United States District Court, D. Arizona
K. Jorgenson, United States District Judge.
before the Court is the Joint Motion for Early Termination of
Supervised Release (Doc. 42). The government and Alexandro
Marrufo (“Marrufo”) request the Court to issue an
order terminating Marrufo's supervised release.
Richards of the District of Arizona Probation Office has
submitted a report to the Court regarding the request. The
report indicates the out-of-state probation officer stated
that, although she has received one email from the AUSA, she
has not responded to that email. Further, she has not spoken
to either counsel. The out-of-state probation officer further
stated Marrufo has not had any positive drug tests since June
2018, works in the construction field, resides with his
parents, needs to be reminded to submit monthly reports, and
has an outstanding $200 special assessment fee. Additionally,
as Marrufo has an unresolved warrant out of Cochise County,
the out-of-state probation officer opposes early termination.
Further, Mr. Richards opposes early termination.
after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5),
(a)(6), and (a)(7) . . . terminate a term of supervised
release and discharge the defendant released at any time
after the expiration of one year of supervised release,
pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure relating to the modification of probation, if it is
satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the
defendant released and the interest of justice[.]
18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(1). These factors concern
“‘general punishment issues such as deterrence,
public safety, rehabilitation, proportionality, and
consistency, '” as well as the need for
restitution. United States v. Sine, No. CR-S-02-079
KJM, 2012 WL 1901298 *2 (E.D.Cal. 2012), (citations omitted).
An offender has the burden to demonstrate that early
termination of supervised release is justified. United
States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 559 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2006).
“[c]ourts have generally held that something more than
compliance with the terms of probation is required to justify
early termination [pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)].
Early termination is usually granted only in cases involving
changed circumstances, such as exceptionally good
behavior.” United States v. Hawatmeh, No. LA
CR 08-00385-VBF-3, 2014 WL 11970544, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
19, 2014) (citations omitted). A defendant typically carries
his burden “by alerting the district court to
‘unforeseen' or ‘changed circumstances'
that implicate its initial sentencing decision and
analysis.” United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d
817, 824 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States
v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Changed circumstances may include “exceptionally good
behavior by the defendant” or other factors that
“render a previously imposed term or condition of
release either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve
the general punishment goals of section 3553(a).”
Miller, 205 F.3d at 1001 (quoting United
States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has stated:
A defendant's “exceptionally good behavior”
may render a previously-imposed sentence inappropriate or too
harsh, but as the district courts of our circuit have
repeatedly recognized, mere compliance is to be expected.
United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th
Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104
F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1997)); United States v. Bauer,
No. 5:09-cr-00980, 2012 WL 1259251, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 13,
2012) (it is “apparent that the reasons cited by
Defendant-compliance with release conditions, resumption of
employment and engagement of family life-are expected
milestones rather than a change of circumstances rendering
continued supervision no longer appropriate”);
United States v. Grossi, No. CR-04-40127, 2011 WL
704364, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 18, 2011) (“Mere
compliance with the terms of supervised release is what is
expected, and without more, is insufficient to justify early
United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 824 n. 2 (9th
Cir. 2014). Further, because § 3583(e)(1) includes
“[t]he expansive phrases ‘conduct of the
defendant' and ‘interest of justice, '”
it is “clear that a district court enjoys discretion to
consider a wide range of circumstances when determining
whether to grant early termination.” Emmett,
749 F.3d at 819.
the Court considers the circumstances of the offense and
Marrufo's limited criminal history. The Court also
considers that Marrufo accepted responsibility in this case,
but has not resolved the outstanding assessment fee or
warrant. The Court finds that, while an early termination is
not inconsistent with policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission,  an early termination of supervised release
would not adequately deter criminal conduct. The Court also
considers the opposition to the request by the out-of-state
probation officer and Mr. Richards.
burden is on Marrufo to justify early an early termination of
supervised release. Marrufo has not shown any exceptionally
good behavior or other changed circumstances to warrant a
modification of his release.
IT IS ORDERED the Joint Motion for Early Termination of
Supervised Release (Doc. 42) is DENIED.