United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Penne Ann Hauk's
Applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income by the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint
(Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that
denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening
Brief (Doc. 16, “Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant
Social Security Administration Commissioner's Opposition
(Doc. 23, “Def.'s Br.”), and Plaintiff's
Reply (Doc. 26, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed
the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 13, R.) and now
reverses the Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at
15-27) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-3).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on
April 3, 2014 (R. at 15) and, a day later, an application for
Supplemental Security Income Benefits (R. at 15) for a period
of disability beginning August 21, 2012 (R. at 15).
Plaintiff's claims were denied initially on August 26,
2014 (R. at 15), and upon reconsideration on April 17, 2015
(R. at 15). Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on February
22, 2017. (R. at 40-77.) On May 24, 2015, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's Applications. (R. at 15-27.) On January 23,
2018, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the
ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-3.) On March 19, 2018, Plaintiff
filed this action seeking judicial review of the denial.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff has the following impairments: osteoarthritis,
fibromyalgia, chronic pulmonary heart disease, status post
hammertoe surgery, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, depression, attention deficit disorder, and anxiety.
(R. at 17-18.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404.” (R. at 20.) The ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to “perform medium work as defined
in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c).” (R. at 20.)
Based on a Vocational Expert's (“VE”) answers
to hypothetical questions, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
could perform her past work as a screen printer and screen
printer helper and is not disabled under the Act. (R. at 26.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinions of
Plaintiff's treating physicians, instead relying on the
opinion of an examining physician; and (2) the ALJ failed to
provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of her
symptoms and limitations. (Pl.'s Br. at 2.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Giving Little Weight to the Medical Opinions
of Plaintiff's Treating Physicians and Instead Giving
Great Weight to the Opinion of an Examining
Physician
The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff is not presently engaged in
substantial gainful activity and, although she suffers from
severe impairments, they are not equal to those listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404. The dispute comes at the ALJ's
assessment of Plaintiff's RFC, in which the ALJ found
that, based on the entire record, Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1567(c) and 416.967(c). Specifically, the ALJ found
Plaintiff could lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and
twenty-five pounds frequently; stand six hours; walk six
hours; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; and never be around unprotected heights
or moving mechanical parts. The Court focuses on this
assessment in concluding that the ALJ erred by relying on the
opinion of an examining physician, rather than those of
Plaintiff's treating physicians, in making her RFC
determination.
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be
given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion
of doctors who did not treat the claimant.”
Id. This is so because treating physicians have the
advantage of in-person interaction and typically a longer
history of treatment than ...