United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Shannon Johnson's
Application for Supplemental Security Income by the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social
Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a
Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of
that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 17, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant SSA Commissioner's Opposition (Doc. 18,
“Def.'s Br.”), and Plaintiff's Reply
(Doc. 21, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed the
briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 12, R.) and now
reverses the Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at
17-28) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-3).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed her Application on April 24, 2014 for a period of
disability beginning July 10, 2010. Plaintiff's claims
were denied initially on November 3, 2014, and on
reconsideration on January 30, 2015. Plaintiff then testified
at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on July 26, 2016. (R. at 34-48.) On
September 22, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's
Applications. (R. at 17-28.) On November 1, 2017, the Appeals
Council upheld the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-3.) The
present appeal followed.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff has a severe impairment of degenerative disc
disease (R. at 19), but that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at
the sedentary level with some limitations, including that
“[t]he claimant is limited to standing and/or walking
for a maximum of three hours in an eight-hour work day”
and “[t]he claimant is limited to sitting for a maximum
of six hours in an eight-hour work day.” (R. at 21.)
After hearing testimony of a Vocational Expert
(“VE”), the ALJ concluded that the limitations in
Plaintiff's RFC have little or no effect on the
occupational base of unskilled sedentary work, such that
Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises three arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred in weighing the assessments of Plaintiff's
treating physicians; (2) the ALJ erred by giving reasons for
rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony that were not
sufficiently specific, clear, and convincing and supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole; and (3) the
ALJ erred by relying on the Medical Vocational Guidelines
(“Grids”) as a framework for concluding Plaintiff
is not disabled. (Pl.'s Br. at 1-2.) . . . . . . . .
A.
The ALJ Erred in Interpreting the Assessments of
Plaintiff's Treating Physicians
An ALJ
“may only reject a treating or examining
physician's uncontradicted medical opinion based on
‘clear and convincing reasons.'”
Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155,
1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81
F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Where such an
opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for
specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Id.
“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that
must be upheld.” Burch v. Burnhart, 400 F.3d
676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ
gave “little weight” and “minimal
weight” to the assessments of Plaintiff's treating
physicians, Dr. Viteri-Giordano and Dr. Skobic. (R. at
24-25.) Dr. Viteri-Giordano opined that Plaintiff cannot sit
for more than 20 minutes, walk slowly for more than one
block, or stand for more than 20 minutes due to
moderate-to-severe chronic pain.[1] (R. at 519, 524.) By
contrast, an examining physician, Dr. Khumalo, stated that
Plaintiff could stand from two to six hours a day and had no
limitations in the amount of time she could sit. (R. at
328-29.) The ALJ gave Dr. Khumalo's assessment
“great weight” with the exception of how much
Plaintiff could lift. (R. at 24.)
The
ALJ's reasons for discounting the assessments of
Plaintiff's treating physicians were less than
legitimate. The ALJ's first and principal reason-that the
treating physicians' opinions were
“incongruent” with the medical evidence-is simply
not the case. The ALJ cites evidence that Plaintiff
demonstrated normal range of motion, muscle strength, and
gait, but these evaluations are not the same as the treating
physicians' assessments of severe chronic pain, which is
supported by substantial evidence in the record by way of
extensive treatment notes. See Rawa v. Colvin, 672
Fed. App'x 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting it is beyond
the scope of an ALJ's authority to conclude that the lack
of muscle atrophy in a claimant means the claimant does not
suffer from chronic pain as noted by the treating physician).
The ALJ's conclusion that the treating physicians'
assessments are inconsistent with Plaintiff's daily
activities is also unfounded. The fact that Plaintiff could
do occasional chores or shop on a motorized scooter does not
contradict a finding that she suffered from chronic, severe
pain. See Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 848 (9th
Cir. 2014) (finding ALJ improperly relied on a claimant's
activities where there was insufficient evidence as to the
extent, manner or complexity of the activities). The ALJ also
states that Plaintiff's “treatment has been
essentially routine and/or conservative in nature” (R.
at 23), but the record does not bear this conclusion out
either; the treatment notes show that Plaintiff's
treating physicians have ...