United States District Court, D. Arizona
MURRAY SNOW CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade's
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on the
merits of Petitioner Rafeeq Qadeer Salahuddin's Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The accepts the R&R.
no party has objected to the procedural background provided
by Magistrate Judge Bade, the Court will adopt it as an
accurate account. (Doc. 17 at 1-4). Magistrate Judge Bade
recommends that Salahuddin's petition be denied as
untimely. (Doc. 17 at 9). Salahuddin objects to the
conclusions of the R&R, arguing that it mischaracterizes
the grounds for relief stated in his petition, wrongly
ignores the fact that a state-created barrier prevented him
from filing his claim in a timely fashion, and contends that
Martinez v. Ryan, should excuse his untimeliness.
But because the R&R correctly analyzed his claims, his
petition for habeas corpus is denied.
court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]he
district judge must review the magistrate judge's
findings and recommendations de novo if objection is
made, but not otherwise. United States v.
Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (emphasis in original). District courts are not
required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any
issue that is not the subject of an objection.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) “imposes a one-year statute of
limitation on habeas corpus petitions filed by state
prisoners in federal court.” Jenkins v.
Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
citations omitted). This one-year period runs from the latest
of four possible dates, two of which are relevant here. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Typically, the one-year statute of
limitations runs from “the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes final.” Id. But because
Salahuddin's conviction became final before the effective
date of AEDPA, he had a one-year grace period beginning in
1996 in which he could have filed a timely challenge. See
Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.
2001) (“AEDPA's one-year grace period for
challenging convictions finalized before AEDPA's
enactment date . . . ended on April 24, 1997 in the absence
of statutory tolling.”). AEDPA also permits the statute
of limitations to run from “the date on which the
impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).
AEDPA's statute of limitations is also subject to
equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,
645 (2010). But equitable tolling is not frequently
available. To qualify, a petitioner must demonstrate
“that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and .
. . that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418
Salahuddin presents two arguments for why the Court should
not conclude his petition is untimely. First, he argues that
the Arizona Supreme Court's decision on his original
appeal represented an external impediment that prevented him
from bringing his claims, and that impediment was not lifted
until he was informed of new developments in the law around
September 2013. Then, he argues that equitable tolling should
apply because of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Martinez. Because neither argument is
successful, the petition is untimely.
argues that the Arizona Supreme Court created an impediment
when it determined that his counsel had waived objections to
the jury selection panel. While this ruling was adverse, it
did not create an impediment to him filing any challenge that
he wished to in federal court. Salahuddin now claims that
this impediment did not lift until he was informed about
developments in the law in September 2013. (Doc. at 8). But
whether Salahuddin was informed of developments in precedent
has little bearing on what the Arizona Supreme Court did when
it ruled on his direct appeal.
Martinez Does Not Apply To AEDPA's Timeliness
v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), does not apply here.
Martinez recognized a narrow set of circumstances in
which the procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel can be excused because of the
ineffectiveness of counsel in PCR proceedings. Cook v.
Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012). But that is not
the issue here. Martinez does not apply to tolling
the limitations of § 2244(d). Other courts have also
reached this conclusion. See Lambrix v. Sec'y,
Florida Dept. of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir.
2014) (“the equitable rule in Martinez applies
only to the issue of cause to excuse the procedural default
of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that
occurred in a state collateral proceeding and has no
application to the operation or tolling of the § 2244(d)
state of limitations for filing a § 2254
petition”); Madueno v. Ryan, No.
CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. ...