United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE ROSEMARY MARQUEZ UNITED STATES JUDGE.
Plaintiff
Southwest Fair Housing Council initiated this lawsuit on
April 20, 2018 (Doc. 1) and filed its First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) on June 26, 2018 (Doc. 8). In the FAC,
Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: WG Chandler Villas
SH, LLC d/b/a Atria Chandler Villas (“Chandler
Villas”); WG Campana Del Rio SH, LLC d/b/a/ Atria
Campana Del Rio (“Campana Del Rio”); WG
Scottsdale, LLC d/b/a Atria Sierra Pointe (“Atria
Sierra Pointe”); Brookdale Senior Living Communities,
Inc. d/b/a/ Brookdale Arrowhead Ranch and Brookdale Freedom
Plaza (“Brookdale”); Immanuel Caring Ministries,
Inc and CopperSands, Inc. d/b/a Immanuel Campus of Care
(“Immanuel and CopperSands”); La Posada at Park
Centre, Inc. (“La Posada”); MorningStar Senior
Management, LLC and MS Arrowhead, LLC d/b/a MorningStar at
Arrowhead (“the MorningStar Defendants”);
Solterra of Arizona, LLC (“Solterra”); The Ensign
Group, Inc. and Saguaro Senior Living, Inc. d/b/a Sherwood
Village Assisted Living and Memory Care (“the Sherwood
Village Defendants”); SRG Management, LLC d/b/a Silver
Springs and Village at Ocotillo (“SRG”); Sunrise
Senior Living Development, Inc., Sunrise Senior Living
Management, Inc., and Sunrise Senior Living Service, Inc.,
d/b/a Sunrise at River Road (“the Sunrise
Defendants”); and Watermark Retirement Communities,
Inc. d/b/a Fountains at La Cholla (“Watermark”).
Pending
before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Sever. (Docs.
90-94, 98, 100-105.)[1] Plaintiff filed a single Response to all
of the Motions (Doc. 106), and Defendants filed Replies
(Docs. 107-113, 115-118).[2]
I.
Background
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants own, lease, and/or operate
nursing-home facilities located in and around the Tucson and
Phoenix areas, and that Defendants “discriminate
against elderly deaf residents and prospective residents by
failing and/or refusing to provide qualified American Sign
Language interpreters or other auxiliary aids and services to
ensure effective communication.” (Doc. 8 at
¶¶ 6, 15-44.) According to the FAC, Plaintiff
utilized “fair housing testers” in 2016-2018 to
determine whether Defendants would supply an American Sign
Language interpreter for a deaf resident if requested or
necessary. (Id. at ¶ 5, 47, 49-80.)
Defendants' employees allegedly informed the testers that
Defendants would not provide ASL interpreters and that the
purported relatives could provide their own interpreters or
communicate with staff in writing. (Id. at ¶
5.) Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3602, et seq.; Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12181, et seq.; Section 1557 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116;
and the Arizona Fair Housing Act, A.R.S. § 41-1491,
et seq. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 81-138.)
Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and equitable
relief; compensatory and punitive damages; and costs,
interest, and attorneys' fees. (Id. at ¶ 7;
see also Id. at 27-29.)
II.
Defendants' Motions to Sever and Motions to Transfer
Venue
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff has, for its own convenience,
impermissibly lumped fourteen separate lawsuits into one.
According to Defendants, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
requirements for permissive joinder under Rule 20(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff's
testers had different communications, on different dates, in
different locations, with employees of 14 different
facilities owned and/or operated by 17 different entities,
each with their own separate, distinct policies and
procedures. Defendants further argue that the witnesses and
documentary evidence will differ for each Defendant and that
severance will facilitate settlement, promote judicial
economy, reduce what would otherwise be prohibitively
expensive discovery and litigation costs, prevent jury
confusion, and avoid prejudice. Finally, some of the Maricopa
County Defendants request a transfer of venue, arguing that
the claims brought against them have been brought in the
incorrect division of the District of Arizona.
Plaintiff
argues in response that its claims are logically related and
rely on common questions of law and fact, because they all
arise under the same statutes and involve the same test used
to identify an identical harm. Plaintiff further argues that
joinder is neither unfair nor prejudicial to Defendants
because the evidence and legal theories will overlap and a
single lawsuit will serve judicial economy. Plaintiff also
argues that the jury will be capable of sorting the
allegations against each Defendant, and that any jury
confusion can be remedied by a limiting instruction. In a
footnote, Plaintiff argues that a transfer of venue is
improper because some of the Defendants' conduct occurred
in Pima County, and the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
specify that, “[i]n cases where the cause of action has
arisen in more than one county, the plaintiff may elect any
of the divisions appropriate to those counties for filing and
trial purposes.” (Doc. 106 at 9 n.8 (quoting LRCiv.
5.1(a)).) . . . . . . . .
III.
Legal Standard
Rule 20
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits joinder of
multiple defendants in one action if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). If these requirements are not both
satisfied, a district court may sever misjoined parties
“as long as no substantial right will be prejudiced by
the severance.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d
1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 (authorizing courts to add or drop parties or sever
claims). Furthermore, even when the requirements of Rule 20
are satisfied, “a district court must examine whether
permissive joinder would ‘comport with the principles
of fundamental fairness' or would result in prejudice to
either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232
F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Desert Empire
Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1980)). If a likelihood of prejudice and jury confusion
outweigh any likely gains in judicial efficiency, severance
is appropriate. See Id. at 1296-97.
IV.
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