Appeal
from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2010-050488
The Honorable Aimee L. Anderson, Judge (Retired)
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, PLC, Phoenix By John J.
Egbert Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, PLC, Peoria By Garrett J.
Olexa Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
May
Potenza Baran & Gillespie PC, Phoenix By Andrew A.
Harnisch Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Judge
Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Maria Elena Cruz
joined.
OPINION
HOWE,
JUDGE
¶1
Under A.R.S. § 12-1551(A) and (B), a party has ten years
from the date a judgment is entered to enforce it unless the
party renews it within that period, which extends the
enforcement period another ten years. The issue in this case
is whether a contractual agreement barring a party from
executing on the judgment tolls the enforcement period. We
hold that it does.
FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2Lynn
Harle and Mark S. Williams were partners in a real estate
venture. Harle sued Williams and others in 2010 alleging
breach of their partnership agreement. Harle and Williams
reached a settlement in May 2011 in which Williams agreed to
pay $50, 000 in $500 monthly installments and waived his
interest in certain real estate (the "Settlement
Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement also called for
entry of a $150, 000 stipulated judgment against Williams and
included a covenant not to record or execute on the judgment
as long as Williams timely made the monthly installment
payments. If William ever failed to do so,
then without notice or action of any kind, this Covenant Not
to Execute shall become null and void and Plaintiff shall be
entitled to record and enforce the Stipulated Judgment,
according to its terms, and Plaintiff shall be entitled to
use any and all legal remedies available to it for the
enforcement of the Stipulated Judgment.
The
court entered the stipulated judgment on May 23, 2011.
¶3
Williams timely paid under the Settlement Agreement until
November 2014. Harle did not begin formal collection actions
on the unpaid amounts until March 23, 2016, when he recorded
the judgment and sought two writs of garnishment. He then
conducted a judgment debtor's examination of Williams in
June 2017.
¶4
Shortly after the debtor's examination, Williams
contended for the first time that the judgment had expired
under A.R.S. § 12-1551(B) because Harle did not timely
renew it under A.R.S. § 12-1612. After briefing, the
trial court determined that the judgment "remain[ed]
enforceable because the period of enforceability was tolled
while Plaintiff was legally barred from enforcing the
judgment." It further determined that the judgment would
remain "in full force and ...