United States District Court, D. Arizona
Kim A. Vega, Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Kim Vega's Application
for Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) under the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint
(Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of that
denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's Opening
Brief (Doc. 14, “Pl.'s Br.”), Defendant
Social Security Administration Commissioner's Opposition
(Doc. 16, “Def.'s Br.”), and Plaintiff's
Reply (Doc. 19, “Reply”). The Court has reviewed
the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 13, R.) and now
reverses the Administrative Law Judge's decision (R. at
17-45) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R. at 1-6).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed her Application on March 31, 2015, for a period of
disability beginning June 30, 2014. (R. at 200.)
Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on June 12, 2015
(R. at 24), and on reconsideration on September 30, 2015 (R.
at 24). Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 12,
2017. (R. at 24.) On November 6, 2017, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's Application. (R. at 21-33.) On March 26,
2018, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the
ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-4.) The present appeal followed.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence and finds it
unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent
medical evidence will be discussed in addressing the issues
raised by the parties. In short, upon considering the medical
records and opinions, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: (1) lumbar and cervical
degenerative disc disease, status post three surgeries; (2)
osteoarthritis (or degenerative joint disease), status post
bilateral total knee arthroplasty; (3) fibromyalgia; and (4)
obesity. (R. at 26.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404.” (R. at 28.) The ALJ
then found that Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can occasionally
kneel, crawl, and climb ramps, stairs, or ladders; never
climb ropes or scaffolds; and frequently balance, stoop,
crouch, and reach overhead bilaterally.” (R. at 28.)
Additionally, the ALJ found Plaintiff “must avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme cold, humidity, and hazards
such as heights and machinery.” (R. at 28.) Based on a
Vocational Expert's (“VE”) answer to a
hypothetical question, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could
perform her past work as a probation and parole officer and
is not disabled under the Act. (R. at 32-33.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
Court addresses only the issues raised by the claimant in the
appeal from the ALJ's decision. Lewis v. Apfel,
236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts
in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.”
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001). The
Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “unless it
contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
Id. Put another way, “[i]t is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “[w]here
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, ” but the Court “must consider
the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“[H]armless
error principles apply in the Social Security Act
context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ's error is harmless
where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court must “look at the
record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the
outcome of the case.” Id. Importantly,
however, the Court may not uphold an ALJ's decision on a
ground not actually relied on by the ALJ. Id. at
1121.
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. pt.
404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ
assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is
capable of performing past relevant work. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to
the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the
claimant can perform any other work based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinion of
Plaintiff's treating physician, instead relying on the
opinions of nonexamining physicians; and (2) the ALJ failed
to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff's symptom testimony. (Pl.'s Br. at 1.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Giving Little Weight to the Medical Opinion
of Plaintiff's Treating Physician and Instead Giving
Great Weight to the Opinions of the Nonexamining State Agency
Medical Consultants
Although
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008), there is a hierarchy among the sources of
medical opinions. Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be
given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion
of doctors who did not treat the claimant.”
Id. This is so because treating physicians have the
advantage of in-person interaction and typically a longer
history of treatment than ...