United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable John J. Tuchi United States District Judge
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Jason Parrish's
Applications for Supplemental Security Income Benefits and
Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint
(Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that
denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening
Brief (Doc. 13, “Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant
Social Security Administration Commissioner's Opposition
(Doc. 14, “Def.'s Br.”), and Plaintiff's
Reply (Doc. 15, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed
the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 12, R.) and now
reverses the Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at
17-35) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-6).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed applications for Supplemental Security Income Benefits
and Disability Insurance Benefits on April 4, 2014 for a
period of disability beginning May 15, 2012. (R. at 21.)
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on August 6, 2014
(R. at 21), and on reconsideration on December 18, 2014 (R.
at 21). Plaintiff then testified at a video hearing held
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May
23, 2016. (R. at 17-35.) On July 29, 2016, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's Application. (R. at 35.) On September 20,
2017, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the
ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-6.) On November 20, 2017,
Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the
denial.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
emphysema; hearing loss; degenerative disease of the cervical
spine; and an anxiety disorder. (R. at 24.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404.” (R. at 24.) The ALJ then found that
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined
in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with certain
exceptions.” (R. at 26.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises three arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by failing to take into account Plaintiff's
manipulative limitations; (2) the ALJ erred by failing to
consider Plaintiff's connective tissue disorder; and (3)
the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff's symptom
testimony. (Pl.'s Br. at 2.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Discrediting Nurse Practitioner Hanks's
Opinion
Plaintiff
raises the argument that the ALJ erred by refusing to
consider Plaintiff's connective tissue disorder.
(Pl.'s Br. at 9.) The ALJ's finding on
Plaintiff's disorder was based on discrediting the
opinion of Nurse Practitioner Deborah Hanks. (R. at 31-32.)
Hanks opined that Plaintiff has Lupus, which “causes
chronic pain in joints.” (R. at 504.) This finding was
supported by laboratory testing “indicating a positive
ANA result and high Sjogren's Anti-SSA-B, ” yet the
ALJ found that “these results on their own are not
sufficient to establish a conclusive diagnosis, particularly
a diagnosis by [a] non-medically acceptable primary care
provider.” (R. at 32.) Because the ALJ's rejection
of Hanks's medical opinion was her justification for
refusing to consider Plaintiff's connective tissue
disorder or its effects on his manipulative abilities, the
Court construes Plaintiff's argument as an assertion that
the ALJ erred in discrediting Hanks's opinion.
The ALJ
discredited Hanks's opinion in part because she is a
nurse practitioner, and thus not an “acceptable medical
source” per a section of the Federal Code of
Regulations in effect at the time Plaintiff filed ...