United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Dominic W. Lanza, United Slates District Judge
INTRODUCTION
This
case involves troubling allegations of negligence by a school
district when attempting to address the special needs of one
of its students. In March 2013, a minor named A.D. was
enrolled as a student in a school within the Roosevelt
Elementary School District No. 66 (“the
District”). Around that time, the District created a
specialized education plan for A.D.-known as a “Section
504 plan”- in an attempt to provide an accommodation
for his attention deficient hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”).
Unfortunately,
it appears the District simply forgot to implement the
Section 504 plan after it was created. This oversight went
undetected for over two years, until a May 2015 incident in
which A.D. had an altercation with one of his teachers in the
classroom. In the aftermath of this altercation, A.D.'s
mother, Esther De La Fuente (“Plaintiff”), filed
a complaint with the United States Office of Civil Rights
(“OCR”). This complaint, which was filed in June
2015, specifically addressed the District's failure to
implement A.D.'s Section 504 plan. Although the District
initially responded to the complaint by denying it had ever
created a Section 504 plan for A.D., it eventually changed
course, acknowledged its failure to provide an appropriate
education to A.D., agreed to expunge certain incidents from
A.D.'s official disciplinary record, and also agreed to
provide “compensatory/remedial” educational
services to A.D., including extra tutoring.
In
December 2017, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, which seeks
damages (both on her own behalf and on behalf of A.D.) for
alleged violations of two different federal disabilities
statutes. Now pending before the Court is a motion for
summary judgment filed by the District and the individual
Defendants (together, “Defendants”). (Doc. 77.)
They seek summary judgment on four grounds: (1) Plaintiff
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing
this suit; (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations; (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to
recover damages for her own emotional distress in these
circumstances; and (4) the official capacity claims against
the individual Defendants are duplicative of the claims
against the District. The motion is fully briefed and nobody
has requested oral argument.[1]
As
explained below, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the
statute of limitations. This is an unfortunate outcome,
because Plaintiff and A.D. are deserving of sympathy, but it
is an outcome compelled by the facts and relevant case law.
Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to
Defendants without considering their other three arguments.
BACKGROUND
I.
Legal Framework
It's
helpful to begin by briefly summarizing the relevant legal
framework. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”), states receive federal funds in
exchange for committing to furnish a free and appropriate
public education (“FAPE”) to all students with
particular disabilities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch.,
137 S.Ct. 743, 748 (2017). “[A] FAPE comprises
‘special education and related services'-both
‘instruction' tailored to meet a child's
‘unique needs' and sufficient ‘supportive
services' to permit the child to benefit from that
instruction.” Id. at 748-49 (citations
omitted). A school furnishes a FAPE by providing the child
with an individualized education program (“IEP”),
which “spells out a personalized plan to meet all of
the child's ‘educational needs.'”
Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.,
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794, similarly protect the interests of students with
disabilities. “Title II forbids any ‘public
entity' from discriminating based on disability, ”
and an implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(7), “requires a public entity to make
‘reasonable modifications' to its ‘policies,
practices, or procedures' when necessary to avoid such
discrimination.” Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 749.
Likewise, Section 504 prohibits “federally funded
‘program[s] or activit[ies]'” from
discriminating based on disability, id. (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)),
thereby “demanding certain ‘reasonable'
modifications to existing practices in order to
‘accommodate' persons with disabilities, ”
id. (citation omitted). “Like the IEP, a
§ 504 Plan is the mechanism for providing a FAPE under
§ 504.” Lauren G. ex rel. Scott G. v. W.
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F.Supp.2d 375, 391 (E.D.
Pa. 2012); see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)
(“A recipient that operates a public elementary or
secondary education program or activity shall provide a free
appropriate public education to each qualified handicapped
person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless
of the nature or severity of the person's
handicap.”).
II.
Factual Background
A.D.
was enrolled as a student at Bernard Black Elementary School
within the District from 2010 through May 19, 2015, at which
time he was “promoted to 9th grade” and no longer
enrolled in the District. (Doc. 77 at 40.)
In
February and March 2013, the District evaluated A.D. under
Section 504. (Doc. 84 at 1-13.) The District determined that
A.D.'s ADHD “adversely impact[s] his ability to
receive instruction and consequences which impacts his
learning” and “impact[s] his ability to function
in the general education setting without
accommodations.” (Id. at 6.) Consequently, on
March 8, 2013, the District provided A.D. with a Section 504
plan. (Id. at 9.) The accommodations provided in
this plan included: (1) “[s]horten[ing] homework
assignments”; (2) “[t]esting in small group or
1:1 instruction”; (3) [n]ursing [s]ervices for [d]aily
[m]edication [a]dministration”; (4)
“[p]rovid[ing] intermittent (chunk) longer
projects/assignments to ensure completion”; and (5)
using a “[p]oint sheet.” (Id.) The
Section 504 plan also included a “Projected
Re-Evaluation Date” of March 8, 2014, one year later.
Plaintiff received a copy of the Section 504 Plan. (Doc. 85
at 10.)
In May
2015, A.D. had an altercation with one of his teachers in the
classroom. (Doc. 77 at 17-27.) A.D. had also had several
minor and major disciplinary ...