United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Matthew Oskowis (“Plaintiff”) appeals the denial
of a due process complaint he brought under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA” or
“the Act”). Plaintiff argues that Administrative
Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer (“ALJ”) erred when
she concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that his
son E.O. was denied a free, appropriate, and public education
(“FAPE”) as a result of procedural violations in
the creation of E.O.'s 2014-15 individualized education
program. Plaintiff filed an opening brief on January 25, 2016
(Doc. 22), in which he asserts that “the ALJ's
Decision is erroneous, unsupported by the facts, and
unsupported by the applicable federal statutes, Code of
Federal Regulations, and applicable case
law.”[1] Defendant Sedona Oak-Creek Unified School
District #9 (“Defendant” or
“District”) filed a response (Doc. 24) and
Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 26). Plaintiff subsequently
sought to amend his reply brief (Doc. 27). The Court granted
that motion (Doc. 28) and has considered Plaintiff's
amended reply brief (Doc. 29) in rendering this ruling. The
Court now affirms the ALJ's decision and dismisses
Plaintiff's appeal.
I.
Statutory Framework
IDEA
provides federal funds to help state and local agencies
educate children with disabilities; the Act in turn
conditions this funding on compliance with specific goals and
procedures-primarily the agencies' obligation to provide
each disabled child with a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412;
Board of Educ. of Hendrik Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1982) (describing the
purpose and primary provisions of IDEA). Among the procedures
mandated by IDEA is the development of a written
individualized education program (“IEP”) for each
child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). A
student's IEP is to be “developed, reviewed, and
revised” by an “IEP Team” that includes the
child's teachers and parents, a representative of the
local educational agency, and, “whenever appropriate,
” the child. 20 U.S.C § 1414(d)(1).
Violations
of IDEA may arise in two types of situations. First, a school
district can run afoul of the Act's procedural
requirements in the creation and implementation of the IEP.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. Second, a school
district can be liable for a substantive violation by
drafting an IEP that is not reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits. Id.
The Act
provides parents with the opportunity to make complaints when
they believe a violation of the Act has occurred. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6)-(8). After making a complaint, a parent is
entitled to “an impartial due process hearing, which
shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the
local educational agency, as determined by State law or by
the State educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(1)(A). If either party is dissatisfied with the state
educational agency's review, they may bring a civil
action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(A).
II.
Procedural Background
Under
the provisions of the Act, on October 30, 2014, Plaintiff
filed a Due Process Complaint against the District that
alleged (1) the District denied E.O.'s parents an
opportunity to meaningfully participate in the creation of
E.O.'s 2014-15 IEP; and (2) that E.O.'s parents were
denied their ability to exercise certain “procedural
safeguards” because the District failed to include a
copy of the IEP with the issuance of its August 15, 2014
Prior Written Notice (“PWN”). By way of relief,
Plaintiff demanded “another annual IEP created that
would be an actual ‘new' creation that is worked
out in its entirety and not in piecemeal fashion, ” and
specifically to have “an independent third-party
trained facilitator” assist with the process, which he
wanted to occur over “at least three two-hour
meetings.”
On
January 30, 2015, a hearing on Plaintiff's Complaint was
held before the ALJ. Plaintiff appeared on his own behalf and
was accompanied by Parent T.M. (collectively,
“Parents”). The ALJ heard and considered the
testimony of Scott Keller, Special Education Director
(“Director”), Joe Donaldson, Special Education
Consultant (“Consultant”), and Rebecca Belanger,
E.O.'s Special Education Teacher (“SET”).
Parents did not testify. The ALJ also considered the
parties' closing arguments and respective supplemental
briefings in rendering her decision.
