United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
DAVID
G. CAMPBELL SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
March 19, 2018, Plaintiff Toby Bolden Williams, who is
currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis
in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint
and paid the filing and administrative fees. In a May 1, 2018
Order, the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Defendants and
ordered Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the
Complaint.[1]
Pending
before the Court are six Motions to Dismiss, which were filed
by Yuma County, Smith, and Lackie (the “Yuma County
Defendants”) (Doc. 46); Defendants City of Yuma,
Preciado, Skaggs, and Lekan (the “First City of Yuma
Defendants”) (Doc. 47); Defendants City of Somerton and
Juarez (the “City of Somerton Defendants”) (Doc.
52); Defendant Alston (Doc. 62); Defendant Yuma County Risk
Management (Doc. 118); and Defendants City of Yuma Risk
Management, Yuma Police Department, and Rodriguez (the
“Second City of Yuma Defendants”) (Doc. 121).
Also pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 57). The Court will grant the Motions to Dismiss, deny
the Motion for Summary Judgment, and order Plaintiff to show
cause why Defendants Binuya and Villa should not be dismissed
for failure to serve.[2]
I.
Plaintiff's Complaint
In his
Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, attorneys'
fees, and court costs from the following Defendants: the City
of Yuma, City of Yuma Risk Management, City of Yuma Police
Chief John Lekan, Officer M. Preciado, Detective James
Skaggs, and Laboratory Technician Adrian Rodriguez; the City
of Somerton, City of Somerton Risk Management/Ralph Villa,
City of Somerton Police Officer J. Binuya, and Police
Detective A. Juarez; Yuma County, Yuma County Risk
Management, Yuma County Jail Captain J. Lackie; Yuma County
County Attorney Jon R. Smith; and Office of Justice
Programs/US Civil Rights Director Michael
Alston.[3]
Plaintiff
contends that on April 6, 2014, he was stopped during a
routine traffic stop, searched, and arrested. (Doc. 1 at 10,
11.)[4]
He claims Defendant Preciado brought him to the City of Yuma
Police Department for further questioning, read him his
Miranda [5] rights, and asked Plaintiff if he wanted
to talk. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff asserts that
although he “did not respond in the affirmative,
” Defendant Preciado “ignored the
[P]laintiff's wishes” and interrogated him for more
than thirty minutes. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Preciado “inherently coerced him to continue
with the questioning” and, after Plaintiff
“answer[ed]
questions
after initially declining, ” Defendant Preciado had the
duty to Mirandize Plaintiff again before using his
statements. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts this conduct
violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Preciado also coerced Plaintiff's
co-defendants when he went into the interrogation room and
told them, “Before you tell me anything[, ] we are
going to say [Plaintiff] had everything.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Preciado
“coached the witnesses with malicious intent to
complete an arrest.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims
this violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.)
Plaintiff
alleges that on April 15, 2014, Defendant Skaggs told a grand
jury he did not know who owned the vehicle that was stopped,
although he met with Plaintiff's co-defendants during an
interview on April 9, 2014, and stated, “you are from
the traffic stop the other night with [Plaintiff].”
(Id. at 8, 10.) Plaintiff also claims Defendant
Preciado, during the course of the criminal case,
“falsi[fi]ed police reports and claimed they had more
suspected contraband than they had in order to detail the
[P]laintiff in order to take his finger[]prints.”
(Id. at 11.) Plaintiff contends he has an Arizona
police laboratory report “where the items that were
sent in for this case do not match the claimed
amounts.” (Id.)
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant Preciado's actions resulted from a lack
of proper training and improper supervision. (Id.)
Alternatively, he claims Defendant Preciado's actions
point “to a de facto policy of non-compliance with the
requirements for protection of civil rights” by
Defendant City of Yuma Police Department. (Id.)
Next,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Yuma County Attorney's Office
and Smith maliciously prosecuted him and “ignored
evide[]nce that was derived from third[-]party investigative
serv[i]ces that showed Dete[ct]ives in this case were
l[y]ing.” (Id.) He claims Defendant Smith
acted “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully and/or
[with] deliberate indifference” to deprive Plaintiff of
his constitutional rights. (Id.)
