United States District Court, D. Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes United States District Judge.
the Court are Plaintiff Fernando Gastelum's motion for
partial summary judgment (Doc. 33) and Defendant Phoenix
Central Hotel Venture, LLC d/b/a Hilton Garden Inn Phoenix
Midtown's cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 39),
which are fully briefed. Plaintiff's request for oral
argument is denied because oral argument will not aid the
Court's decision. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); LRCiv. 7.2(f). For
the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied, and
Defendant's motion is granted.
December 2017, Plaintiff reviewed a third-party lodging
website to book an ambulatory and wheelchair accessible room
at Defendant's hotel. (Doc. 10 ¶¶ 15, 26.)
According to Plaintiff, this website “failed to
disclose  accessibility features in enough detail to
reasonably permit [him] to assess independently whether
Defendant's hotel and guest rooms [met] his accessibility
needs.” (¶ 29.) Next, Plaintiff visited
Defendant's first-party website, www.hilton.com,
attempting to find the information that was not available on
the third-party website. (¶ 30.) Also finding that the
first-party website lacked enough detail on Americans with
Disability Act (“ADA”) compliance, Plaintiff
“called Defendant's hotel to inquire whether it was
compliant with the ADA.” (¶¶ 31-35.)
Defendant's reservation agent took Plaintiff's call,
informing him that there was a handicap accessible room that
was ADA compliant and that the room was available at the same
price as regular rooms. The reservation agent also offered to
take Plaintiff's reservation with no costs or penalty on
cancellation. Plaintiff did not book a room.
subsequently visited Defendant's hotel to verify in
person whether the hotel was ADA compliant and suitable for
his stay. Plaintiff, who has sued over a hundred hotels in
and around the Phoenix area in the last two years, testified
during a deposition (in another cases, alleging nearly
identical ADA violations) that he would visit hotels with his
son and his lawyer to engage in an inspection of the
facilities, but that he personally almost never got out of
the car. Plaintiff, or more likely his son or his attorney,
discovered numerous areas where Defendant's hotel was
allegedly out of compliance with the ADA. Because of these
alleged deficiencies, Plaintiff elected not to stay at the
hotel on December 4, 2017. Plaintiff also alleges that he
“intends to book a room at the Defendant's hotel
once Defendant has removed all accessibility barriers. . .
.” (¶ 16.)
April 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking partial
summary judgment on his ADA claims. On May 21, 2018,
Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all of
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and, viewing those facts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary
judgment may also be entered “against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the
case, and a dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could
find for the nonmoving party based on the competing evidence.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to
establish the existence of a genuine and material factual
dispute. Id. at 324. The non-movant “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts, ” and instead “come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Conclusory
allegations, unsupported by factual material, are
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). If the
non-movant's opposition fails to cite specifically to
evidentiary materials, the court is not required to either
search the entire record for evidence establishing a genuine
issue of material fact or obtain the missing materials.
See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell
Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).
moves for partial summary judgment on whether Defendant's
property and website violated the ADA. On cross-motion,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing
to bring his ADA claims, and that the Court should decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law
claims. The Court will first consider whether Plaintiff has
standing because it “is the threshold issue of any
federal action . . . .” Local Nos. 175 & 505
Pension Tr. v. Anchor Cap., 498 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.
“who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts must satisfy the threshold requirements imposed by
Article III . . . by alleging an actual case or
controversy.” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 101 (1983). Three elements must be present for a
plaintiff to have standing: (1) the plaintiff must have
“suffered an injury in fact;” (2) there must be a
“causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of;” and (3) it must be “likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to satisfy all three
elements, but its arguments with respect to the second and
third elements are derivative of its argument that Plaintiff
has not suffered an injury in fact. The Court therefore limits
its analysis to whether Plaintiff has suffered an injury in
injury in fact must be: (a) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical, and (b) concrete and
particularized. Additionally, where, as is the case here, a
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, there is an additional
requirement of showing “a sufficient likelihood that
[the plaintiff] will again be wronged in a similar way . . .
[t]hat is, . . . a real and immediate threat of repeated
injury.” Fo ...