United States District Court, D. Arizona
Gregory R. Sullivan, Plaintiff,
Nationwide Insurance Company of America, et al., Defendants.
Dominic W. Lanza United States District Judge.
before the Court are three motions filed by pro se Plaintiff
Gregory Sullivan: a motion to remand (Doc. 9), a motion to
allow electronic filing (Doc. 21), and a motion to rule on
previously filed motions (Doc. 23).
filed the motion to remand on July 22, 2019, and Defendant
Nationwide Insurance Company of America
(“Nationwide”) filed a response on August 2,
2019. (Doc. 15.) Under LRCiv 7.2(d), Plaintiff had the option
of filing a reply by August 9, 2019. Plaintiff failed to do
and the motion became ripe on the following business day,
August 12, 2019. Ten days after the motion to remand became
ripe, Plaintiff filed a motion to allow electronic filing and
a motion to rule on the pending motions. (Doc. 23.)
Court has many cases pending before it and many motions on
which to rule. Careful consideration and resolution of
pending motions requires review of the briefs, research of
the legal issues, contemplation, and precise drafting. All of
this takes time.
Court has inherent power to control its docket. Thompson
v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831
(9th Cir. 1986). The Court is mindful of the need “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, and
strives to handle all matters with both wisdom and
expediency. Although the Court understands that waiting for
rulings is frustrating, litigants are expected to exercise
reasonable patience before filing motions for rulings. Ten
days is too soon.
the Court will address the motion to remand now because it
can be easily and quickly resolved.
jurisdiction exists when there is complete diversity of
citizenship between the plaintiff and the defendants and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of
interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A controversy
meets this requirement when “all the persons on one
side of it are citizens of different states from all the
persons on the other side.” Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). A corporation, whether
incorporated in a state of the United States or in a foreign
country, is “deemed a citizen of its place of
incorporation and the location of its principal place of
business.” Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de
Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir.
Notice of Removal states that “Defendant Nationwide is
a Wisconsin company with its principal place of business in
Ohio” (Doc. 1 ¶ 2), and indeed, the Complaint
alleges that Nationwide's “principal place of
business is [in] Ohio” (Doc. 1-3 ¶ 2). The motion
to remand does not assert otherwise. The Notice of Removal
states that Plaintiff is a “resident” of Arizona
(Doc. 1 ¶ 2), which is insufficient to establish
citizenship for diversity purposes, Kanter v.
Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 858-59 (9th Cir.
2001), but the Complaint affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff
is a “citizen” of Arizona (Doc. 1-3 ¶ 1).
Thus, the parties are diverse. And the motion to remand
confirms that “Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of
$250, 000, ” so the amount-in-controversy requirement
is met. The motion to remand will be denied.
the Court will deny the motion to allow pro se electronic
filing. Electronic filing requires parties to code their
filing so that they are properly docketed electronically.
Docketing requires legal training which Plaintiff does not
possess. When electronically filed documents are not properly
docketed, they are not easily retrievable by the Court on its
case management reports.
seems to believe there are two other pending
“motions” awaiting rulings, but one appears to be
the August 1, 2019 motion for reconsideration (Doc. 13),
which the Court denied on August 2, 2019 (Doc. 14), and the
other appears to be the “Response to the Declaration of
Mark E. Hartman of Opposition for Remand Motion to Remand and
Vacate Mandatory Initial Discorvery [sic] Pilot
Project” (Doc. 17), which is not a motion.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to remand
(Doc. 9) is denied, the motion to allow
electronic filing (Doc. 21) is denied, and
the motion to rule on previously filed motions (Doc. 23) is
granted in part and denied in part.
 Perhaps the “Response to the
Declaration of Mark E. Hartman of Opposition for Remand
Motion to Remand and Vacate Mandatory Initial Discorvery
[sic] Pilot Project” (Doc. 17) was intended to be the