United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Mario Salazar filed suit against Defendants Arturo Flores and
Lily Transportation for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
collision (Doc. 1). Defendants now move for partial summary
judgment on Plaintiff's claims for negligent entrustment
and negligent hiring, supervision, and training (collectively
“negligent entrustment” or the “negligent
entrustment claims”) (Docs. 44, 48, 49). The Court
rules as follows.
I.
Background
In May
2014, Plaintiff was sleeping in his truck, parked in a lot
next to a service station in Wikieup, Arizona (Doc. 45 at
¶ 1; Doc. 47 at ¶ 1). Defendant Flores, who was
operating a commercial vehicle leased to Defendant Lily
Transportation, entered that same parking area and collided
with Plaintiff's right rear bumper (Doc. 45 at
¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 2-3). Plaintiff
filed a four-count complaint alleging: (1) negligence; (2)
vicarious liability; (3) negligent entrustment; and (4)
negligent hiring, supervision, and training.
Defendants
argue that because Lily Transportation has admitted that
Flores was operating his vehicle within in the course and
scope of his employment, Plaintiff's direct negligence
claims against Lily Transportation (the negligent entrustment
claims) are subsumed by Plaintiff's vicarious liability
claim (Doc. 44 at 2-6). Defendants further argue there is no
dispute of material fact as to negligent entrustment, as
Plaintiff has failed to disclose any witnesses or evidence to
support its claims (Doc. 44 at 6-7).
II.
Legal Standard
A court
shall grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting
documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, “show[] that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). Material facts are those facts “that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact
arises when “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.
The
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. If the movant meets
its burden, “its opponent must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, “the
nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Id. at 587 (citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
A.
Direct Negligence Claims
Defendants
argue that because Lily Transportation has admitted that
Flores was operating his vehicle within in the course and
scope of his employment, under Arizona law, Plaintiff's
negligent entrustment claims are subsumed within the claim
for vicarious liability. Defendants' argument is based on
the Arizona Supreme Court case of Lewis v. Southern
Pacific Company, which found that Arizona does not
recognize claims of negligent entrustment separate and apart
from vicarious liability:
If the defendant employees were actually negligent at the
time of the accident and proximately caused the accident,
this is sufficient to establish the [employer's]
liability. But the failure of an employer to hire only
competent and experienced employees does not of itself
constitute an independent ground of actionable negligence.
425 P.2d 840, 841 (Ariz. 1967). Since Lewis,
however, subsequent cases decided by the Arizona Court of
Appeals have found Lewis' holding “no
longer represents the law in Arizona on this subject.”
Quinonez in re Quinonez v. Andersen, 144 Ariz. 193,
197 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984); cf. Pruitt v. Pavelin, 685
P.2d 1347 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984) (reading Lewis
narrowly); see also Brill v. Lawrence Transp. Co.,
No. CV-17-01766-PHX-JJT, 2018 WL 6696815, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 20, 2018) (“[T]he Court finds that Lewis
is not controlling in this matter and Arizona law allows
Plaintiff to allege direct liability claims in addition to
claims of vicarious liability.”); Ford v.
Barnas, No. CV-17-02688, 2018 WL 5312912, at *7 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 26, 2018) (finding Quinonez, and not
Lewis, to be controlling); Russell v.
Flores, No. CV-14-02474-TUC-RM (EJM), 2017 WL 564969, at
*6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2017) (“While Lewis has
not been explicitly overruled, as Plaintiff correctly notes,
‘no published decision has cited to Lewis
since Quinonez.'”). The Court agrees.
First,
the Court finds Lewis to be distinguishable as the
employees in that case were not found negligent, and as a
result, any direct negligence by the employer in hiring those
employees could not be a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. 425 P.2d at 841. The Court is also
not persuaded by Defendants' limited reading of
Quinonez as only allowing both claims to proceed
when there is a viable punitive damages claim. ...