Appeal
from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No.
CR2016-127930-001 DT The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge.
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Michelle L.
Hogan Counsel for Appellee.
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By
Kevin D. Heade Counsel for Appellant.
Judge
Jon W. Thompson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Kenton D. Jones
joined.
OPINION
Thompson, Judge
¶1
Larry Grant Gentry (defendant) appeals from his conviction
and sentence for one count of manslaughter. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [1]
¶2
In December 2015, the victim, M.R., and defendant's step-
daughter, Autumn, had a son together. The couple lived with
their son in the same apartment complex as defendant and
Autumn's mother, Traci. Defendant and Traci shared their
apartment with various other family members.
¶3
On June 12, 2016, M.R. brought his son to defendant and
Traci's apartment. Shortly thereafter, Traci noticed the
baby had bruises and a possible bite mark on his body. Traci
confronted M.R. and Autumn about the injuries and they
started to argue. Frustrated, M.R. attempted to take his son
out of the apartment but Traci would not allow it.
¶4
Aware of the confrontation, defendant left the apartment for
the grocery store. Upon defendant's return, he saw M.R.
push Autumn. Defendant went into his bedroom, retrieved a
gun, and told M.R. to leave. Defendant eventually discarded
the gun and the two men continued to argue. To avoid further
escalation, M.R. and Autumn went back to their apartment,
leaving their son with Traci.
¶5
Within minutes, M.R. returned to defendant's apartment,
walked inside, and asked, "are you going to shoot
me?" Defendant told M.R. to leave, but M.R. refused and
walked "slightly" toward defendant. Defendant
reached for the gun and Traci attempted to wrestle it from
his grasp. When defendant gained control of the gun, he
instructed a family member, who was standing near M.R., to
move away and shot M.R. a total of ten times in his legs,
arms, shoulders, back, and torso. M.R. died from the gunshot
wounds.
¶6
After shooting M.R., defendant walked over to his body, lit a
cigarette, and said, "he deserved it." When
officers arrived, defendant told them he shot M.R. Defendant
would later claim that M.R. reached for defendant's gun,
that he feared M.R. would use the gun on him and his family,
and that he was in "protection mode." Defendant had
no visible injuries and none of the family members who were
present during the offense could corroborate his claim that
M.R. attempted to take his gun.
¶7
The state charged defendant with one count of manslaughter, a
class 2 dangerous felony. A jury found him guilty as charged
and found that two aggravating factors applied. The trial
court sentenced him to a slightly aggravated term of thirteen
years in prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2019), 13-4031 (2019), and
-4033(A)(1) (2019).[[2]]
DISCUSSION
A.
Batson Challenge
¶8
Defendant challenges the state's peremptory strike of a
racial minority juror and argues the trial court erred by
denying his Batson challenge. We will uphold the
denial of a Batson challenge absent clear error.
State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 400, ¶ 52
(2006). The court is in the best position to assess a
prosecutor's credibility, and we extend "great
deference" to the court's ruling. See Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n. 21 (1986).
¶9
Equal protection prohibits the use of a peremptory strike to
exclude a potential juror solely on the basis of race.
Id. at 89. A Batson challenge is comprised
of a three part analysis: (1) the opponent of the strike must
make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination;
(2) if shown, the striking party must then provide a facially
race-neutral basis for the strike; and (3) if provided, the
opponent must show the facially-neutral explanation is merely
a pretext for purposeful discrimination. Newell, 212
Ariz. at 41, ¶ 53 (citations omitted). The second step
is satisfied unless the reasons provided are inherently
discriminatory. Id. at ¶ 54 (citing
Hernandez v. New York,500 U.S. 352, 360 ...