United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge
Plaintiff
Erika Jacobs (the “Plaintiff”) filed suit against
Mesa Police Department (the “Defendant”) alleging
multiple causes of action arising out of the alleged
violation of her civil rights. (Doc. 1-1) The Defendant moves
for summary judgment on each of the Plaintiff's claims
(the “Motion”). (Doc. 28) The Motion was fully
briefed on December 3, 2018. (Docs. 34, 36) Oral argument was
not requested. The Court's ruling is as follows.
I.
Legal Standard
A court
shall grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting
documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party “show that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). Material facts are those facts “that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact
arises if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.
The
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record, together with
affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. If the movant is able to do such, the burden then shifts
to the non-movant who, “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts, ” and instead must “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). A
judge's function at summary judgment is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Cable v. City of Phoenix, 647 Fed.Appx. 780, 781
(9th Cir. 2016).
II.
Background[1]
On
January 15, 2018, the Plaintiff was crossing a street in
downtown Mesa, Arizona. (Doc. 34 at 1; Doc. 29 at 2) The
Plaintiff was stopped by police officer Nathan Boulter. (Doc.
29 at 2; Doc. 29-7 at 2) Officer Boulter issued a citation to
the Plaintiff for violating A.R.S. § 28-646(A)(2), a
statute prohibiting a person from crossing a street against a
“Do Not Walk” signal. (Doc. 29 at 2) On April 11,
2018, the Plaintiff and the Defendant attended a civil
traffic hearing before the Honorable Richard Garcia in the
Municipal Court of the City of Mesa. (Doc. 29-4) At the civil
traffic hearing, Judge Garcia ruled that the Plaintiff
violated the statute by crossing the street against a
“Do Not Walk” signal. (Doc. 29-4 at 38) Judge
Garcia suspended the Plaintiff's fine pending her appeal
of his decision. (Doc. 29-4 at 39) The Plaintiff appealed
Judge Garcia's decision, but her appeal was dismissed for
failure to pay the civil traffic appeal fee. (Doc. 28 at 3)
The
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in the Maricopa County
Superior Court, and the Defendant removed the case to this
Court. (Doc. 1) The Plaintiff alleges that Officer Boulter
issued her a citation based on her race, which is a violation
of her civil rights under various statutes. (Doc. 1-2) The
Defendant filed the Motion seeking an award of summary
judgment on each of the Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 28)
III.
Analysis
The
Defendant states that summary judgment is appropriate in this
case because the Municipal Court of the City of Mesa already
found the Plaintiff guilty of violating A.R.S. §
28-646(A)(2). (Doc. 28 at 5) Therefore, the Defendant argues
that all of the Plaintiff's claims are barred under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Heck v.
Humphrey precedent. (Doc. 28 at 5); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (stating “civil
tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the
validity of outstanding criminal judgments”).
The
doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is
“grounded on the premise that ‘once an issue has
been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further
fact-finding function to be performed.'”
Wabakken v. California Dep't of Corr. &
Rehab., 801 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing
Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 860, 864
(2010)). Collateral estoppel both “protect[s] litigants
from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the
same party or his privy and . . . promot[es] judicial
economy, by preventing needless litigation.”
Id.
Collateral
estoppel bars “relitigation of an issue decided at a
previous proceeding if (1) the issue necessarily decided at
the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is
sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding]
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or
in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].”
Wabakken, 801 F.3d at 1148 (citing People v.
Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240 (2005)). “[O]nly
issues actually litigated in the initial action may be
precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral
estoppel doctrine.” Id. “An issue is
actually litigated [w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the
pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination,
and is determined.” Id.
First,
the Court notes that there are no genuine disputes as to the
material facts in this case. In this case, each of the
Plaintiff's claims arise out of the judgment against her
for crossing the street against the “Do Not Walk”
sign. This is the same issue as the one addressed at the
Plaintiffs civil traffic hearing in the Municipal Court of
the City of Mesa. The Plaintiffs civil traffic hearing
resulted in a judgment on the merits, as evidenced by the
full transcript of the hearing provided to the Court. (Doc.
29-4) At the hearing, Judge Garcia heard argument and
received evidence on an identical dispute between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant, and Judge Garcia issued a final
judgment on the merits against the Plaintiff. (Doc. 29-4 at
39) The Plaintiffs appeal of Judge Garcia's decision was
dismissed for failure to pay fees, and Judge Garcia's
judgment against the Plaintiff has not otherwise been
reversed. Finally, the Defendant is asserting collateral
estoppel against the Plaintiff, who was party to the
proceeding before the Municipal Court of the City of Mesa.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted
as the Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from pursuing her
claims against the Defendant due to the Municipal Court of
the City of Mesa's prior judgment on these identical
issues.
Accordingly,
1. IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's
Motion for Summary ...