United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Silvia Esperanza Solis's
Applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income by the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint
(Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that
denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening
Brief (Doc. 12, “Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant SSA
Commissioner's Opposition (Doc. 19, “Def.'s
Br.”), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 20,
“Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and
the Administrative Record (Doc. 11, R.) and now reverses the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
as upheld by the Appeals Council.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed her Application for Disability Insurance Benefits on
August 15, 2012, and her Application for Supplemental
Security Income on August 22, 2012, both for a period of
disability beginning April 30, 2010. (R. at 13.)
Plaintiff's claims were denied initially on November 7,
2012, and upon reconsideration on March 19, 2014. (R. at 13.)
Plaintiff
then testified at a hearing held before an ALJ on September
22, 2015. (R. at 35- 78.) On November 18, 2015, the ALJ
denied Plaintiff's Applications. (R. at 13-25.) On
November 16, 2016, the Appeals Council upheld the ALJ's
decision. (R. at 1-3.) The present appeal followed.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff has severe impairments of obesity and depressive
disorder (R. at 15), but that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past
work as a Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”),
such that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act. (R. at
18-25.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d
1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in
substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has a “severe”
medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not
disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three,
the ALJ considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises four arguments on appeal: (1) the ALJ erred by finding
that Plaintiff has the RFC for simple work but can perform
semi-skilled work, which is inconsistent with the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (“DOT”); (2) the ALJ erred
by failing to incorporate into Plaintiff's RFC physical
and mental limitations identified by Plaintiff's
examining physician and the reviewing physicians; (3) the ALJ
erred in determining that Plaintiff's testimony was not
entirely credible; and (4) the ALJ erred in rejecting the lay
witness testimony of Plaintiff's sister. (Pl.'s Br.
at 15-25.)
A.
The ALJ Failed to Reconcile the Inconsistency Between
Plaintiff's RFC and the DOT Classification of
Plaintiff's Past Work
Plaintiff
first argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that Plaintiff
could perform her past work as a CNA, which requires a DOT
General Educational Development (“GED”) reasoning
level of three-the ability to apply “commonsense
understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written,
oral, or diagrammatic form [and] [d]eal with problems
involving several concrete variables in or from standardized
situations.” (Pl.'s Br. at 17 (internal quotations
omitted).) This conclusion was inconsistent with the
ALJ's finding-based on the ALJ's reliance on the
medical opinion of Dr. Littlefield, an examining
psychologist-that Plaintiff's RFC limited her “to
simple, repetitive tasks, which by definition means that she
has difficulty understanding or remembering detailed
instructions.” (Pl.'s Br. at 17 (internal
quotations omitted).) In other words, Plaintiff contends that
the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform a DOT GED reasoning
level three job when the ALJ's RFC limited Plaintiff to a
GED reasoning level one or two job. See Meissl
v. Barnhart, 403 F.Supp.2d 981, 983 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(noting “the one vocational consideration directly on
point with [a limitation to simple repetitive tasks] is a
job's reasoning level score”). The Court agrees
that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff could perform
her past relevant work as a CNA, which requires a higher GED
reasoning level than that the ALJ herself assigned to
Plaintiff based on substantial evidence in the record. For
this reason alone, the Court must reverse the ALJ's
decision.
B.
The ALJ Erred in Failing to Incorporate the Findings of
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