Plaintiff
claims Defendant Juarez gave false testimony during a hearing
that took place on April 15 and 29, 2015, in Yuma County
Superior Court, case numbers S1400CR201400411 and
S1400CR201400419. (Id. at 10.) He contends Defendant
Juarez lied to the court and violated multiple Defendant City
of Somerton policies when he took “the alleged cup home
on the night of the incident” and “tur[ned] in a
blank evidence bag to [Defendant] Rodriguez the next
day.” (Id.) Plaintiff also takes issue with
Defendant Binuya's June 15, 2015 testimony.
(Id.)
In
addition, Plaintiff asserts that while he was incarcerated in
the Yuma County Jail, he was denied proper medical care for
anxiety, “ADD/ADHD, ” “ODD, ” and
physical injuries “su[]stained at the time of
incar[c]eration.” (Id. at 11-12.) He also
claims he was denied education classes, rehabilitation
programs, and religious classes, and was confined in solitary
confinement. (Id.) He alleges this was done at
Defendant Lackie's instruction and Defendant Lackie
“directed” Plaintiff's requests for services
to be routed to him. (Id. at 11.) He also contends
Defendant Lackie “became in [an] instant [the]
principal of the education services at the jail” so he
could review Plaintiff's “confident[i]al IEP
repor[t]s, ” which had confidential medical records
attached to them. (Id.)
Finally,
Plaintiff claims Defendant Alston had a duty to investigate
the complaint Plaintiff submitted to the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) and to “act when civil
rights and related laws were broken and presented to him,
” but he “turned a blind eye to police
misconduct, ” “justified police misconduct,
” and concluded “there was no racial motive in
this case.” (Id. at 7, 10, 11.) He contends
Defendant Alston concluded that Plaintiff, who was “the
only African American in this case, ” was not treated
differently and stated that Defendant Preciado had given
Plaintiff the same chances he gave Plaintiff's
co-defendants. (Id. at 10, 11.) Plaintiff alleges
this conclusion was based on a transcript of the traffic stop
interview, but Plaintiff claims Defendant Preciado's
statements in the interview do not support a conclusion that
Plaintiff was given the same chances given to his
co-defendants. (Id.)
II.
Motions to Dismiss
A.
Legal Standards
1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A
motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure “tests the legal sufficiency of a
claim” and “[d]ismissal is proper only where
there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of
sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732
(9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
court construes all allegations of material fact in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Marcus v.
Holder, 574 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009). The court
will “‘presume that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim.'” Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (citation omitted).
However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Moreover, although the court must construe a pro
se plaintiff's pleadings “liberally and . . .
afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt, ”
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010),
“[v]ague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
Cir. 1982).
When
deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally looks
only to the face of the complaint and documents attached
thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc.,
284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Hal Roach Studios,
Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,
1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). If a court considers evidence
outside the pleading, it must convert the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. United
States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). A
court may, however, consider documents incorporated by
reference in the complaint or matters of judicial notice
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 908. A court “may
take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record'
without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
2.
Statute of Limitations
“The purpose of a statute of limitation is ‘to
prevent assertion of stale claims against a
defendant.'” Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d
930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Davidton v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2001)). The applicable statute of limitations in an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state's
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The
Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is
two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1).
Accrual
of § 1983 claims is governed by federal law. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, a
claim accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason
to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.”
Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.
2012); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d
374, 381 (9th Cir. 1998). To be timely, Plaintiff's
claims must have accrued on or after March 19, 2016, two
years before his Complaint was filed. Claims that accrued
before March 19, 2016, are untimely.
B.
Yuma County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
In
their June 7, 2018 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46), the Yuma
County Defendants contend Plaintiff's claims against
Defendants Lackie and Smith are barred by the statute of
limitations, Defendant Yuma County cannot be sued under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, and Plaintiff has failed to
identify any Yuma County policy or custom that caused his
injuries. The Yuma County Defendants also assert
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Lackie regarding the
denial of educational benefits is precluded under res
judicata and his other claims against Defendant Lackie must
be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege any
factual content to support them. In addition, the Yuma County
Defendants argue Defendant Smith is entitled to absolute
immunity and Plaintiff cannot assert a claim of malicious
prosecution because the criminal proceedings did not
terminate in Plaintiff's favor.
