United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
ROSEMARY MARQUEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson's Emergency
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 5.) Defendants filed
a Response. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff filed an untimely Reply and
a Motion to Supplement Reply. (Docs. 18, 22.) For the
following reasons, Plaintiff's request for preliminary
injunctive relief will be denied.
I.
Background
Plaintiff
filed this action on November 2, 2018. (Doc. 1.) She alleges
two claims arising from the discontinuation of her
medications. (Id. at 3-4.) She alleges that her
medication is being denied in retaliation for one or more of
her many lawsuits against prison staff.[1] (Id. at
3, 7-8.) She also alleges that the denial of her medications
has caused and will cause myriad symptoms, including suicidal
feelings, anxiety, and pain. (Id. at 3.)
On
December 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 5.) She seeks injunctive relief
requiring prison medical staff to restore her medications
(specifically, her Gabapentin, Clonazepam, and hormone
therapy medications), arguing that the denial of such relief
will cause “unnecessary pain and suffering and
potential loss of life.” (Id. at 1.) On
January 14, 2019, the Court ordered that Defendants United
States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the United States
Public Health Service file a response to Plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief. (Doc. 7.) Defendants filed
their Response on February 15, 2019. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff
filed her Reply on March 1, 2019, and her Motion to
Supplement Reply on March 8, 2019. (Docs. 18, 22.)
II.
Standard of Review
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation
omitted). There are four requirements for a preliminary
injunction: (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of
equities tips in the plaintiff's favor; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. The
relief sought by Plaintiff requires affirmative conduct by
Defendants. “Such ‘mandatory preliminary
relief' is subject to heightened scrutiny and should not
be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving
party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399,
1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Anderson v. United
States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1980)).
The
Ninth Circuit follows a “sliding scale” approach
to preliminary injunctions. All. for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Under
this approach, a weaker showing as to the likelihood of
success on the merits may be offset by a stronger showing
with respect to the balance of the equities. Id. at
1131-32. If the moving party is unable to establish a
likelihood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction
may still be granted if (1) there are serious questions going
to the merits, i.e., substantial, difficult, and doubtful
questions on which the plaintiff has a fair chance of
success; (2) the balance of hardships tips
“sharply” in the plaintiff's favor; and (3)
the other Winter requirements, i.e., irreparable
harm and in the public interest, are met. Id. at
1135.
The
Prison Reform Litigation Act creates additional requirements
for injunctive relief against prison officials. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3636(a)(2). “Preliminary injunctive relief must
be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to
correct the harm . . . and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm. Id.
III.
Discussion
Plaintiff
has failed to establish serious questions or a likelihood of
success on the merits. Plaintiff alleges that she is being
denied her medications in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical
treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. To
state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show (1)
a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that
failure to treat the condition could result in further
significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain and (2) the defendant's response was deliberately
indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096
(9th Cir. 2006).
“Deliberate
indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v.
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with
deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of
and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence
or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner's safety.
Id. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross
negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.”
Clement v. California Dep't of Corr., 220
F.Supp.2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton
v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere
claims of “indifference, ” “negligence,
” or “medical malpractice” do not support a
claim under § 1983). The indifference must be
substantial. The action must rise to a level of
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
Plaintiff
has failed to establish that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to her medical needs. With respect to Gabapentin
and Clonazepam, Defendants submit evidence directly refuting
Plaintiff's allegation that her medications were taken
away without medical justification.[2] On two consecutive days,
Plaintiff was caught diverting her Clonazepam and Gabapentin
instead of taking them as prescribed. (Doc. 15 at 70-71
(September 13, 2018 note stating that Plaintiff had been
caught diverting medication by placing the crushed pills in
her left cheek), 77 (September 14, 2018 note stating that
Plaintiff had been caught diverting medication by placing the
crushed pills ...