United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
case arises from a March 12, 2016 traffic accident that
resulted in the instantaneous death of Johnathan Blyler
(“the Decedent”). The vehicle that struck the
Decedent's vehicle was a tractor-trailer being driven by
Steven Robertson, an employee of Ameri-Can Freight Systems,
Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). The plaintiffs
in this lawsuit are (1) the Decedent's mother, Zandra
Manion (“Mother”), who asserts a wrongful death
claim under A.R.S. § 12-611 as a statutory beneficiary
of the Decedent, and (2) the Decedent's wife, Lisa Blyler
(“Wife”), who asserts both a wrongful death claim
under A.R.S. § 12-611 in her capacity as a statutory
beneficiary and a survival claim under A.R.S. § 13-1440
on behalf of the Decedent's estate (“the
Estate”) (together, “Plaintiffs”).
Now
pending before the Court is a motion for partial summary
judgment filed by Defendants. (Doc. 73.)[1] In Section A of
their motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on five causes
of action (negligent supervision, negligent retention,
negligent maintenance, negligent hiring, and negligent
training). (Id. at 3-9.) In Section B of their
motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on the following
four damage claims: (1) any claim for the Decedent's
future wages asserted by the Estate as part of the survival
action, (2) any claim related to the Decedent's pain and
suffering, (3) any claim for the Decedent's future wages
asserted by Mother or Wife as part of their respective
wrongful death actions; and (4) any claim for punitive
damages. (Id. at 9-16.)
In
response, Plaintiffs clarified that “[m]ost of the
Motion is not opposed.” (Doc. 84 at 1.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal and/or non-existence
of all five of the causes of action specified in Part A of
Defendants' motion. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiffs
further stated that “Plaintiffs Manion and Blyler are
not making claims for economic losses as part of their action
for wrongful death” and that “Plaintiffs
stipulate to the dismissal of their claim for punitive
damages.” (Id. at 2.) Finally, in a separate
response, the Estate stated that “no Plaintiff has made
a claim for pain and suffering.” (Doc. 82 at 6.)
Given
these concessions and clarifications, the only disputed issue
for the Court to resolve is the challenge to the Estate's
ability to recover future wages as part of the survival
action. In a nutshell, Defendants argue that such damages are
unavailable for two reasons: (1) an estate cannot, as a
matter of law, recover future economic losses in a survival
action where the decedent died immediately, and (2)
alternatively, the Estate's claim for future loss of
income is too speculative. (Doc. 73 at 9-12; Doc. 87 at 2-7.)
For the following reasons, the Court disagrees and denies the
motion.[2]
LEGAL
STANDARD
A party
moving for summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “In order to
carry its burden of production, the moving party must either
produce evidence negating an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the
nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential
element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz
Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “If . .
. [the] moving party carries its burden of production, the
nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or
defense.” Id. at 1103.
“Summary
judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'” Rookaird v. BNSF
Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “A genuine dispute of material
fact exists if ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.'” United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
Account No. Ending 8215 in Name of Ladislao V. Samaniego, VL:
$446, 377.36, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249-50 (1986)). The court “must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Rookaird, 908 F.3d at 459. Summary
judgment is also appropriate against a party who “fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
ANALYSIS
I.
Whether The Estate Can Recover Future Loss Of Income In
The Survival Action
“A
wrongful death claim and a survival claim are separate claims
arising from the same incident.” Gandy v. United
States, 437 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1086 (D. Ariz. 2006). Both
types of claims are being asserted in this case: Wife and
Mother have each asserted a wrongful death claim under A.R.S.
§ 12-611 and the Estate (acting through Wife) has
separately asserted a survival claim under A.R.S. §
14-3110. In their motion, Defendants don't dispute the
Estate's ability to assert a survival claim but argue the
Estate should be barred from seeking one particular category
of damages as part of that claim-economic damages arising
from the loss of Decedent's future wages.
Before
addressing Defendants' argument, it is helpful to provide
some background concerning the nature of survival and
wrongful death actions under Arizona law. Both are creatures
of statute. First, the Arizona survival statute provides:
Every cause of action, except a cause of action for damages
for breach of promise to marry, seduction, libel, slander,
separate maintenance, alimony, loss of consortium or invasion
of the right of privacy, shall survive the death of the
person entitled thereto or liable therefor, and may be
asserted by or against the personal representative of such
person, provided that upon the death of the person injured,
damages for pain and suffering of such injured person shall
not be allowed.
A.R.S. § 14-3110. “Under Arizona law, a claim
under the survival statute may be brought only by a
decedent's estate.” Gotbaum v. City of
Phoenix, 617 F.Supp.2d 878, 883 (D. Ariz. 2008). The
enactment of the survival statute “extended the right
of a decedent's personal representative to pursue the
decedent's personal injury claim ...