United States District Court, D. Arizona
Douglas D. Yokois, Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
David
G. Campbell Senior United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Douglas D. Yokois, who is currently confined in the Arizona
State Prison Complex-Eyman, Special Management Unit (SMU) I,
in Florence, Arizona, brought this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff has
filed a “Notice to the Court Regarding Continuing
Harassment and Retaliation Against Plaintiff by
Defendants” (Doc. 193) and an “Emergency Motion
for Order of Protection from Harassment and Retaliation by
Defendants and Extension of Time” (Doc. 195). The Court
will construe these as motions for injunctive relief.
Defendants oppose the motions. (Docs. 194,
200.)[1]
I.
Background
In his
three-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sued several
Defendants for violations of his religious rights under the
First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) arising from their
alleged denial of Plaintiff's use and possession of
several religious items. (Doc. 28.) On screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff
stated First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against Defendants
Cervantes, Daniel, Vicklund, O'Neil, Linderman, Brown,
Henry, Ryan, Van Winkle, Hensley, Thompson, McWilliams,
Pinney, Cheriyan, Mattos, Curran, [2] and Miser and directed them
to answer. (Doc. 29.) Defendant Herman was later substituted
for Defendant Linderman in his official capacity only. (Doc.
36.)
II.
Motions for Injunctive Relief
In his
first motion, Plaintiff alleges that he “continues to
suffer acts of harassment and retaliation” by
Defendants for filing grievances and lawsuits and that false
disciplinary charges have been brought against him for
engaging in these activities. (Doc. 193 at 1-2.) He also
alleges that he “has been cut off from those meager
legal resources and copying services all prisoners except him
have access to, in the midst of preparing his response to
summary judgment motion of Defendants.” (Id.
at 5.) Plaintiff claims that absent an order enjoining
Defendants “from their campaign of harassment and
retaliation against Plaintiff, he will be totally cut off
from his ability to meaningfully respond to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Id.)
In his
second motion, Plaintiff seeks an order of protection
preventing Defendants from transferring him from the
ASPC-Eyman South Unit to the SMU I. (Doc. 195 at 11.)
Plaintiff claims that he is being transferred in retaliation
for exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances
and lawsuits. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that
being transferred to SMU I will limit his access to legal
materials he needs to pursue his claims in this action.
(Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff also requests an extension
of time to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
III.
Discussion
A
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary
remedy” that may be granted only where the movant shows
that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass'n,
Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.
2009). An injunction should not issue if it “is not of
the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v.
Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997). But if the
request for relief concerns the prisoner's access to the
courts, “a nexus between the preliminary relief and the
ultimate relief sought is not required.” Prince v.
Schriro, et al., CV 08-1299-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 1456648, at
*4 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009), citing Diamontiney v.
Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990).
As an
initial matter, Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation
arise from events distinct from his First Amendment and
RLUIPA claims that are before the Court.[3] As the Court
previously explained to Plaintiff when ruling on his prior
motions for injunctive relief (see Doc. 111), new
claims may not be presented in a motion for injunctive relief
and must be brought in a separate action. See Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (a party seeking injunctive relief must establish a
relationship between the claimed injury and the conduct
asserted in the complaint). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his
allegations of retaliation, he must bring those claims in a
separate action.
Moreover,
even if the Court construes Plaintiff's allegations
regarding his legal materials and legal documents as an
access-to-courts claim, Plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief still fails. To maintain an
access-to-courts claim, an inmate must submit evidence
showing an “actual injury” resulting from the
defendant's actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 349 (1996). With respect to an existing case, the actual
injury must be “actual prejudice . . . such as the
inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a
claim.” Id. at 348-49. Plaintiff has failed to
show a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable
injury as it pertains to an access-to-courts claim. There is
no evidence that Plaintiff has faced an unreasonable delay or
the inability to file anything in this action. Although
Plaintiff claims that he has been cut off from legal
resources, he does not specify which legal resources he is
being denied access to, and a review of the docket in this
matter reflects that Plaintiff has filed numerous motions,
responses, and notices and has been able to actively pursue
his claims against Defendants. Plaintiff has not shown that
his ability to litigate this or any other case has been
impeded. Plaintiff has not been prevented from bringing a
claim as a result of Defendants' alleged obstructionism.
Thus, Plaintiff has not established actual injury. Plaintiff
has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on an
access-to-courts claim and has failed to show irreparable
harm. Thus, the Court need not address the remaining
Winter factors. See Ctr. for Food Safety v.
Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2011) (because
the plaintiffs failed to show they are likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the
court need not address the remaining elements of the
preliminary injunction standard).
The
Court will grant Plaintiff an additional 30 days to respond
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, but will deny
Plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief in all other
respects.
IT
IS ORDERED:
(1) The
reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to
Plaintiff's “Notice to the Court Regarding
Harassment and Retaliation Against Plaintiff” (Doc.
193) and “Emergency Motion for Order of Protection from
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