United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Dominic W. Lanza United Slates District Judge.
Plaintiffs
Eva Pepaj, Paola Canas, CJ Gibson, Danielle Ruiz, Claudia
Sampedro, and Alana Campos (“Plaintiffs”) filed a
complaint initiating this action on March 1, 2019, and the
case was reassigned to the undersigned judge by random draw
on March 18, 2019. Having reviewed the Complaint (Doc. 1),
the Court has determined that Plaintiffs failed to adequately
plead subject-matter jurisdiction.
The
Court has an independent obligation to determine on its own
initiative whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583
(1999). Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.”
Plaintiffs
allege that “[j]urisdiction is appropriate in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that all Plaintiffs to this
action are citizens of a foreign state, Defendant is a
citizen of Arizona, and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75, 000.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 11.) Diversity
jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the plaintiffs and the defendants and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of
interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A controversy
meets this requirement when “all the persons on one
side of it are citizens of different states from all the
persons on the other side.” Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
“[A]
party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able
to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the
relevant parties.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert
Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). “In order
to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the
diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of
the United States and be domiciled within the
State.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989). Alleging that a person is a
“resident” of a state is not adequate for
purposes of alleging state citizenship, because a natural
person's state citizenship is “determined by her
state of domicile, not her state of residence. A person's
domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the
intention to remain or to which she intends to return.”
Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857.
“[T]he
party asserting diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of
proof.” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th
Cir. 1986). Failure to specify each party's state
citizenship is fatal to an assertion of diversity
jurisdiction. Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857.
Plaintiffs
failed to allege the citizenship of each Plaintiff in their
complaint. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiff CJ Gibson is a
“resident” of California (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14),
but they fail to allege that she is domiciled in California.
See Kanter, 265 F.3d at 857. Plaintiffs did not
attempt to affirmatively allege the citizenship of Plaintiffs
Eva Pepaj, Paola Canas, [1] Danielle Ruiz, Claudia Sampedro, and
Alana Campos. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 13,
15-17.)
Defective
allegations regarding citizenship may be amended.
Id. The Court will allow Plaintiffs to amend their
complaint.[2]
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that by April 2,
2019, Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint,
properly alleging diversity jurisdiction.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiffs fail to timely
file an amended complaint, the Clerk of the Court shall
dismiss this case, without prejudice, for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction on April 3,
2019.
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Notes:
[1] Indeed, Plaintiff Paola Canas was not
mentioned at all in the “PARTIES” section of the
Complaint.
[2] This amendment will not affect
Plaintiffs' ability to later file an amended complaint as
a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ramirez v. Cty. of San
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