United States District Court, D. Arizona
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE LYNNETTE C. KIMMMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pending
before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Reasonable Suspicion of Stop and Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Statements. (Docs. 20, 21.) The government filed
responses on December 14, 2018. (Docs. 22, 23.) No. replies
were filed. This matter was referred to the Court for a
hearing and a report and recommendation, pursuant to LRCrim
57.6. Evidence and argument were heard on February 6,
2019.[1](Doc. 32.) This matter was submitted
following oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing.
Defendant
argues that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop his vehicle; therefore, all evidence obtained after
the stop, including the ammunition and Defendant's
statements, should be suppressed. Having now considered the
matter, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District
Court, after its independent review, grant Defendant's
motion to suppress based on an illegal traffic stop. Because
granting the motion based on the stop results in the
suppression of all evidence obtained after the stop,
including Defendant's statements, the Court need not
reach Defendant's separate motion to suppress his
statements.[2]
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant
Arturo Esteban Martinez-Beltran is charged with smuggling
goods from the United States and possession of ammunition by
a non-immigrant alien. (Doc. 8.) Trial is currently set for
April 16, 2019. (Doc. 30.)
On May
26, 2018, Arizona DPS Officer Barry Anderson received from
another officer a “be on the lookout” advisory
for a 2003 black Mercedes SUV with Mexican license plate
number VTL596A. (RT at 8-9, 21-22, 33.) Officer Anderson
spotted the identified vehicle heading eastbound on I-10 at
milepost 228. (Id. at 9-10.) He observed the vehicle
driving at 70 miles per hour in the middle lane of the
three-lane highway. (Id. at 10.) The vehicle
maintained its speed and lane-location for approximately two
miles prior to the officer stopping it. (Id. at
10-11, 14, 24, 27.) Officer Anderson determined the SUV was
in violation of A.R.S. § 28-721 because it was
travelling below the 75-mile-per-hour speed limit outside of
the right-hand lane. (Id. at 11.) Due to heavy
traffic conditions on that Friday of Memorial Day weekend,
the officer testified he was concerned that a vehicle driving
below the speed limit in the center lane could impede traffic
and cause a collision. (Id. at 12-13.)
The
Court admitted video recordings from Officer Anderson's
two dashboard cameras, both of which begin approximately 30
seconds, or just over one-half mile, prior to Officer
Anderson turning on his lights to effectuate a stop of the
SUV. (Id. at 23, 24, 26-27; Exs. 25 (direct in-front
view), 26 (wide-angle view).) At that time, the SUV was
between mileposts 229 and 230. (RT at 18.)
At the
beginning of the video, the SUV is approaching a semi-truck
in the right-hand lane and there is a sedan behind the truck
that the SUV had passed prior to the video beginning. (Ex.
26; RT 28, 27.) The officer testified that the violation
occurred prior to the SUV passing those vehicles, which was
allowed from the center lane under the statute. (RT at 18,
27-28.) In the mile-and-a half prior to the video recording,
Officer Anderson stated that there was space for the SUV to
travel in the right-hand lane. (Id. at 34.) However,
Officer Anderson also confirmed that prior to initiating his
emergency lights for the stop, the SUV was overtaking the
sedan and semi-truck. (Id.)
In the
first thirty seconds of the video, one vehicle is seen
passing the SUV in the left-hand lane. (Ex. 26; RT 28.)
Officer Anderson acknowledged that two vehicles passed the
SUV on the left between milepost 228 and 230, and that the
left-hand lane was clear for passing. (RT at 28.) However,
the officer opined that the traffic seen driving by shortly
after the stop revealed that traffic was backed-up by the
SUV. (Id. at 18, 29.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
argues that Officer Anderson did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle based on a traffic violation;
therefore, all evidence flowing from the illegal stop should
be suppressed based on the exclusionary rule.
The
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures extends to the brief investigatory stop of a
vehicle. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Therefore, an officer must have a
“reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity may
be afoot to stop a motorist. United States v.
Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002). A stop
is valid if the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe
the driver violated a traffic law, regardless of the
officer's intent in stopping the vehicle. See Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that a
pretextual stop is valid if supported by probable cause);
United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104
(9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that an investigatory traffic
stop requires only reasonable suspicion).
When
the Court makes reasonable-suspicion determinations, it must
look at the “totality of the circumstances” of
each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
“particularized and objective basis” for his or
her suspicions about criminal activity. United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). An investigatory stop
must be based on facts, not the “mere subjective
impressions of a particular officer, ” United
States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th
Cir. 1989), and the inferences drawn by the officer must be
objective and reasonable, United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
Officer
Anderson's stop of Defendant's SUV was based on a
violation of ...