. 265) and Plaintiff filed a
Reply (Doc. 267); Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment (Doc. 255), to which Plaintiff filed a Response
(Doc. 269) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 271); and
Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 (Doc. 257), to which Plaintiff
filed a Response (Doc. 270) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc.
272). The Court resolves these Motions without oral argument.
See LRCiv 7.2(f).
After a
trial from March 21 to 31, 2017, a jury found that Defendant
violated Title VII by discriminating against Plaintiff, its
former employee, on the basis of sex. (Doc. 204.) The jury
found that Defendant's actions did not violate the Equal
Pay Act or the Arizona Wage Act. (Doc. 204.)
The
Court then held a three-day evidentiary hearing between May 4
and 11, 2017, after which the Court entered an Order setting
forth its findings of fact and conclusions as to
Plaintiff's equitable damages for Defendant's
violation of Title VII. (Doc. 243, Damages Order.) The Court
also limited the $528, 000 jury award of compensatory and
punitive damages to $300, 000, as provided by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982a(b)(3). In sum, the Court determined that
Plaintiff was entitled to $300, 000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and $206, 928.06 in equitable damages.
The
parties have filed various Motions to express their
disagreement with the Court's findings and conclusions in
the Damages Order and with regard to punitive damages at
trial. The Court has reviewed the record and the submissions
of the parties and now addresses the Motions in turn.
I.
Plaintiff's Rule 52(b) Motion
Under
Rule[1]
52(b), Plaintiff asks that the Court amend certain of its
findings in the Damages Order. Plaintiff first argues that
the Court erred in finding that Plaintiff's entitlement
to back pay terminated on August 31, 2015, because
Defendant's evidence was not sufficient to show that
Plaintiff could obtain a suitable position after August 2015.
The Court disagrees. As the Court already pointed out in the
Damages Order, “a job in sales of other apparel and
accessory items, whether specialty or general, is not so
different in character that Plaintiff's initial lack of
intimate familiarity with the product line or industry could
be said to affect her opportunities.” (Damages Order at
14.) “The law does not allow Plaintiff to redefine what
is substantially equivalent employment such that it
eliminates all other possible employment.” (Damages
Order at 14.)
In its
present Motion, Plaintiff has presented nothing new, and it
should thus come as no surprise to Plaintiff that the
Court's findings remain the same now. Moreover, as the
Court also noted in the Damages Order, Plaintiff failed to
make a reasonable effort to mitigate her damages after
February 28, 2014-making only “post hoc
attempts to create the appearance of diligence”
(Damages Order at 16)-and Plaintiff was thus not entitled to
back pay for the period in which Defendant showed that
substantially equivalent job opportunities existed, that is,
from August 31, 2015 on (Damages Order at 14-15). The Court
finds no error in its prior findings and conclusions.
Plaintiff
next argues that the Court should adjust Plaintiff's
compensation amount to match that earned by a male who
obtained a position she was denied. As the Court has already
stated on several occasions in these proceedings, the issue
of Plaintiff's compensation as compared to a similarly
situated male was presented to the jury in the form of
Plaintiff's Equal Pay Act and Arizona Wage Act claims,
both of which the jury rejected. The jury expressly found
that the differences in pay between Plaintiff and male
counterparts “resulted from one or more factors other
than sex.” (Doc. 204 at 4.) Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that, ignoring gender, she would have earned the
same amount as a particular male who obtained the position
she was denied. Once again, this is a subject on which the
Court has already expressed its conclusion, and Plaintiff
presents nothing new to convince the Court to change its
conclusion. The Court will thus deny Plaintiff's Rule
52(b) Motion (Doc. 254).
II.
Defendant's Rule 59(e) Motion
Defendant
asks the Court to alter the Judgment under Rule 59(e) by
reconsidering the conclusion that Plaintiff is entitled to
back pay even though she resigned from her job after
Defendant's discriminatory employment action. In their
briefs related to Defendant's Rule 59(e) Motion, the
parties renew arguments they have already made to the Court
in at least 14 prior briefs, (see Damages Order at 1
(enumerating briefs)), and which the Court already addressed
in detail, (e.g., Damages Order at 2-6). Defendant
presents no new argument to the Court and should be
unsurprised that the Court declines to change its prior
conclusion. The Court will thus deny Defendant's Rule
59(e) Motion (Doc. 255).
III.
Defendant's Rules 50 and 59 Motion
Defendant
next argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50 or a new trial under Rule 59 on the issue of
punitive damages. Specifically, Defendant argues (1) the
trial record contains insufficient evidence that
Defendant's conduct was willful, egregious, or recklessly
indifferent, as required for a punitive damages award; (2)
the jury's punitive damages award of $500, 000, as
compared to the compensatory damages award of $28, 000, is
excessive and disproportionate, even though the Court reduced
the award to the statutory cap; and (3) the Court improperly
admitted testimony regarding two former employees of
Defendant and excluded evidence of Defendant's
anti-harassment policy.
Rule
50(a) provides that after a party has been fully heard on an
issue at trial, the court may grant a motion for judgment as
a matter of law against that party only if it finds that
“a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”
Rule 59(a) provides that the court may “grant a new
trial on some of the issues . . . for any reason for which
new trial has heretofore been granted.” Upon review of
the record of trial in this case, it is clear to the Court
that the evidence presented provided a legally ...