United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable John J. Tuchi, United States District Judge.
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Kathy Brown's
Application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 8, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's
Opposition (Doc. 9, “Def.'s Br.”), and
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 10, “Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc.
7, R.) and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge's
decision (R. at 18-38) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R.
at 2-7).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits on April 3, 2014 for a period of disability
beginning May 17, 2013. (R. at 21.) Plaintiff's claim was
denied initially on September 30, 2014 (R. at 21), and on
reconsideration on January 30, 2015 (R. at 21). Plaintiff
then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on August 9, 2016. (R. at 18-38.)
On November 22, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's
Application. (R. at 32.) On August 25, 2017, the Appeals
Council denied a request for review of the ALJ's
decision. (R. at 2-7.) On September 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed
this action seeking judicial review of the denial.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: cervical radiculopathy and spondylosis; status
post C4-7 fusion; lumbar degenerative disc disease and
radiculopathy; and carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. at 23.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404.” (R. at 25.) The ALJ then found that
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined
in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except [Plaintiff] can occasionally
lift and carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and carry 10
pounds, sit for 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, and stand/walk
for 6 hours of an 8hour workday.” (R. at 25.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises three arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by giving little weight to the opinion of
Plaintiff's treating physician; (2) the ALJ erred by
partially discrediting Plaintiff's symptom testimony; and
(3) the Court should remand for computation of benefits.
(Pl.'s Br. at 1.)
A.
The ALJ Did Not Err by Partially Discrediting the Opinions of
Plaintiff's Treating Physician
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be
given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion
of doctors who did not treat the claimant.”
Id.
Given
this hierarchy, if the treating physician's evidence is
controverted by a nontreating or nonexamining physician, the
ALJ may disregard it only after “setting forth
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on
substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). “The
ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and
thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical
evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making
findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1989). ...