United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HON.
JOHN J. TUCHI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE .
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Anna
Sanchez-Gonzalez's[1] Applications for Supplemental Security
Income Benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 14, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's
Opposition (Doc. 15, “Reply”), and
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 18, “Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc.
13, R.) and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge's
decision (R. at 18-41) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R.
at 3-17).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed applications for Supplemental Security Income Benefits
and Disability Insurance Benefits on January 25, 2013 for a
period of disability beginning May 17, 2011. (R. at 24.)
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on August 7, 2013
(R. at 55-76), and on reconsideration on February 4, 2014 (R.
at 116-18.) Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September
29, 2015. (R. at 42-54.) On October 21, 2015, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's Applications. (R. at 18-41.) On December 22,
2016, the Appeals Council granted a request for review of the
ALJ's decision. (R. at 179-83.) The Appeals Council
issued its decision (R. at 3-17) on February 7, 2017 and
found that because Plaintiff turned 55 just six weeks after
the ALJ's decision, thereby becoming a member of the
category for those approaching advanced age, the Plaintiff
“became disabled on October 21, 2015, the date of the
[ALJ's] decision, but not before that date.” (R. at
13.) Plaintiff now appeals the finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled from her alleged disability onset date of May 17,
2011 until October 20, 2015. (Pl.'s Br. at 3.)
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: status-post left shoulder surgery, degenerative
disc disease of the cervical spine, hypertension, diabetes
mellitus, and obesity. (R. at 26.) The ALJ concluded that
while Plaintiff's “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms . . . [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
are not entirely credible.” (R. at 30.) Ultimately, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled and that
Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work as a
housekeeper, but has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) for light unskilled work in the national
economy. (R. at 35-36.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by improperly discounting the opinions of
Plaintiff's treating physician; and (2) the ALJ erred by
discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Pl.'s
Br. at 1-2.)
A.
The ALJ Did Not Err by Giving Little Weight to the Opinions
of Plaintiff's Treating Physician Because She Provided
Specific and Legitimate Reasons, Supported by Substantial
Evidence, for Her Decision
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be
given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion
of doctors who did not treat the claimant.”
Id.
Given
this hierarchy, if the treating physician's evidence is
controverted by a nontreating or nonexamining physician, the
ALJ may disregard it only after “setting forth
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on
substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). “The
ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and
thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making
findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence means more
than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.”
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
1995).
The
contradictory opinion of an examining physician constitutes
substantial evidence when the “examining physician
provides ‘independent clinical findings that differ
from the findings of the treating physician.” Orn
v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir.
1985)). “Independent clinical findings can be either
(1) diagnoses that differ from those offered by another
physician and that are supported by substantial evidence . .
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