United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable John J. Tuchi United States District Judge
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Terri Singer's
Application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 14, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's
Opposition (Doc. 17, “Def.'s Br.”), and
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 20, “Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc.
13, R.) and now reverses the Administrative Law Judge's
decision (R. at 31-51) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R.
at 1-7).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits on October 17, 2013 for a period of disability
beginning July 1, 2012. (R. at 22.) Plaintiff's claim was
denied initially on March 31, 2014 (R. at 22), and on
reconsideration on September 13, 2014 (R. at 22). Plaintiff
then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) on March 15, 2016. (R. at 46-65.)
On May 26, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's Application.
(R. at 35.) On April 9, 2018, the Appeals Council denied a
request for review of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-6.) On
June 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial
review of the denial.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: fibromyalgia; degenerative changes of the
cervical spine with radiculopathy, migraine headaches, and
obesity. (R. at 36.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404.” (R. at 40.) The ALJ then found that
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to “perform less than a full range
of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b)” in a role such as administrative clerk or
office manager. (R. at 40, 44.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred in rejecting the examining physician's
assessment and (2) the ALJ erred by discrediting
Plaintiff's pain and symptom testimony. (Pl.'s Br. at
1.)
A.
The ALJ Erred by Rejecting the Examining Physician's
Assessment
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “The opinion of an examining physician is .
. . entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a
nonexamining physician.” Id. at 830.
“[T]he opinion of an examining doctor, even if
contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for
specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at
830-31. “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a
detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and
making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
Here,
the ALJ assigned minimal weight to the opinion of
Plaintiff's examining physician, Dr. John Peachey, while
assigning partial weight to the opinions of agency desktop
reviewers. (R. at 44.) Dr. Peachey concluded that
Plaintiff's “symptoms diminish her abilities to
perform physical work-related activities, ” and that
“a complete form of disability is recommended.”
(R. at 44.) Conversely, the agency desktop reviewers opined
that Plaintiff “can perform a full range of light
work.” (R. at 43.) The ALJ found that the record
contains insufficient objective medical evidence to support
Dr. ...