United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Debra Sue Sallee (“Sallee”) seeks review under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”),
which denied her application for disability benefits and
supplemental security income. For the following reasons, the
Court finds that the administrative law judge's
(“ALJ”) decision was based on reversible legal
error and remands for further proceedings.
Sallee
is a 50-year-old woman who previously worked as an accounts
payable clerk and a customer service representative and
alleges she became disabled in March 2013. In 2014, she filed
applications for disability benefits and supplemental
security income. (A.R. 198-207.) Her claims were initially
denied on June 12, 2014 (A.R. 68-69) and again upon
reconsideration on November 18, 2014 (A.R. 98-99). Sallee
then filed a written request for a hearing on December 4,
2014. (A.R. 153-154.) On June 15, 2016, she appeared and
testified at a video hearing at which an impartial vocational
expert also appeared and testified. (A.R. 42-67.) On July 7,
2016, the ALJ issued a decision that Sallee was not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (A.R. 23-35.)
The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final
decision when the Appeals Council denied Sallee's request
for review on October 5, 2017. (A.R. 1-6.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
Court addresses only the issues raised by the claimant in the
appeal from the ALJ's decision. Lewis v. Apfel,
236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts
in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.”
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001). The
Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “unless it
contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
Id. Put another way, “[i]t is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “[w]here
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, ” but the Court “must consider
the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“[H]armless
error principles apply in the Social Security Act
context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ's error is harmless
where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court must “look at the
record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the
outcome of the case.” Id. Importantly,
however, the Court may not uphold an ALJ's decision on a
ground not actually relied on by the ALJ. Id. at
1121.
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. pt.
404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ
assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is
capable of performing past relevant work. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to
the fifth and final step, which addresses whether the
claimant can perform any other work based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
BACKGROUND
At step
one, the ALJ found that Sallee met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,
2018 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 8, 2013, the alleged onset date. (A.R. 25.) At
step two, the ALJ found that Sallee had the following severe
impairments: bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety
disorder. (A.R. 26.) The ALJ also found that Sallee had the
non-severe impairments of interstitial cystitis, obesity, and
high blood pressure. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ
determined that Sallee did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of a listed impairment. (A.R. 26-28.) At step four,
the ALJ found that Sallee had the residual functional
capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following nonexertional limitations:
limited to simple routine and repetitive tasks, with only
occasional interaction with the public. (A.R. 28-33.) The ALJ
further found that Sallee was not capable of performing any
past relevant work. (A.R. 33.) At step five, the ALJ found
that, considering Sallee's age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that Sallee can perform, including janitor and dishwasher.
(A.R. 33-34.)
Sallee
argues that the ALJ's decision is defective for four
reasons: (1) the ALJ erred during step four by rejecting
Sallee's symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ erred during step
four by assigning “great weight” to state agency
consultants; (3) the ALJ erred during step two in finding
Sallee's interstitial cystitis was not a severe
impairment; and (4) the ALJ erred during step five in only
limiting Sallee's mental work capacities to work that
involves simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. (Doc. 15.)
As
explained below, the Court agrees with Sallee that the ALJ
committed reversible error when evaluating the severity of
her interstitial cystitis and when rejecting her symptom
testimony. Given these conclusions, it is unnecessary to
resolve Sallee's remaining assignments of error, because
they pertain to later stages of the five-step process and the
ALJ's analysis during those stages may be different on
remand.
ANALYSIS
I.
Whether the ALJ Erred in Finding Sallee's
...