United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
G.
Murray snow Chief United States District Judge
Pending
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants
Maricopa County Superior Court and Commissioner Lindsay P.
Abramson (Doc. 17). For the following reasons the motion is
granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
This
action arises out of a state court action filed by Plaintiff
John Hastings. In that action, Commissioner Abramson
concluded that Hastings' claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Hastings then filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hastings then
filed an “Objection to Commissioner's Ruling and
request to overturn by a Judge.” (Doc. 13 at 13-15.)
Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Pamela Gates reviewed
and then denied Hastings' objection.
Hastings
then filed this action, seeking “a court order
reversing Defendant Lindsay Abramson's erroneous ruling
and permanently removing her from his state case.”
(Doc. 1 at 3.) Hastings further “requests that this
court order the Maricopa County Superior Court to enter
default and default judgment in favor of Plaintiff as that
Defendant failed to respond.” (Id.) Finally,
Hastings “requests that the district court order the
defendants not to act so biasedly [sic] or be impossibly
difficult . . . in the future.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standards
Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and federal subject
matter jurisdiction must exist at the time an action is
commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State
Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.
1988). Because of its import, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the
court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h); Attorneys
Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95
(9th Cir. 1996). “If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
Jurisdictional
attacks under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either facial or factual.
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039
(9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger
asserts that the allegations contained in the complaint are
insufficient on their face to invoke federal
jurisdiction.” Id. Given the nature of a
facial challenge, courts take the allegations in the
complaint as true and view them in light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,
328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a court need
not “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely
because they are cast in the form of factual
allegations.” Id. (citation omitted).
II.
Analysis
The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over actions
brought by “state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005). The doctrine arises from the fact that
“federal district court[s] do[] not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment
of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine prohibits not only
direct appeals of state court judgements, but also de facto
appeals of state court decisions as well as the adjudication
of “any issue raised in the suit that is inextricably
intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court in its
judicial decision.” Id. at 1158. “[W]hen
the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal
wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks
relief from the judgment of that court, ” the district
court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. Id.
at 1163.
It is
clear from the face of Hastings' complaint that he is
appealing the ruling of the Superior Court. This case is a
routine application of Rooker-Feldman: Hastings
seeks an order from this court “reversing Defendant
Lindsay Abramson's erroneous ruling and permanently
removing her from the case;” he “requests that
this court order the Maricopa County Superior Court to enter
default and default judgment in favor of Plaintiff;”
and he “requests that the district court order the
defendants not to act so biasedly [sic] or be impossibly
difficult . . . in the future.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) This
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such an appeal.
Hall, 341 F.3d at 1154.
Hastings
also argues that the decisions of the Superior Court violated
his due process rights and exhibited “reckless
disregard for federal law, plaintiffs U.S. Constitutional
rights, and SCOTUS precedent, ” and that he thus
challenges the Superior Court's actions on those grounds
rather than directly appealing the Superior Court's
judgment. But “Rooker held that when a losing
plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district
court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal
rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside
the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a forbidden
de facto appeal.” Id. at 1156. That is
precisely what Hastings seeks to do here.
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of
Defendants Maricopa County Superior Court and Commissioner
...