Plaintiff
filed a Response (Doc. 51). Plaintiff does not address most
of the issues raised in the Motion, but does provide
statements regarding Defendant Lackie's refusal to
provide medical care and other services, Plaintiff's
placement in solitary confinement, Defendant Lackie's
review of Plaintiff's confidential school records, and
the Yuma County Defendants' use of confidential documents
that were part of an “IEP Administrative
[H]earing.” Plaintiff seeks sanctions for “any
violations” the Yuma County Defendants may have
committed by submitting confidential documents. Plaintiff
claims the Yuma County Defendants did not “admit[] one
way or the other” the allegations in the Complaint and
are “simply saying[, ‘]even if we did it, it is
too late because you are tardy.[']” Plaintiff
contends the Yuma County Defendants filed their Motion
“in bad faith and with dirty hands, ” asserting
that they have “unlimited resources and the skills of
multipl[e] lawyers and yet in their documents they don't
deny the [P]laintiff's claim.” Plaintiff also
claims the Yuma County Defendants “withheld information
from federal officials during a federal investigation and
that include[ed] misleading or failing to come forward with
the truth.”[6]
Defendants
filed a Reply (Doc. 58), reiterating their arguments that
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and should be dismissed because he failed to
plead any factual content to support them. Defendants also
contend that some of the exhibits attached to Plaintiff's
Response should be struck as immaterial and impertinent.
Plaintiff
subsequently filed a Response (Doc. 60), claiming the Yuma
County Attorney's Office is unconcerned about a detective
lying to the grand jury because they sent him a letter saying
that Plaintiff should have filed the grand jury transcript
under seal. He asserts that the Yuma County Defendants should
have been shocked by the detective's conduct and
condemned it.[7]
1.
Defendant Lackie
Plaintiff's
claims against Defendant Lackie relate to his confinement in
the Yuma County Jail. The Court notes that Plaintiff was
transferred to the custody of the Arizona Department of
Corrections on October 14, 2015. See Doc. 46-1 at 4.
At that point, Plaintiff knew or should have known of his
injuries. Indeed, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed a June
9, 2014 complaint in this Court in Williams v. Yuma
County Sheriff Department, CV 14-01272-PHX-DGC (DKD),
regarding the alleged failure to provide him with medical
care and his placement on lockdown and in an isolation cell,
but voluntarily dismissed that case. See Docs. 1,
5-6 in CV 14-01272. He also filed a September 29, 2014 due
process complaint with the Arizona Office of Administrative
Hearings regarding the Yuma County Sheriff's failure to
provide him with a free appropriate public education.
See Doc. 46-15.[8]
Because
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Lackie accrued more
than two years before Plaintiff filed his Complaint, his
claims are untimely and will be dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations.
2.
Defendant Smith[9]
Although
malicious prosecution claims can be brought against
prosecutors and “other persons who have wrongfully
caused the charges to be filed, ” Awabdy v. City of
Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004),
“[o]ne element that must be alleged and proved in a
malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior
criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484. “An individual
seeking to bring a malicious prosecution claim must generally
establish that the prior proceedings terminated in such a
manner as to indicate his innocence.” Awabdy,
368 F.3d at 1068; Frey v. Stoneman, 722 P.2d 274,
278 (Ariz. 1986) (“When a termination or dismissal
indicates in some fashion that the accused is innocent of
wrongdoing it is a favorable termination.”). Plaintiff
has failed to state a malicious prosecution claim because his
criminal charges were not resolved in his favor.
Moreover,
as to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Smith ignored
evidence that detectives were lying, prosecutors are
absolutely immune from liability for damages under §
1983 for their conduct in “initiating a prosecution and
in presenting the State's case” insofar as that
conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)).
Immunity even extends to prosecutors for “eliciting
false or defamatory testimony from witnesses or for making
false or defamatory statements during, and related to,
judicial proceedings.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at
270; see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029-30
(9th Cir. 2003) (prosecutor absolutely immune from liability
for failure to investigate the accusations against a
defendant before filing charges; for knowingly using false
testimony at trial; and for deciding not to preserve or turn
over exculpatory material before trial, during trial, or
after conviction); Roe v. City & County of San
Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1997)
(absolute immunity for decision to prosecute or not to
prosecute and for professional evaluation of a witness and
evidence assembled by the police).
Because
Defendant Smith is protected by absolute immunity and because
Plaintiff has failed to state a malicious prosecution claim,
the Court will dismiss ...