Appeal
from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Nos.
JD28985/JS18836 The Honorable Sara J. Agne, Judge.
Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix By Thomas A. Vierling Counsel
for Appellant
Law
Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa By H. Clark Jones Counsel
for Appellee Jessica S.
Judge
Maria Elena Cruz delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Kenton D.
Jones joined.
OPINION
CRUZ,
JUDGE.
¶1
The guardian ad litem ("GAL"), on behalf
of the minor A.R., requests reversal of the juvenile
court's finding that severance of the parental rights of
Jessica S. ("Mother") was not in A.R.'s best
interests. For the following reasons, we accept special
action jurisdiction sua sponte and deny relief. We
affirm the juvenile court's findings and the order
denying DCS' petition to sever Mother's parental
rights.
FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2
Mother is the biological parent of A.U., a child victim of
severe physical abuse. Julio Ramirez
("Father")[1] is not A.U.'s biological parent, but
he and Mother are the biological parents of two other
children, both with initials A.R. (hereinafter "middle
child" and "A.R."), born after A.U. As a
result of the abuse perpetrated on A.U. while in the care of
Mother and Father, Mother's parental rights to A.U. were
severed. In that separate case neither parent was
conclusively identified as the abuser. Still, the fact that
the injuries occurred while A.U. was in the care of Mother or
Father, or both, and due to their severity-including complex
skull fractures to both sides of his head, brain bleeding
consistent with head trauma, healing fractures to his left
leg and hand, bruising to his face, bruising to his abdomen
and back, and peeling on his feet associated with
second-degree burns, most of which occurred over time - the
juvenile court found that Mother and Father each either
abused A.U. or knew it was occurring. Additionally, the two
parents had their parental rights to the middle child
terminated when DCS established that there was a sufficient
nexus between A.U.'s abuse and the risk of abuse to the
middle child. A.R.-Mother and Father's second, and
younger, biological child-is the subject of this severance
proceeding.
¶3
Four days after A.R.'s birth, DCS filed a dependency
petition under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.")
section 8-533(B)(2), alleging Mother and Father had willfully
abused A.U. and that there was a sufficient nexus between
A.U.'s abuse and risk of abuse to the newly-born A.R. DCS
further alleged, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10), that
the prior termination of parental rights to A.U. was an
additional ground for termination of Mother's and
Father's rights to A.R. Six months later, DCS filed its
petition for severance. DCS eventually placed A.R. with the
paternal grandmother, Mildred Ruano ("Ruano"), a
potential adoptive placement. By the time of the final
hearing, A.R. had been in placement with Ruano for eight
months.
¶4
After the final hearing, the juvenile court found A.R. was
dependent as to Mother, and that abuse pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(2) was conclusively established as a ground
for severance against Mother, but that DCS failed to
establish, under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10), that the
underlying cause that prevented Mother from being able to
meet A.U.'s needs continued to exist and prevented Mother
from meeting the needs of A.R. Lastly, the court ruled that,
although Ruano seemed a loving placement for A.R., given the
likelihood Ruano would allow frequent unsupervised contacts
between Father and A.R., "the preponderance of the
evidence [did] not favor termination of Mother's
parent-child relationship as a benefit to [A.R.]."
¶5
In the end, the court severed Father's parental rights to
A.R., but not Mother's. The GAL timely appealed the
ruling denying severance of Mother's rights. It is
unclear whether a GAL, alone, has standing to seek appellate
review of the juvenile court's order. Further, the ruling
is not a final order because Mother's dependency case is
still ongoing in the juvenile court. DCS' argument
assumes that the court's order was a final and appealable
order. See A.R.S. § 8-235(A); Ariz. R.P. Juv.
Ct. 103(A). Even if jurisdiction by appeal is lacking, this
court has the "discretion to consider the matter as a
special action." State v. Perez, 172 Ariz. 290,
292 (App. 1992); see also Danielson v. Evans, 201
Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35 (App. 2001) (sua sponte
accepting special action jurisdiction). Accordingly, the
court in its discretion will entertain the GAL's
challenge, on behalf of the minor, to the June 2018 ruling by
accepting special action jurisdiction sua sponte,
because clarifying the appropriateness of considering a
parent's efforts and progress in the context of the
best-interests analysis is an issue of statewide importance.
See A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(4); Ariz. R.P. Spec.
Act. 1(a).
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
¶6
"We accept the juvenile court's findings of fact if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will
affirm a severance order unless it is clearly
erroneous." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child
Safety,245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018) (citation
omitted). It is not proper for this court to weigh the
evidence. Id. Resolving conflicting evidence, even
"sharply disputed" evidence, is "uniquely the
province of the juvenile court." Id. (citation
omitted). This court "will affirm unless, as a matter of
law, no reasonable fact-finder could have found that the
evidence ...