United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
James
A. Teilborg Senior United States District Judge
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Ienco's
(“Plaintiff”) appeal from the Social Security
Commissioner's (the “Commissioner”) denial of
his application for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.,
1381 et seq. (Doc. 1 at 1). This matter has been
fully briefed by the parties.[1] The Court now rules on
Plaintiff's appeal.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
parties are familiar with the background information in this
case, and it is summarized in the Administrative Law
Judge's (“ALJ”) decision. (See Doc.
9-9 at 38-56). Accordingly, the Court will reference the
background only as necessary to the analysis below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits may be
overturned “only when the ALJ's findings are based
on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Benton ex rel. Benton v.
Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003).
“‘Substantial evidence' means more than a
mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir.
1990)).
“The
inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields
such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v.
Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible of more than
one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion
which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ
is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the
evidence.” Id. (citations omitted); see
Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,
1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is because “[t]he trier of
fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in
the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome,
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019
(9th Cir. 1992); see Benton, 331 F.3d at 1035
(“If the evidence can support either outcome, the
Commissioner's decision must be upheld.”).
The ALJ
is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony,
determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court must
affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501
(9th Cir. 1989). On the other hand, the Court “may not
affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore,
the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and
making its own judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not
disabled. Rather, it is a “fundamental rule of
administrative law” that a reviewing court, in dealing
with a judgement which an administrative agency alone is
authorized to make, may only make its decision based upon
evidence discussed by the agency. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
Thus, the Court's inquiry is constrained to the reasons
asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support
of those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d
871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Similarly, when challenging an
ALJ's decision, “issues which are not specifically
and distinctly argued and raised in a party's opening
brief are waived.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley
Trans. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1110 n. 1
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see also Bray v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 n. 7
(9th Cir. 2009) (applying the principle to Social Security
appeals). Accordingly, the Court “will not manufacture
arguments for an appellant.” Arpin, 261 F.3d
at 919 (citation omitted).
A.
Definition of a Disability
A
claimant can qualify for Social Security disability benefits
only if he can show that, among other things, he is disabled.
42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The Social Security Act
defines “disability” as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person
is disabled only if his “physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
B.
The Five-Step Evaluation Process
The
Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential
process for evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d
715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). A finding of “not
disabled” at any step in the sequential process will
end the inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The
claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps,
but the burden shifts to the ALJ at the final step.
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The five steps are as
follows:
First,
the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled.
Id.
At the
second step, the ALJ next considers whether the claimant has
a “severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If
the claimant does not have a severe impairment, then the
claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c). A
“severe impairment” is one that
“significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.”
Id. Basic work activities are the “abilities
and aptitudes to do most jobs, ” such as lifting,
carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and
remembering simple instructions, responding appropriately to
co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine.”
Id. § 404.1521(b). Additionally, unless the
claimant's impairment is expected to result in death,
“it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a
continuous period of at least 12 months” for the
claimant to be found disabled. Id. § 404.1509.
Third,
having found a severe impairment, the ALJ then considers the
severity of the claimant's impairment. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). This requires the ALJ to
determine if the claimant's impairment “meets or
equals” one of the impairments listed in the
regulations. Id. If so, then the ALJ will find that
the claimant is disabled. Id. If the claimant's
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then
the ALJ will assess the claimant's “residual
functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and
other evidence in [the claimant's] case record.”
Id. § 404.1520(e). In assessing the
claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), the ALJ will consider the claimant's
“impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain,
[that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect
what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.”
Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant's RFC is
the most the claimant can still do despite the effects of all
the claimant's medically determinable impairments,
including those that are not severe. Id. §
404.1545(a)(1-2).
At step
four, the ALJ determines whether, despite his impairments,
the claimant can still perform “past relevant
work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To do
this, the ALJ compares the claimant's residual function
capacity with the physical and mental demands of the
claimant's past relevant work. Id. §
404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform his past
relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not
disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Otherwise,
the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At the
fifth and final step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant
“can make an adjustment to other work” that
exists in the national economy. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ
considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Id. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the ALJ
finds that the claimant can make an adjustment to other work,
then the claimant is not disabled. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). However, if the ALJ finds that the
claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the
claimant is disabled. Id.
In
evaluating the claimant's disability under this five-step
process, the ALJ must consider all evidence in the case
record. Id. § 404.1520(a)(3). This includes
medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and
third-party reporting. See Id. §§
404.1527, 404.1529.
C.
The ALJ's Evaluation under the Five Step
Process
Prior
to beginning the sequential evaluation process, ALJ Waters
noted that Plaintiff's case was before her on remand from
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Tr. 397).[2] Previously, on
October 27, 2011, ALJ Tucevich had denied Plaintiff's
application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits alleging disability beginning December 30,
2008. (Tr. 28, 397).[3] After the Appeals Council denied review on
September 28, 2012, Plaintiff requested review by the
District Court, which affirmed the Commissioner's
decision. (Tr. 397). Upon Plaintiff's appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the District Court's
decision, ordering the ALJ to reconsider Plaintiff's
eligibility for disability benefits. (Id.); see
Ienco v. Colvin, 627 Fed.Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2015).
