United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Dominic W. Lanza, United Slates District Judge
INTRODUCTION
In this
diversity action, Alejandro Hernandez, Jr. and Alejandro
Yanez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege they
sustained injuries when their car was rear-ended on the
highway by a semi-truck that was being driven by Lakhvir
Singh (“Singh”) and that was owned by Mann
Carrier, Inc. (“Mann”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). (Doc. 1-1.) The complaint asserts
four causes of action: (1) negligence against Singh; (2)
vicarious liability against Mann; (3) negligent hiring,
supervision, and training against Mann; and (4) negligent
entrustment against Mann. (Id.)
Now
pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of action,
which Plaintiffs oppose. (Docs. 70, 78, 83.) As explained
below, the motion will be granted.[1]
BACKGROUND
I.
The Collision
On
March 20, 2015, at approximately 9:26 p.m., Singh was driving
a 2010 Kenworth T660 semi-trailer truck eastbound on I-40 in
or around Kingman, Mohave County, Arizona. (Doc. 79 ¶
1.) Plaintiffs were also driving on the I-40 in a 2006 Dodge
Durango SLT 4-Door Wagon. (Id. ¶ 5.) At some
point, Singh's truck collided with the rear end of
Plaintiffs' vehicle. The parties dispute who was at fault
for the collision.
II.
Singh's Experience
Singh
attended and graduated from Sunny Truck Driving School
(“Sunny”) in Flushing, New York in 1999. (Doc. 71
[Singh Dep.] at 23:25-24:24 [pp. 34-35].)[2] Singh has not
taken any truck driving classes since attending Sunny. (Doc.
79-2 [Singh Dep.] at 26:19-25.)
Singh
has been an over-the-road truck driver since 2003 and was
issued a commercial driver's license in February 2008 by
the state of California, which was valid at the time of the
collision in this case. (Doc. 79 ¶¶ 12, 13
[Plaintiffs' concession that these points are
undisputed].)
Singh
has worked for Mann since approximately 2007 as an
over-the-road truck driver. (Doc. 79 ¶ 14.) When Singh
was hired by Mann, he received only a 30-minute safety
orientation, and he has never participated in any safety
training classes while employed by Mann. (Doc. 79-2 at
79:3-20.)
The
only evidence in the record regarding Singh's motor
vehicle collision history comes from Singh's deposition.
Before the collision at issue in this case, Singh had been
involved in three or four collisions. (Doc. 79-2 at 43:6-14.)
One of those occurred while he was working for Mann, and the
other two or three occurred while he was driving a taxi.
(Id. at 43:15-44:3, 45:8-14.) He was also involved
in two truck collisions after the one at issue here; in one
of those, the other driver was cited, and in the other, cows
had come onto the road. (Id. at 45:15-47:15.) None
of these collisions was Singh's fault. (Id. at
47:4-7.)
III.
Mann's Employment Documents
In
response to a request for production of Singh's
“employment file, ” Defendants produced only drug
and alcohol testing records and a California Department of
Motor Vehicle Driver History. (Doc. 79-9 at 7-8.) Defendants
could not produce any written employee manuals, policies, or
procedures or any other writings pertaining to Singh's
employment with Mann in effect at the time of the collision.
(Doc. 79-9 at 6-7.)
In
response to a separate document request, Defendants also
could not produce any policies or procedures regarding
training or supervising Mann's employees in operating its
vehicles from March 20, 2014 onward. (Id. at 9.) And
Defendants could not produce any employee manuals or
handbooks provided to Singh during his employment with Mann.
(Id. at 10.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
A party
moving for summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “In order to
carry its burden of production, the moving party must either
produce evidence negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the
nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz
Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “If . .
. [the] moving party carries its burden of production, the
nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or
defense.” Id. at 1103.
“Summary
judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'” Rookaird v. BNSF
Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “A genuine dispute of material
fact exists if ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.'” United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
Account No. Ending 8215 in Name of Ladislao V. Samaniego, VL:
$446, 377.36, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249-50 (1986)). The court “must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Rookaird, 908 F.3d at 459. Summary
judgment is also appropriate ...