United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Cynthia Lynn Butler's
Application for Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social
Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a
Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of
that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 12, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's
Opposition (Doc. 16, “Def.'s Br.”), and
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 20, “Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc.
9, R.) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge's
decision (R. at 19-31) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R.
at 1-4).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed her initial application on May 10, 2010 for a period of
disability beginning February 1, 2010. (R. at 94.) Her claim
was denied initially on September 2, 2010, and upon
reconsideration on February 22, 2011 (R. at 94.) She then
testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on October 18, 2011 (R. at 94.)
where the ALJ found Plaintiff disabled from February 1, 2010
through May 30, 2011. (R. at 95.)
Plaintiff
subsequently filed another application on September 7, 2012
for a period of disability beginning October 19, 2011. (R. at
132.) Her claim was denied initially on January 9, 2013, and
upon reconsideration on August 30, 2013. (R. at 132.) She
then testified before an ALJ on November 13, 2014, and on
February 20, 2015, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not
disabled from September 7, 2012 through the date of decision.
(R. at 132.) Plaintiff appealed, and, upon review, the
Appeals Council remanded the case back to an ALJ for
reconsideration. (R. at 149.)
On June
13, 2017, Plaintiff appeared before an ALJ to testify (R. at
19), and on October 2, 2017, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was
not disabled (R. at 31). Plaintiff then appealed the
ALJ's decision on October 31, 2017 (R. at 5), and the
Appeals Council denied her request for review (R. at 1). The
present appeal followed.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the
medical records and opinions, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has the following impairments: cervical dystonia, migraine
headaches, and benign essential tremor. (R. at 22.) He also
found that Plaintiff has a sedentary residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) with postural, manipulative, and
environmental limitations. (R. at 26.) Lastly, based on a
vocational expert's analysis of Plaintiff's age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff could work as a general office clerk, addresser,
and document preparer, and is not disabled under the Act. (R.
at 30.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by rejecting the treating physician's
assessments, instead according partial weight to examining
and nonexamining physicians; and (2) the ALJ erred in
rejecting Plaintiff's symptom testimony in the absence of
specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record. (Pl.'s Br. at 12-23.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Discrediting the Opinions of Plaintiff's
Treating Physician
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more ...