On
March 27, 2015, in a 12-page Order, the ALJ denied the relief
requested in Plaintiff's Complaint, finding that Parents
had ample opportunity to meaningfully participate during the
meetings regarding E.O.'s 2014-15 IEP (hereafter
“ALJ Decision”). The ALJ found that Parents were
physically present at these meetings and participated through
discussion and questions raised. (Id.) She also
found that the District's failure to include a copy of
the August 14, 2014 IEP with its August 15, 2014 PWN did not
render the final 2014-15 IEP invalid or incomprehensible.
(Id.) She further found that Plaintiff's
proposed relief-“that a new annual IEP be created under
the direction of an independent third-party trained
facilitator during at least three two-hour
meetings”-had “no relation to the alleged
violation in that Petitioners have not raised any substantive
issues with the final 2014 - 2015 IEP.” (Id.)
The ALJ accordingly denied the requested relief.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
filed this appeal on April 27, 2015. (Doc. 1). Therein,
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in finding that Parents
meaningfully participated in the creation of the 2014-15 IEP;
and the implementation of E.O.'s 2014-15 IEP in piecemeal
fashion was reasonable under the circumstances. For relief,
Plaintiff requests the same “relief requested in the
aforementioned Due Process Complaint, ” costs, expenses
and attorneys' fees, and other relief as this Court deems
just and proper. (Doc. 1 at 12).
For the
following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff's
appeal is without merit and affirms the decision of the ALJ.
III.
Standard of Review
Once in
federal court, the moving party bears the burden of proving
that the ALJ's decision was not met by a preponderance of
the evidence. L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,
556 F.3d 900, 908-10 (9th Cir. 2008). In assessing an appeal,
the Act mandates that a court “(i) shall receive the
records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear
additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii)
basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,
shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C); see
also R.B. v. Napa Valley Unif. Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932,
937 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). So that courts do not
“substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review,
” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, the administrative
proceeding below is to be afforded “due weight.”
Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817
(9th Cir. 2007) (noting “complete de novo review of the
administrative proceeding is inappropriate”).
Nonetheless, courts assessing IDEA appeals are to give
“less deference than is conventional” in review
of other agency actions. Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
“judicial review in IDEA cases [are to] differ[ ]
substantially from judicial review of other agency actions,
in which courts generally are confined to the administrative
record and are held to a highly deferential standard of
review”). “How much deference to give state
educational agencies, however, is a matter for the discretion
of the courts.” Gregory K. v. Longview Sch.
Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987). Where the
ALJ's findings are “thorough and careful, ”
the amount of deference to the ALJ increases. Capistrano
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Cty. of San Diego v. California
Special Educ. Hrg. Off., 93 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir.
1996) (noting that an ALJ decision should be given
“substantial weight” when “when it evinces
[] careful, impartial consideration of all the evidence and
demonstrates [] sensitivity to the complexity of the issues
presented”) (internal citation and quotations
omitted)).
Here,
the ALJ issued her decision in a 12-page, detailed opinion
that reflects that careful thought was given to the issues
raised by Plaintiff. To the extent there were alleged
discrepancies in testimony and evidence, the ALJ addressed
them in her Decision. (See e.g., Decision at 7
¶ 21). The ALJ states that she considered all of the
exhibits that were offered by the parties and admitted into
evidence, as well as the testimony given by the three
witnesses that appeared. (Id. at 3, n. 5). Her
Decision supports this statement. At times, the ALJ asked her
own questions of the testifying witnesses to clarify the
record and facts. (See e.g., Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings, dated Jan. 30, 2015
(“Tran.”) at 49:16-18; 49:22-25; 50:2-4;
57:11-12). As discussed infra, the ALJ also applied
the correct legal standards in determining whether the
District's implementation of E.O.'s IEP amounted to a
deprivation of E.O.'s right to a FAPE. Finally, after
this Court's review of the administrative record, it
appears that the ALJ accurately and impartially described the
background of events and facts related to the creation of the
2014-15 IEP in a manner that is supported by a preponderance
of the evidence.
In
light of this careful decision making, this Court will afford
the ALJ's decision substantial weight.
IV.
...