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Matthewson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

United States District Court, D. Arizona

August 28, 2019

Scott T Matthewson, Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.

          ORDER

          JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Scott Matthewson's (“Plaintiff”) appeal from the Social Security Commissioner's (the “Commissioner”) denial of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Doc. 1). This matter has been fully briefed by the parties.[1]The Court now rules on Plaintiff's appeal.

         I. BACKGROUND

         The parties are familiar with the background information in this case, and it is summarized in the Administrative Law Judge's (“ALJ”) decision. (See Doc. 8-3 at 19-31). Accordingly, the Court will reference the background only as necessary to the analysis below.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         The ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits may be overturned “only when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). “‘Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990)).

         “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (citations omitted); see Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). This is because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); see Benton, 331 F.3d at 1035 (“If the evidence can support either outcome, the Commissioner's decision must be upheld.”).

         The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On the other hand, the Court “may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

         Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. Rather, it is a “fundamental rule of administrative law” that a reviewing court, in dealing with a judgement which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, may only make its decision based upon evidence discussed by the agency. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). Thus, the Court's inquiry is constrained to the reasons asserted by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of those reasons. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003).

         Similarly, when challenging an ALJ's decision, “issues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised in a party's opening brief are waived.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Trans. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1110 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)); see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the principle to Social Security appeals). Accordingly, the Court “will not manufacture arguments for an appellant.” Arpin, 261 F.3d at 919 (citation omitted).

         A. Definition of a Disability

         A claimant can qualify for Social Security disability benefits only if he can show that, among other things, he is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A disability is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is disabled only if his “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

         B. The Five-Step Evaluation Process

         The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential process will end the inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The five steps are as follows:

         First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id.

         At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. Basic work activities are the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs, ” such as lifting, carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and remembering simple instructions, responding appropriately to co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine.” Id. § 404.1521(b). Additionally, unless the claimant's impairment is expected to result in death, “it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months” for the claimant to be found disabled. Id. § 404.1509.

         Third, having found a severe impairment, the ALJ then considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). This requires the ALJ to determine if the claimant's impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments listed in the regulations. Id. If so, then the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled. Id. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the ALJ will assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the claimant's] case record.” Id. § 404.1520(e). In assessing the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), the ALJ will consider the claimant's “impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain, [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant's RFC is the most the claimant can still do despite the effects of all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1-2).

         At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite his impairments, the claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To do this, the ALJ compares the claimant's residual function capacity with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 1520(a)(4)(iv). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.

         At the fifth and final step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the ALJ finds that the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). However, if the ALJ finds that the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the claimant is disabled. Id.

         In evaluating the claimant's disability under this five-step process, the ALJ must consider all evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1520(a)(3). This includes medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and third-party reporting. See Id. §§ 404.1527; 404.1529.

         C. The ALJ's Evaluation under the Five Step Process

         At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2014, the amended alleged onset date. (Doc. 8-3 at 21). In step two, the ALJ ascertained that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, obesity, anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder.” (Id.). Under the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of the impairments listed in the Social Security Regulations. (Id. at 22).

         Before moving on to step four, the ALJ conducted an RFC determination after consideration of the entire record. (Id. at 23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he is able to perform unskilled work requiring no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.” (Id.).

         At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work as a nurse or communications director. (Id. at 29). Finally, the ALJ concluded at step five that based on Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience, Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs existing in the national economy. (Id. at 30). Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability under the Social Security Act from June 1, 2014 through September 27, 2017-the date of the ALJ's decision. (Id. at 31).

         III. ANALYSIS

         Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's denial of his application for Social Security benefits was not supported by substantial evidence and rests upon an error of law. (Docs. 1 at 2; 9 at 8, 13, 20). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse and remand the final decision of the Agency because the ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient reasons for rejecting medical opinions from Plaintiff's treating physicians, (Doc. 9 at 8), and Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony, (id. at 13). Plaintiff also claims the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff could perform the identified occupations at step five of ...


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