Particularly, the Ninth Circuit directed the ALJ to make
findings on remand as to Plaintiff's ability to work in
excess of 25 hours per week. (Id.).
While
the claims above were pending, Plaintiff filed subsequent
applications for Title II and Title XVI benefits on November
27, 2012. (Tr. 397, 521). These subsequent claims were denied
initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 397). Thereafter,
Plaintiff filed a request for hearing, which was held on
December 4, 2015. (Id.). Prior to a decision being
issued, however, the Appeals Council remanded the earlier
claim and directed ALJ Waters to consolidate Plaintiff's
subsequent claims filed on November 27, 2012 with the
remanded claims. (Id.). After Plaintiff appeared and
testified at a hearing on March 7, 2017, ALJ Waters issued an
unfavorable decision on June 6, 2017. (Tr. 397, 415).
At step
one of the sequential evaluation process, ALJ Waters found
that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since December 30, 2008, the alleged onset date.
(Tr. 400). In step two, the ALJ ascertained that Plaintiff
had one severe impairment- schizoaffective disorder.
(Id.). At this step, the ALJ also found that
Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of diabetes,
hyperlipidemia, a learning disability in reading, essential
tremor, and hypothyroidism. (Id.). Under the third
step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of the impairments listed in
the Social Security Regulations. (Tr. 401). Before moving on
to step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC determination after
consideration of the entire record. (Tr. 402). The ALJ found
that Plaintiff had “the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels[.]” (Id.). However, the ALJ noted the
following non-exertional limitations: “The claimant can
perform simple routine and repetitive work tasks involving
simple work related decisions and simple instructions with
few changes in the work setting.” (Id.). The
ALJ also determined that the “record does not support a
finding of an inability to perform all work-related activity
on a full time basis.” (Tr. 409).
At step
four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform past
relevant work as a sandwich maker and industrial cleaner
because this work did “not require the performance of
work-related activities precluded by” Plaintiff's
RFC. (Tr. 413). Although the ALJ ascertained that Plaintiff
was capable of performing past relevant work, the ALJ noted
that there were also other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
including kitchen helper and laboratory equipment cleaner.
(Tr. 414). Consequently, the ALJ did not proceed to the fifth
and final step but, rather, concluded that Plaintiff had not
been under a disability from December 30, 2008 through June
6, 2017, the date of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 415);
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (stating
that if the claimant can still do his past relevant work, the
ALJ will find that he is not disabled).
III.
ANALYIS
Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ's denial of his application for
Social Security Benefits and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) was not supported by substantial evidence and asks that
the ALJ's decision be reversed for an award of benefits.
(Doc. 10 at 12, 24-25). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that:
(1) the ALJ erred by failing to discuss whether
Plaintiff's mental impairments satisfy the paragraph
“C” criteria for Listing 12.03; (2) the ALJ
improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; (3) the
ALJ improperly evaluated statements from other sources; and
(4) the ALJ failed to properly consider all the record
evidence. (See Doc. 10). However, for the reasons
set forth below, the final decision of the Commissioner is
affirmed.
A.
Whether the ALJ Erred in Determining that Plaintiff's
Mental Impairment Did Not Satisfy the Paragraph
“C” Criteria for Listing 12.03
Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss and make
findings as to the Paragraph “C” criteria for
Listing 12.03 at step three of the sequential evaluation
process. (Id. at 21). In this step, the ALJ
considers whether a claimant's impairments meet or equal
the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The impairments included in the Listings
are considered “severe enough to prevent an individual
from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his
or her age, education, or work experience.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1525(a), 416.925(a) (emphasis added).
“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a
listing, it must meet all of the specified medical
criteria.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
530 (1990). Likewise, to show that an unlisted impairment is
“equivalent” to a listed impairment, the claimant
“must present medical findings equal in severity to
all the criteria for the one most similar listed
impairment.” Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
When analyzing a claimant's mental impairments, including
psychotic disorders, “[t]he required level of severity
for these disorders is met when the requirements in both A
and B are satisfied, or when the requirements in C are
satisfied.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §
12.03.
Here,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's mental impairments
did not meet Listings 12.03 (Schizophrenic, Paranoid, and
Other Psychotic Disorders, 12.04 (Depressive Disorders), or
12.06 (Anxiety Related Disorders) because Plaintiff did not
meet the requisite “B” or “C”
criteria. (Tr. 401-02). The ALJ first determined that
Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for each of the listings
under Paragraph B. (Tr. 401-02).[4] Then, the ALJ turned to
Paragraph C. (Tr. 402). Paragraph C of Listing 12.03
requires:
Medically documented history of a chronic schizophrenic,
paranoid, or other psychotic disorder of at least 2
years' duration that has caused more than a minimal
limitation of ability to do basic work activities with
symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medication or
psychosocial support, and one of the following:
(1) Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration; or
(2) A residual disease process that has resulted in such
marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental
demands or change in the environment would be predicted to
cause the individual to decompensate; or
(3) Current history of 1 or more years' inability to
function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with
an indication of ...