United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Eileen
S. Willett United States Magistrate Judge
On
March 15, 2019, Defendant United States of America
(“United States”) filed a “Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim” (Doc. 13). The Court issued an Order (Doc. 15)
advising Plaintiffs of Local Rule of Civil Procedure
(“LRCiv”) 7.2(e)(1), which limits responses to
seventeen pages, exclusive of attachments. On April 17, 2019,
Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. 19) to the Motion to
Dismiss that is twenty-five pages long, not including
attachments. Plaintiffs' Response also violates LRCiv
7.1(b)(1) as it is single-spaced. Plaintiffs did not seek
leave of Court to file an impermissibly long Response.
“The
district court has considerable latitude in managing the
parties' motion practice and enforcing local rules that
place parameters on briefing.” Christian v. Mattel,
Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Iota Xi Chapter Of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson,
566 F.3d 138, 150 (4th Cir. 2009) (“District court
acted well within its discretion in fashioning a sanction for
the defendants' failure to comply with [local rule page
limitation].”); N/S Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 127 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking
appellant's briefs and dismissing appeal for failure to
comply with briefing rules, explaining that the Court's
“resources are limited. In order to give fair
consideration to those who call upon us for justice, we must
insist that parties not clog the system by presenting us with
a slubby mass of words rather than a true brief”);
Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 345 (9th
Cir. 1996) (upholding district court's discretion to
disregard briefs filed in circumvention of page limits).
However, because the United States has filed its Reply (Doc.
20) and has not filed a separate motion to strike, the Court
will not strike the Response. For the reasons below, the
Court will grant the United States' Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 13).[1]
I.
DISCUSSION
Because
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, a case
presumably lies outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As subject
matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a
case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States
v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). The Court is
obligated to determine sua sponte whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (federal courts “have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from
any party”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
(“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”).
Pursuant
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, “it is axiomatic
that the United States may not be sued without its consent
and the existence of consent is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Courts strictly construe waivers of
sovereign immunity. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]hat a plaintiff against the United States may
receive less than complete relief in the federal courts
should not necessarily be viewed as an inappropriate result,
for such a plaintiff is accorded, by statute, more relief
than historical principles of sovereign immunity would
allow.”).
The
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, gives
federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions that
arise under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States. The Ninth Circuit has “consistently held
that § 1331 does not waive the government's
sovereign immunity from suit.” Gabriel v. General
Services Admin., 547 Fed.Appx. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th
Cir. 1985) (“[T]he analysis of jurisdiction cannot stop
with § 1331, because the claims in this case are in
essence against the federal government, and thus are barred
by sovereign immunity unless the government has consented to
suit.”).
“Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows litigants to seek the
dismissal of an action from federal court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a
Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001),
abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77 (2010). A “[p]laintiff's factual
allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny
in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge
of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d
9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “When subject matter jurisdiction is
challenged under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b) (1), the
plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to
survive the motion.” Tosco Corp., 236 F.3d at
499; see also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (“It
is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary
rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”)
(citations omitted).
After
reviewing the parties' briefing (Docs. 13, 19, 20), the
Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden of establishing a waiver of the United States'
sovereign immunity and have not established subject matter
jurisdiction over the United States. See Cato v. United
States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that it is a plaintiffs burden of showing a waiver of
sovereign immunity). Accordingly, the Court will grant the
United States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13).
II.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED granting the
United States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13).
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing this action without
prejudice.
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