United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE RANER C. COLLINS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
September 13, 2018, Plaintiff Rose Ann Karam filed a pro se
Complaint in this matter. (Doc. 1.) In addition, she filed an
Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (IFP)
(Doc. 2) and a Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party
Appearing without an Attorney (Doc. 3). Facing an impending
service deadline, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Status Update
on her IFP (Doc. 7), an amended IFP application (Doc. 9), and
a Motion for Extension of Time within which to Serve
Complaint and Summons (Doc. 8). Approximately one month
later, Plaintiff filed a recusal motion requesting the
undersigned withdraw from this case due to an alleged
conflict of interest. (Doc. 10.) Then, on February 11, 2019,
Plaintiff filed a Request Ruling on In Forma Pauperis
Application and Motion to Extend Time to Serve Defendants.
(Doc. 11.) The Court will first address recusal.
I.
Recusal of District Court Judge
Plaintiff's
motion asks this Court to recuse from further proceedings,
stating that the Court's screening of her Complaint has
taken far too long, and the undersigned has a conflict of
interest because he is an alumnus of the University of
Arizona Law School. (Doc. 10 at 1.) To illustrate why the
motions should have been addressed earlier, Plaintiff notes
that her IFP motion in another case was granted by Magistrate
Judge Bernardo P. Velasco within six days of filing.
Id. at 1-2. She also claims the undersigned is
biased and alleges a tenuous connection between the
undersigned's former employment at the Pima County
Attorney's Office and the unfortunate events she has
suffered. Id. Notably, PCAO is not a named defendant
in her case. Finally, she asserts that she will be filing a
complaint against the undersigned in the future. Id.
A
district court judge may recuse himself sua sponte if his
impartiality as to the case at issue may reasonably be
questioned or he has a personal bias against a party. 28
U.S.C. §§ 455(a)-(b); see also United States v.
Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008). Impartiality
is an objective standard; it requires that “a
reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” Holland, 519 F.3d at 913
(citing Clemens v. United States Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d
1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The reasonable person is
not someone who is hypersensitive or unduly suspicious, but
rather is a well-informed, thoughtful observer.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
However,
a judge need not recuse simply because a litigant filed or
threatens to file a lawsuit against the judge, United
States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 958 (9th Cir. 2007),
or because the judge has issued an adverse ruling against the
litigant, Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th
Cir. 1984). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has conclusively
determined that being an alumnus of the university which is
the subject of litigation does not require recusal. See
e.g., United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d
1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998) (alumnus judge's yearly
contribution to school was considered “minimal
contact” not requiring recusal); Maurey v. Univ. of
S. Cal., 12 Fed.Appx. 529, 532 (9th Cir. 2001), as
amended on denial of reh'g (Aug. 23, 2001) (alumnus
judge giving yearly contributions, engaging in fundraisers,
and aiding in moot court competition at law school need not
recuse); Lunde v. Helms, 29 F.3d 367, 370-71 (8th
Cir. 1994) (without more, graduating from the law school not
reasonable basis for recusal).
The
Court finds no cause to recuse from this matter. The
undersigned's contacts with the law school are minimal.
Neither is the Court is influenced by a potential lawsuit;
such occurrences are an anticipated consequence of being a
judicial officer. The Court apologizes for the delay in
screening Plaintiff's claim, but there are significant
differences between this matter and the matter before
Magistrate Judge Velasco. Plaintiff's complaint before
the Magistrate Judge lists one defendant and involves a
request for records. See Complaint (Doc. 1),
Karam v. United States Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., CV-18-00454-JGZ-BPV (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2018). In
contrast, the instant matter lists over twenty-five
defendants-both entities and individuals-and involves
multiple federal statutes and a state tort claim. This
requires a thorough examination and therefore more time for
screening. Plaintiff's recusal motion is denied. (Doc.
10.)
II.
IFP Application
Generally,
parties who file an action in federal district court must pay
a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 permits indigent plaintiffs to apply for a fee
waiver. Before granting a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court must decide whether the litigant is truly
unable to pay filing fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1);
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).
Good cause appearing, the Court will grant the Application
for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2), rendering
the IFP status motion (Doc. 7) and the amended IFP (Doc. 9)
moot. Furthermore, the Court will grant Plaintiff's
motion to permit electronic filing. (Doc. 3.)
III.
Statutory Screening of IFP Complaint
Even if
the Court finds that a litigant is unable to pay, it has an
additional, statutory obligation to screen a complaint before
it may be served. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, “section
1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to
dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127
(9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, a district court must screen
and dismiss actions filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma
pauperis if the action “seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief, ” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), or fails to plead a cognizable legal
theory, Balistreri v. Pacific Police Dept., 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
District
Court screening orders apply the same standard as applied to
a Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Watison
v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A
complaint under 12(b)(6) must contain a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8
does not require detailed factual allegations, “it
demands more than an unadorned, the defendant
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. The complaint must contain more than “a
statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a
legally cognizable right of action.” Bell Atlantic
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id.
“Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]
. . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. So, although a
plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be
consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess
whether there are other “more likely
explanations” for a defendant's conduct.
Id. at 681.
If the
plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted, ” the district court must dismiss the
claim. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). But, a
“complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] ‘must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.'” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). While
dismissal is appropriate if the complaint's deficiencies
cannot be cured by amendment, if the pleading can be remedied
through the addition of facts, the claimant should be granted
an opportunity to amend a complaint prior to final dismissal,
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir.
2000).
IV.
...