United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Christopher Burbey-Miller applied for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security
income, alleging disability beginning June 14, 2013. (A.R.
19.) The claim was denied initially on August 18, 2014, and
upon reconsideration on February 26, 2015. (Id.)
Plaintiff then requested a hearing. (Id.) On October
20, 2016, Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified at
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
(Id. at 33-62.)
On
January 11, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision finding
Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act (“Act”), which became the
Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council
denied review. (Id. at 4-6.) On November 7, 2017,
Plaintiff sought review by this Court. (Doc. 1.) After
receipt of the administrative record (Doc. 11), the parties
fully briefed the issues for review (Docs. 15, 17). For
reasons stated below, the Court reverses the
Commissioner's decision and remands for benefits.
BACKGROUND
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled
and the inquiry ends. At step two, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant has a “severe” medically
determinable physical or mental impairment. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. At step three, the ALJ considers whether
the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments
meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1
to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically
found to be disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and determines whether the claimant
is still capable of performing past relevant work. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and
final step, where she determines whether the claimant can
perform any other work based on the claimant's RFC, age,
education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If
so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is
disabled.
At step
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the status
requirement of the Act through December 31, 2018, and has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 14, 2013,
the alleged onset date. (A.R. 21.) At step two, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: obesity,
obstructive sleep apnea, degenerative disc disease
status-post hiatal hernia, status-post inguinal hernia,
gastroesophageal reflux disease, mood disorder, testosterone
deficiency, anxiety and depression. (Id.) At step
three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1
to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. (Id. at 22.) At
step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff:
has the [RFC] to perform light work . . . except he can
occasionally climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds, frequently
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop knee, crouch and
crawl. [He] must not be exposed to fumes, odors or poor
ventilation.
He should not be exposed to hazards such as moving machinery
or unprotected heights. He is limited to simple, routine and
repetitive work tasks involving simple work related decisions
and simple instructions with few changes in the work setting.
(Id. at 25.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff can
perform past relevant work as an outside delivery driver.
(Id. at 30.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff is not disabled. (Id. at 32.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
It is
not the district court's role to review the ALJ's
decision de novo or otherwise determine whether the claimant
is disabled. Rather, the court is limited to reviewing the
ALJ's decision to determine whether it “contains
legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance, and “such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be
upheld.” Id. The court, however, “must
consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm
simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting
evidence.'” Id. Nor may the court
“affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not
rely.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
challenges whether the ALJ's RFC determination is
supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of
his treating physicians and treating nurse practitioner, and
rejected his symptom testimony.
I.
Opinions of Treating Physicians
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions
of Drs. Popa and Brown. In weighing medical source opinions,
the ALJ should distinguish between three different types of
physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat the
claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not
treat the claimant; and, (3) nonexamining physicians who
neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v.
Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ
generally should give more weight to the opinion of a
treating physician than to the opinion of an examining
physician, and more weight to the opinion of an examining
physician than to the opinion of a non-examining physician.
Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; Sprague v. Bowen, 812
F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
Where a
treating physician's opinion is not contradicted by
another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear
and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted,
it still may not be rejected without “specific and
legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence
in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Likewise,
when an examining physician's opinion is not contradicted
by another physician, it may only be rejected for
“clear and convincing” reasons, and when an
examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another
physician, the ALJ is required to provide only
“specific and legitimate reasons” to reject the
opinion. Id. at 830-31. “An ALJ can satisfy
the substantial evidence requirement by setting out a
detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and
making findings.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d
995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
A.
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