United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE ROSEMARY MARQUEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the Court is Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration. (Doc. 131.) Defendants move for
reconsideration or clarification of the Court's previous
Order resolving a dispute as to whether Plaintiff could
compel Charles Ryan, the director of the Arizona Department
of Corrections, to sit for a deposition. (Id.)
Defendants seek reconsideration or clarification of the
Court's statement that Defendant Ryan possesses
“knowledge of facts directly related to”
Plaintiff's allegations. (Doc. 131.) Defendants “do
not seek reconsideration of any other aspects of the
Court's Order, nor its ultimate conclusion.”
(Id.) The Court denies Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration, but grants Defendants' request for
clarification to the extent that the discussion herein
clarifies the Court's previous Order. (Doc. 122.)
The
Court previously granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as
to Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Director
Ryan but denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to
claims construed as against Director Ryan in his personal
capacity. (Id.) (discussing Doc. 73 at 6-8.)
While
there is no respondeat superior liability under
§ 1983, supervisors may be held liable “when
culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to
them.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2011). There must be a “sufficient causal
connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and
the constitutional violation.” Id. at 12017
(quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th
Cir. 1989.)) “[T]he supervisor's participation
could include his own culpable action or inaction in the
training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, his
acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the
complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or
callous indifference to the rights of others.”
Id. at 1207-08.
The
Court declined to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against
Director Ryan, construed as claims against him in his
personal capacity, finding that he “adequately alleged
that Ryan ‘set[] in motion a series of acts by others .
. . which [he] knew or reasonably should have known would
cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.'”
(Doc. 73) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08).
Alternatively, the Court found that Plaintiff
“adequately alleged that Ryan is culpable for action
relating to ‘the training, supervision, or control of
his subordinates' or for ‘conduct that showed a
reckless or callous indifference to the rights of
others.'” (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently
restated these allegations in his Second Amended Complaint
(SAC). (Doc. 74.)
In
discussing the legal standard governing the dispute regarding
the deposition of Director Ryan, the Court noted that
depositions of top government officials may be allowed where
the official “has first-hand knowledge related to the
claim being litigated.” (Id.) (quoting
Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 423 (1st Cir.
2007). The Court explained that, since the remaining claims
against Director Ryan are solely in his personal capacity,
“Director Ryan clearly has knowledge of facts directly
related to these allegations” since the allegations
“concern his own personal involvement in
plaintiff's alleged mistreatment.” (Doc. 122.)
Defendants
argue that this observation was “clear error” and
constitutes a finding that was “manifestly
unjust.” (Doc. 131.) The Court clarifies that its
previous statement, made in the context of a discovery
dispute, was not a finding of fact that would preclude
Defendants from later “presenting evidence, consistent
with his filings throughout this case, that he knew nothing
about the conditions” of Plaintiff's confinement.
(Doc. 131.) Rather, the Court's observation that Director
Ryan necessarily “has knowledge of facts” related
to allegations against him made solely in his personal
capacity merely follows logically from the nature of the
personal capacity allegations made. Plaintiff's SAC
alleged, inter alia, that Director Ryan issued
instructions through the Department's chain of command
that caused Plaintiff to be subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. (Doc. 74 ¶¶ 165, 174.)
And the Court previously found that Plaintiff's
previously amended Complaint (Doc. 40), which contained less
supporting factual material than his SAC, “adequately
alleged that Ryan ‘set[] in motion a series of acts by
others . . . which [he] knew or reasonably should have known
would cause others to inflict a constitutional
injury.'” (Doc. 73.)
It
follows that Director Ryan possesses relevant knowledge, but
not that such knowledge necessarily bolsters Plaintiff's
claims. Rather, the knowledge could well be in the negative;
Director Ryan may possess knowledge of facts tending to show
that he did not issue the instructions and set in motion the
series of acts as alleged. Either way, the Director would
have first-hand knowledge and this consideration is relevant
to whether Plaintiff may compel his deposition. This differs
from instances in which a subpoenaed agency head is named
merely in his official capacity and may not have personal
knowledge of the claims at issue. See Green v. Baca,
226 F.R.D. 624, 649 (C.D. Cal. 2005), order
clarified, No. CV-02-204744MMMMANX, 2005 WL 283361 (C.D.
Cal. Jan 31, 2005) (noting in claim brought for
unconstitutional implementation of department policies in
toto that “unlike other official capacity suits,
it cannot be said that [Sheriff] has no personal knowledge of
the facts at issue.”)
Defendants
also urge that the Court improperly “relied on an
Exhibit from Andrich's Motion to Strike.” (Doc.
131.) The Exhibit mentioned was an “Arizona Department
of Corrections Inmate Grievance Appeal Response.” (Doc.
122.) Defendants argue that it was improper for the Court to
consider the grievance form because it relates to Plaintiffs
placement in segregation, rather than directly to the
conditions of his confinement in segregation. (Doc. 131.)
Defendants also argue that the form should not be considered
because it was “signed for” Director Ryan and not
by him personally. (Doc. 131.) The Court reiterates that its
previous discussion of the grievance form was merely
“[i]in further support of its independent conclusion
that Defendant Ryan would have personal knowledge as to his
own personal involvement in Plaintiffs allegations, as
discussed above. (Doc. 122.)
In
summation, the Court's observation that Director Ryan has
“knowledge of facts” related to the personal
capacity allegations against him is not a factual finding as
to the merits of those allegations and of course in no way
precludes the later introduction of evidence “to show
that [Director Ryan] was unaware of Andrich's objections
to his conditions of confinement at a time when he could have
intervened.” (Doc. 131.) Defendants remain free to file
a Motion for Summary Judgment and to introduce evidence in
support of that Motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion
for Reconsideration (Doc. 131) is denied,
but the request for clarification is granted to the extent
this Order ...