United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
David
G. Campbell, Senior United States District Judge.
Petitioner
Cory Deonn Morris is an Arizona state prisoner sentenced to
death for the murders of five women. Morris has filed a
motion to amend his habeas petition to add five claims
related to his alleged incompetency during his state court
and federal habeas proceedings. (Doc. 38.) The motion is
fully briefed. (Docs. 41-42.) Also before the Court is
Respondents' motion to strike the juror declarations
filed with Morris's request for evidentiary development
and the notice of request for evidentiary development. (Doc.
45.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 52-53.) For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Morris's
motion to amend and will grant, in part, Respondents'
motion to strike.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July
2005, a jury in Maricopa County Superior Court convicted
Morris of five counts of first-degree murder and determined
he should be sentenced to death for each count. See State
v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324 (2007). The following factual
account is summarized from the Arizona Supreme Court's
opinion affirming Morris's convictions and sentences.
See id.
Morris
worked at a bar three nights a week and lived in a camper in
the backyard of his aunt and uncle's house in Phoenix,
Arizona. On April 12, 2003, Morris's uncle went to the
camper to find Morris and discovered a decomposed body in the
camper under a blanket. That same day, police officers
questioned Morris about the body, as well as four other
bodies that had been found nearby. The first had been
discovered in an alley near Morris's camper on September
11, 2002. Morris admitted knowing each of the five victims
and provided two different versions of each of their deaths
to the police. In the first version, he claimed that each
victim had died of a drug overdose while he was away from the
camper. When the investigating detective informed Morris that
he didn't believe him, Morris stated each victim asked
him to choke her during sex and died accidentally as a
result.
Morris
presented no defense during the guilt phase of trial. The
jury found two aggravating factors in the aggravation phase:
conviction of prior serious offenses, based on the five
convictions from the guilt phase of the trial, and commission
of all five murders in both an “especially cruel”
and “especially heinous or depraved” manner. At
the penalty phase, Morris presented mitigation evidence
focusing on the responsibilities placed on him at a young
age, problems with his appearance and hygiene, his desire to
improve himself, and his good work record. The jury
determined that Morris's mitigation evidence was not
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency and that death
was the appropriate sentence for each of the five murders.
Morris
raised four case-specific issues on appeal: (1) the State
presented insufficient evidence to prove that two of the
women were murdered, (2) the prescreening of prospective
jurors violated his right to be present at all stages of the
criminal proceeding, (3) the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting excessively gruesome photographs. Morris,
215 Ariz. at 332-34. Morris also raised 14 separate
challenges to the constitutionality of Arizona's death
penalty scheme. Id. at 341-43. The Arizona Supreme
Court rejected these arguments and affirmed Morris's
convictions and sentences. Id. at 343.
Morris
filed a petition for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) raising ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel claims, a “new law” claim,
and eleven claims identical to claims raised on appeal. (EIR
Doc. 307.)[1] The court dismissed several claims and
granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue that
“additional experts should have been retained to
present expert testimony in the penalty phase to disprove the
State's necrophilia theory.” (EIR 354 at 5.) A
six-day evidentiary hearing was held, after which the court
dismissed the PCR petition, finding no deficient performance
or prejudice in trial counsel's failure to secure expert
testimony about either decomposition or necrophilia. (EIR
438.) Morris's petition for review in the Arizona Supreme
Court was denied without comment on March 14, 2017.
On May
30, 2017, Morris filed a statement of intent to file a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On
February 20, 2018, Morris filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Petition”) asserting 49 claims for
relief, many of them containing several subclaims. (Doc. 21.)
Respondents filed an Answer on May 22, 2018 (Doc. 27), and
Morris filed a Reply on August 13, 2018 (Doc. 34).
II.
MOTION TO AMEND
Morris
seeks to amend his Petition with claims that (1) appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim
challenging Morris's competence to stand trial (Doc.
38-1, redlined amended Claim Twenty-Two, Attachment A), (2)
postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge Morris's competence to stand trial and to
proceed in his postconviction proceedings (Doc. 38-2,
redlined amended Claim Forty-Eight, Att. B), (3) trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
request a competency hearing (Doc. 38-3, proposed new Claim
Fifty, Att. C), (4) Morris was convicted and sentenced to
death while incompetent (Doc. 38-4, proposed new Claim
Fifty-One, Att. D), and (5) Morris is being denied his due
process rights by having to litigate his federal habeas
proceedings while incompetent (Doc. 38-5, proposed new Claim
Fifty-Two, Att. E).
Respondents
ask the Court to deny Morris's motion to amend because of
(1) the futility of the proposed amendment, (2) undue delay,
and (3) undue prejudice to Respondents and victims. (Doc. 41)
(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Caswell v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.
2004)). Respondents assert that the proposed amendment should
be denied as futile because the proposed amended claims (1)
are untimely and do not relate back to Morris's timely
filed habeas petition, (2) are procedurally defaulted or not
cognizable, and (3) are tenuous. Morris does not dispute that
the motion to amend was filed after the expiration of the
statute of limitations, but asserts that his new claims are
timely because they “relate back” to the pending
habeas petition. Morris asserts that the core facts
supporting each claim are contained “in interrelated
claims in Morris's original petition that arise out of
Morris's detachment from reality and his counsel's
corresponding failure to conduct a thorough mental-health
investigation.” (Doc. 42 at 2.) After considering the
applicable law and facts of this case, the Court does not
agree.
