United States District Court, D. Arizona
Murray Snow, Chief United States District Judge.
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants
Kathie Sprague Kennedy and Interstate 40 Grand Canyon RV Park
(“Kennedy”) (Doc. 15). For the following reasons
the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
2017, Plaintiff Sandra Hart was on a cross-country road trip
with her husband. Hart suffers from multiple sclerosis and is
confined to a wheelchair. The couple stopped for the night in
Ashfork, Arizona, and stayed at the Interstate 40 Grand
Canyon RV Park owned by Kathie Kennedy. During their stay,
Hart, with her husband, attempted to use the women's
showering facilities. Since the shower stall had no seat, Mr.
Hart positioned Hart on a borrowed chair and went to insert
money into the coin-operated machine that controlled the
showers. The shower turned on, and immediately began to spray
scalding water on Hart. She was unable to turn off the
showerhead herself because the water control knobs were too
high for Hart to reach, and she was unable to move herself
out of the scalding water because the shower stall had no
called for help from her husband, who tried to turn up the
shower's cold water. Hot water continued to pour from the
showerhead. Eventually Mr. Hart got the shower turned off. As
a result of the incident, Hart suffered second-degree burns.
She then brought this action, alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the
Arizonans with Disabilities Act (“AZDA”). Hart
also brought state law claims of negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. She seeks injunctive relief
under the ADA and AZDA, and money damages for the state law
claims. (Doc. 1 at 8-9.) Kennedy moves to dismiss Hart's
complaint, arguing that Hart lacks standing. But
Kennedy's motion only contains arguments regarding
Hart's ADA claim for injunctive relief, so the Court
considers only that claim.
to dismiss for lack of Article III standing are properly
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.
2011). “Each element of standing ‘must be
supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at
the successive stages of the litigation.” Id.
at 1068 (alterations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “For
purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of
standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as
true all material allegations of the complaint and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
III standing is a constitutional limitation on a court's
subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be granted by statute.
See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77).
Because standing is a jurisdictional question, it is properly
addressed in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion instead of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174.
“[T]he jurisdictional question of standing precedes,
and does not require, analysis of the merits.”
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Equity Lifestyle
Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184,
1189 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008)). But “[t]his is not to say
that [a] plaintiff may rely on a bare legal conclusion to
assert injury-in-fact, or engage in an ingenious academic
exercise in the conceivable to explain how defendants'
actions caused [her] injury.” Id.
satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff
must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact'
that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). To bring a claim for
injunctive relief-the only relief available to a private
plaintiff under the ADA-a plaintiff must additionally
demonstrate “real and immediate threat of repeated
injury in the future.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports
(U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). Courts are to “take a broad view of
constitutional standing in civil rights cases, especially
where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits are the
primary method of obtaining compliance with the act.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th
does not challenge either causation or redressability for
Hart's ADA claim. The Court therefore addresses only
injury-in-fact, specifically whether Hart has
“demonstrated a likelihood of ...