United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Andrew Maves applied for supplemental security income,
alleging disability beginning July 31, 2012. (A.R. 19.) The
claim was denied initially on August 26, 2014, and upon
reconsideration on December 3, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff
then requested a hearing. (Id.) On June 23, 2016,
Plaintiff testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 38-57.) At the conclusion of
the hearing, the ALJ ordered a psychological consultative
examination. (Id. at 55.) A second hearing was held
on December 6, 2016, at which Plaintiff and a vocational
expert (VE) testified. (Id. at 58-90.)
On
January 12, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision finding
Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act (“Act”), which became the
Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council
denied review. (Id. at 1-3.) On February 26, 2018,
Plaintiff sought review by this Court. (Doc. 1.) After
receipt of the administrative record (Doc. 11), the parties
fully briefed the issues for review (Docs. 15-16). For
reasons stated below, the Court reverses the
Commissioner's decision and remands for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled
and the inquiry ends. At step two, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant has a “severe” medically
determinable physical or mental impairment. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. At step three, the ALJ considers whether
the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments
meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1
to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically
found to be disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and determines whether the claimant
is still capable of performing past relevant work. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and
final step, where she determines whether the claimant can
perform any other work based on the claimant's RFC, age,
education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If
so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is
disabled.
At step
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his application. (A.R.
21.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: depression and anxiety.
(Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404. (Id. at 22.) At step four, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff:
has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: he has no limitation in his ability to
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, but
a mild limitation in his ability to make judgments on simple
work-related decisions. Mild is defined as a slight
limitation, but he is still able to function well. [He] is
limited to unskilled work that can be learned on the job in
30 days or less . . . [h]e has a moderate limitation in his
ability to interact appropriately with the public and
coworkers. Moderate is defined as more than a slight
limitation, but still able to function satisfactorily.
Finally, he has a mild limitation in his ability to respond
appropriately [to] usual work situations and changes in
routine work setting.
(Id. at 23-24.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff
has no past relevant work. (Id. at 29.) At step
five, however, after considering Plaintiff's age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled.
(Id. at 30.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
It is
not the district court's role to review the ALJ's
decision de novo or otherwise determine whether the claimant
is disabled. Rather, the court is limited to reviewing the
ALJ's decision to determine whether it “contains
legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance, and “such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be
upheld.” Id. The court, however, “must
consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm
simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting
evidence.'” Id. Nor may the court
“affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not
rely.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
challenges whether the ALJ's RFC determination is
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ improperly weighed medical opinions,
rejected his symptom testimony, and rejected the lay
testimony of Plaintiff's grandfather.
I.
Medical Opinions
Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Drs.
Warden and Teed. In weighing medical source opinions, the ALJ
should distinguish between three different types of
physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat the
claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not
treat the claimant; and, (3) nonexamining physicians who
neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v.
Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ
generally should give more weight to the opinion of a
treating physician than to the opinion of an examining
physician, and more weight to the opinion of an examining
physician than to the opinion of a non-examining physician.
Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; Sprague v. Bowen, 812
F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
Where a
treating physician's opinion is not contradicted by
another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear
and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted,
it still may not be rejected without “specific and
legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Likewise,
when an examining physician's opinion is not contradicted
by another physician, it may only be rejected for
“clear and convincing” reasons, and when an
examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another
physician, the ALJ is required to provide only
“specific and legitimate reasons” to reject the
opinion. Id. at 830-31. “An ALJ can satisfy
the substantial evidence requirement by setting out a
detailed and thorough ...