A.
Applicable Law
A
petition for habeas corpus may be amended pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2242;
see also Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas petitions to the
extent not inconsistent with the habeas rules). A court looks
to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address
a party's motion to amend a pleading in a habeas corpus
action. See James v. Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1126
(9th Cir. 2001).
Leave
to amend shall be freely given “when justice so
requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Courts must review
motions to amend in light of the strong policy permitting
amendment. Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
785 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986). Factors that may justify
denying a motion to amend are undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive, futility of amendment, undue prejudice to
the opposing party, and whether petitioner has previously
amended. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
Leave
to amend may be denied based upon futility alone. See
Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845. To assess futility, a court
necessarily evaluates whether relief may be available on the
merits of the proposed claim. See Caswell, 363 F.3d
at 837-39 (conducting a two-part futility analysis reviewing
both exhaustion of state court remedies and the merits of the
proposed claim). If the proposed claims are untimely,
unexhausted, or otherwise fail as a matter of law, amendment
should be denied as futile.
The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) imposes a one-year statute of
limitations for the filing of federal habeas corpus
petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); see Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004). Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c), Morris may add an otherwise untimely
claim to his habeas petition if it relates back to a
timely-filed claim. See Alfaro v. Johnson, 862 F.3d
1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017). In the habeas context, the
original pleading to which Rule 15 refers is governed by the
“more demanding” pleading standard of Habeas
Corpus Rule 2(c), which provides that a petition must
“specify all the grounds for relief available to the
petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each
ground.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655
(2005). The “relation back” provision is to be
strictly construed in light of “Congress' decision
to expedite collateral attacks by placing stringent time
restrictions on [them].” Id. at 657; see
United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.
2005).
“Mayle
requires a comparison of a petitioner's new claims to the
properly exhausted claims left pending in federal
court[.]” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1142-43
(9th Cir. 2009). An untimely claim relates back if it
“arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original
pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B). “The
requirement that the allegations in the [amended pleading]
arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence is
meant to ensure that the original pleading provided adequate
notice of the claims raised in the amended pleading.”
Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d
322, 326 (9th Cir. 1989)). This Court is not to read the
“conduct, transaction, or occurrence” requirement
so broadly as to render meaningless the statute of
limitations. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662-64.
A
late-filed claim in an amended federal habeas petition
relates back if the timely claim and the late-filed claim
“are tied to a common core of operative facts.”
Id. at 664; see Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d
1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “a new
claim in an amended petition relates back to avoid a
limitations bar . . . only when it arises from the same core
of operative facts as a claim contained in the original
petition”). Claims share a common core if the litigant
“will rely on the same evidence to prove each
claim.” Williams, 517 F.3d at 1133. If a new
claim clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory already in the
original petition, the new claim may relate back to the date
of the original petition and avoid a time bar. Woodward
v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001).
“An amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back
(and thereby escape AEDPA's one-year time limit) when it
asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that
differ in both time and type from those the original pleading
set forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650.
B.
Analysis
1.
Proposed Amended Petition
Claims
Fifty through Fifty-Two are asserted by Morris for the first
time in the proposed amended petition. In Claim Fifty, Morris
asserts trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
investigate Morris's incompetence and request a
competency hearing. (Doc. 38-3, at 1.) In Claim Fifty-One
Morris asserts he was convicted and sentenced to death while
incompetent, and his incompetency continued throughout his
state-court proceedings. (Doc. 38-4 at 1.) In Claim
Fifty-Two, Morris argues he is being denied his due-process
rights by having to litigate his federal habeas proceedings
when he is currently incompetent. (Doc. 38-5 at 1.)
Morris
states he suffers from delusional disorder and exhibits
symptoms of detachment from reality, paranoia, denial, and
mistrust. Morris alleges counsel failed to properly
investigate his mental health, specifically his incompetence,
despite several red flags indicating he was unable to
rationally assist in his defense or understand the
proceedings. Morris argues that, due to his delusional
disorder, he lacked a rational understanding of his trial
proceedings and the ability to effectively communicate with
his attorneys.
Morris
alleges that the facts he now offers in support of his claims
are “rooted in the same facts alleged by Morris in his
petition.” (Doc. 38 at 7-10.) Morris alleges the new
claims in the amended petition-Claims Fifty through
Fifty-Two-arise out of the same nucleus of facts contained in
several claims found in his timely filed Petition: Claims
Two, Three (A), Four (B), and Nineteen. (Doc. 38 at 8-9)
(citing Doc. 21 at 99-100, 109, 130- 64, 182-94, 275-83).
Morris
also alleges that the proposed amendments to existing Claims
Twenty-Two and Forty-Eight challenge appellate and
post-conviction counsel's effectiveness respectively.
Morris asserts that these revisions relate back to the facts
concerning appellate and post-conviction counsel in the
Petition in addition ...