United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Gregory Richard
Rohrbach's Application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits by the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) under the Social Security Act (“the
Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this
Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court
now addresses Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc. 12,
“Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant Social Security
Administration Commissioner's Opposition (Doc. 13,
“Resp.”), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 16,
“Reply”). The Court has reviewed the briefs and
Administrative Record (Doc. 9, R.) and now reverses the
Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at 19-31) as
upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 14-17).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits on March 18, 2013, for a period of disability
beginning April 20, 2009. (R. at 22.) Later, Plaintiff
amended the onset date to April 1, 2013. (R. at 22.)
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on August 14, 2013
(R. at 22), and on reconsideration on February 11, 2014 (R.
at 22.) Plaintiff then testified at a video hearing held
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on
December 8, 2015. (R. at 22.) On February 22, 2016, the ALJ
denied Plaintiff's Application. (R. at 31.)[1] On December 7,
2016, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the
ALJ's decision. (R. at 14-17.)
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: osteoarthritis of the right knee, history of
knee surgeries (1980's), status post cervical laminectomy
(1980's), history of shoulder surgeries, carpal tunnel
syndrome, obesity, lumbar and cervical degenerative disc
disease and spondylosis, hypertension, and obstructive sleep
apnea. (R. at 25.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled because
while Plaintiff's alleged impairments “could
reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms
. . . [his] statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
credible.” (R. at 27.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff is
unable to perform his past relevant work as a painter but has
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for
light unskilled work available in the national economy. (R.
at 30.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by improperly discounting the opinions of
Plaintiff's treating physician; and (2) the ALJ erred by
discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Pl.'s
Br. at 1.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Giving Little Weight to the Opinions of
Plaintiff's Treating Physician Without Providing Specific
and Legitimate Reasons, Supported by Substantial Evidence,
for Her Decision
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be
given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion
of doctors who did not treat the claimant.”
Id.
Given
this hierarchy and a treating physician's position at the
top if it, if the treating physician's evidence is
controverted by a nontreating or nonexamining physician, the
ALJ may disregard it only after “setting forth
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on
substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). “The
ALJ can meet this burden only by setting out a detailed and
thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making
findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Embrey v. Bowen, 849
F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The ALJ must do more
than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own
interpretations and explain why they, rather than the
doctors', are correct.”). Normally, “[t]he
opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself
constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection
of the opinion of . . . a treating physician.”
Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.
Here,
Plaintiff's two treating physicians reported that
Plaintiff has severe physical restrictions. Dr. Narayanaswamy
Deepak found that Plaintiff could sit for 15 to 30 minutes at
a time and one to two hours total. (R. at 28.) Dr. Deepak
also opined that Plaintiff could stand or walk for two hours
of an eight-hour workday, could lift or carry five pounds
occasionally, and could never squat, crawl, climb, or reach.
(R. at 28.) Similarly, Dr. Nimfa Aguila found that Plaintiff
could sit for 30 minutes at a time and for a total of two
hours in an eight-hour day and could stand or walk for two
hours during that time. (R. at 28.) Dr. Aguila opined that
Plaintiff could frequently lift or carry five pounds and
occasionally six to twenty pounds. (R. at 28.) When ...