United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Eric
J. Markovich United States Magistrate Judge
Pending
before the Court is Defendant Campas' Motion to Stay the
Deadline to File a Joint Proposed Pretrial Order. (Doc. 141).
Defendants Rosebeck and Davis joined in the motion, while
Plaintiff opposed. For the following reasons the Court will
grant the Defendants' motion to stay and not bifurcate
any claims.
I.
Background
This
case was removed from Pima County Superior Court to the
Federal District Court for the District of Arizona on January
18, 2017. (Doc. 1). After discovery, Plaintiff filed two
motions for Partial Summary Judgment: one against Defendant
Erika Campas (Doc. 100) and another against Defendants
Rosebeck and Davis. (Doc. 101). Defendant Campas also filed a
Partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the issue
of qualified immunity. (Doc. 106). This Court denied all
three motions for summary judgment on March 26, 2019. (Doc.
140). Defendant Campas subsequently provided notice to the
Court on April 23, 2019 of her interlocutory appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the denial of her
cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 142). Because of
that appeal, Defendant Campas filed a Motion to Stay the
Deadline to File a Joint Proposed Pretrial Order (Doc. 141),
which Defendants Davis and Rosebeck joined. (Doc. 144).
Plaintiff filed her Response to the Motion to Stay on May 3,
2019, arguing that no stay was necessary as to the claims
against Defendants Davis and Rosebeck and that the Court
could bifurcate the claims against Defendant Campas and
proceed to trial. (Doc. 147). Both Defendants Davis and
Rosebeck and Defendant Campas filed Replies on May 10, 2019
(Doc. 149; Doc. 150).
II.
Law
In this
jurisdiction, the filing of an interlocutory appeal regarding
qualified immunity automatically divests a district court of
jurisdiction to proceed with trial, unless the district court
finds the claim frivolous or that it has been waived.
Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992).
However, in situations involving interlocutory appeals, the
district court “retains jurisdiction to address aspects
of the case that are not the subject of the appeal.”
United States v. Pitner, 397 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.5
(9th Cir. 2002). Even though the district court retains
jurisdiction on matters not subject of the appeal, it may
decide, at the district court judge's discretion, to
grant a stay of proceedings after the filing of an
interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b)(2018) (“application for an appeal hereunder
shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof
shall so order”).
A
district court “possesses the inherent power to control
its docket and promote efficient use of judicial
resources.” Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v.
Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254 (1936) and Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California,
Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)). However,
“case management standing alone is not necessarily a
sufficient ground to stay proceedings.” Id.
“A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a
matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise
result to the appellant.” Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
The
Supreme Court in Nken v. Holder reiterated the
traditional factors in determining whether to grant a motion
to stay: “‘(1) whether the stay applicant has
made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.'” Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v.
Braunskll, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). In analyzing these
factors, the first two are the most critical. Id.
However, each case must be decided upon its own particular
circumstances, Virginian R. Co. v. United States,
272 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1926), and the burden is on the party
requesting the stay to show that these particular
circumstances justify a stay. Nken, 556 U.S. at
433-34 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708
(1997) and Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
Regarding
whether the applicant has made a strong showing of the
likelihood of success of the appeal, it is “not enough
that the chance of success on the merits be better than
negligible.” Id. at 434 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). But this does not mean that an
applicant need show that success is “more likely than
not.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968
(9th Cir. 2011). Instead, the applicant has to show that
there is a “substantial case for relief on the
merits.” Id.[1] This has to be the standard
because to require a greater showing would make the Court
“attempt[] to predict with accuracy the resolution of
often-thorny legal issues without adequate briefing and
argument.” Id. at 967. Concerning the other
critical factor, irreparable harm to the applicant, more than
a mere possibility of harm is required. Nken, 556
U.S. at 434. However, in many ways it is “easier to
anticipate what would happen as a practical matter following
the denial of a stay” than it is to determine the
likelihood of success. Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968.
A
federal court may bifurcate claims and order a separate trial
“for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). However, a court
may order a separate trial only for separate issues,
id., and its decision on whether to do so is within
the court's sound discretion. Hangarter v. Provident
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir.
2004).
III.
Analysis
The
filing of Defendant Campas' appeal as to her qualified
immunity claim automatically divests this Court of
jurisdiction to proceed to trial on any of Plaintiff's
claims against Defendant Campas. The qualified immunity claim
was not deemed “frivolous” when this Court denied
Defendant Campas' motion for summary judgment nor was it
waived. Therefore, this Court may not proceed to trial on the
claims against Defendant Campas until the resolution of the
appeal. While it is true that the Court could
proceed with aspects of the case unrelated to the appeal,
Defendant Campas' involvement in codefendants Davis and
Rosebeck's case leads this Court to determine that a stay
is warranted as to all Defendants given the four
factors outlined in Nken. To decide otherwise and
bifurcate the claims, as suggested by Plaintiff, would lead
to the same issues being tried twice.[2] This concern also informs
the Court's decision to grant the motion to stay as to
all Defendants.
A.
Strong Showing of Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
This
first factor is neutral. The standard Defendants must meet to
satisfy this factor is that there is a “substantial
case for relief based on the merits, ” but they need
not show that success is more likely than not. See
Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968. The Court stands by its
ruling that Defendant Campas is not entitled to summary
judgment on her claim for qualified immunity. However, the
Court also did not deem the claim to be frivolous. The Court
determined that there were genuine issues of material fact
that precluded it from deciding whether warrantless removal
of the children was reasonable as a matter of law. (Doc. 140
at 9:28-10:1). Defendant Campas has claimed that this Court
failed to consider more of the undisputed facts that would
have justified warrantless removal (i.e. unaccompanied
children after arrest of a parent). (Doc. 150 at 2:13-17).
Given this claim, the Court cannot say that Defendant Campas
has merely shown a greater than negligible likelihood of
success on appeal. Nor can the Court say ...