United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
G.
MURRAY SNOW CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Defendant Christopher Rouen's Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 10), Defendant Global Resourcing LLC's
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (Doc. 23), and
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Doc. 19).
BACKGROUND
In
November 2018, Plaintiff Ronald Worthley filed a complaint in
this Court alleging that Defendants Christopher Rouen and
Global Resourcing LLC violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) by failing to pay his overtime wages.
(Doc. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
failed to pay his wages in a timely manner, in violation of
the Arizona Wage Statute. (Id.).
Defendant
Christopher Rouen then filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss. In
that motion, he argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction
because Plaintiff did not allege an amount in controversy
that exceeds $75, 000, the complaint does not differentiate
between the allegations against him individually and against
the company, and the attorneys who are representing Plaintiff
are not licensed to practice law in Arizona. (Doc. 10).
Because
Defendant Rouen apparently only filed this motion to dismiss
on his own behalf, Plaintiffs sought a default judgment
against the corporate defendant. (Doc. 15). Defendant Rouen
did not file a response. A few weeks later, this Court
entered a default judgment against corporate defendant Global
Resourcing LLC. (Doc. 17). More than a month later,
Defendant's attorney, Mr. Powers, entered an appearance
with this Court and filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment. (Doc. 23). For the following reasons, the Court
will deny individual Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and
grant the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
Jurisdiction
Federal
courts have federal question jurisdiction “when a
federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 519 U.S. 386, 392
(1987). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that
“Defendants have intentionally failed and/or refused to
pay Plaintiff minimum wage according to the provisions of the
FLSA” and states that “[t]his Court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. §
1331.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 36, 5). For each claim
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court has
jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). And for
Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, this Court has
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Plaintiff also sufficiently differentiated between Mr. Rouen
and Global Resourcing LLC. (See e.g. Doc. 1, ¶
14). Defendant's motion to dismiss therefore lacks
merit.[1]
II.
Relief from Default Judgment
“[J]udgment by default is a drastic step appropriate
only in extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever
possible, be decided on the merits.” United States
v. Signed Personal Check No. 730, 615 F.3d 1085, 1089
(9th Cir. 2010). The three factors that a district court
should consider in deciding whether to vacate entry of
default judgment are: (1) whether movant engaged in culpable
conduct that lead to its default; (2) whether movant lacks a
meritorious defense; and (3) whether reopening the default
judgment would prejudice any other party. Franchise
Holding II, LLC, v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc.,
375 F.3d 922, 925, 926 (9th Cir. 2004).
1.
Culpability or Mere Negligence
A Court
may find that a Defendant is culpable “where there is
no explanation of the default inconsistent with a devious,
deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to respond.”
TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691,
698 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendant Rouen, who is not an attorney,
innocently believed that he was filling a motion to dismiss
on behalf of both him and Global Resourcing-or at least
believed that by filing the motion to dismiss he would toll
the deadlines as to Global Resourcing. Following the judgment
of default against Global Resourcing, Defendant Rouen
continued to engage in negotiations to settle the case-which
may explain the delay in moving for relief from default
judgment. Examining this course of events, the Court cannot
conclude that the default must have resulted from a
“devious, deliberate, or bad faith failure to
respond.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 698.
2.
...