United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Susan M. Brnovich United States District Judge
Pending
before the court is Plaintiff Charles Evan Reed Jr.'s
(“Plaintiff”) appeal from the Social Security
Commissioner's (the “Commissioner”) denial of
his application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits.
I.
Background
On
March 25, 2011, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) delivered an order finding Plaintiff was
not disabled, but “limited to simple, routine
work.” R. at 105. Thereafter, on December 18, 2013,
Plaintiff filed an additional application for Supplemental
Security Income Benefits, alleging the severity of his
impairment had increased since being denied Supplemental
Security Income Benefits in March 2011. R. at 16. On July 7,
2016, an ALJ again found Plaintiff was not disabled,
reasoning Plaintiff had failed to prove a change in
circumstances related to his mental impairments sufficient to
overcome the presumption of continuing nondisability, and
adopting the prior residual functional capacity of
“simple, routine work.” Id. at 13, 21.
II.
Legal Standard
Generally,
an ALJ's disability determination should be upheld if it
is both free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th
Cir. 1996). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433
F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the
evidence. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
Cir. 2012). As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of
which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
An
ALJ's determinations, including the finding of a
plaintiff's residual functional capacity, “are
entitled to some res judicata consideration in subsequent
proceedings.” Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691,
694 (9th Cir. 1988).
[A]n ALJ's finding that a claimant is not disabled
“create[s] a presumption that [the claimant] continued
to be able to work after that date.” Miller v.
Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir.1985). The
presumption does not apply, however, if there are
“changed circumstances.” Taylor v.
Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). An increase
in the severity of the claimant's impairment would
preclude the application of res judicata. Id.
Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1995),
as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). “Once the claimant overcomes
the presumption of nondisability, she must then prove that
she is in fact disabled.” Schneider v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ committed materially harmful error by:
(1) rejecting Reed's symptom testimony in the absence of
specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole; (2) rejecting
assessments by treating psychologists Janice Cochran, M.D.,
and Monica Faria, M.D.; and (3) concluding Reed's changed
circumstances were not sufficient to overcome the presumption
that he was not disabled.
A.
The ALJ Did Not Err in Rejecting Plaintiff's Symptom
Testimony
“In
evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony
regarding subjective pain, an ALJ must engage in a two-step
analysis.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586,
591 (9th Cir. 2009). “First, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence
of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d
1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Second, if the claimant meets this
first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ
can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of
her symptoms only by offering specific, clear, and convincing
reasons for doing so.” Id. In weighing a
claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider
inconsistencies between his testimony and his conduct, his
work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties
concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms
of which he complains. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284
(citations omitted). “The information that your medical
sources or nonmedical sources provide about your pain or
other symptoms is also an important indicator of the
intensity and persistence of your symptoms.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.929(c)(3). In determining the extent to which
symptoms affect capacity to perform basic work activities,
the court will consider all available evidence and evaluate
the claimant's statements in relation to the objective
medical evidence, accounting for any inconsistencies in the
evidence and conflicts between the claimant's statements
and statements by his medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(4).
Here,
the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
discrediting Plaintiff's testimony by stating that
Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not
supported by the evidence to the extent they were
inconsistent with the residual functional capacity
assessment, R. at 23, and then elaborating on the remark. The
ALJ properly cited evidence of Dr. Reynolds' treatment
records as an indicator of Plaintiff's symptoms, stating
Plaintiff continued to have seizures, but they were mostly
nocturnal, occurred only a couple times a month, lasted only
10 to 30 minutes, and were less frequent when taking
medication. Id. at 23-24, 28 (citing R. at 850-76
(noting that on January 2, 2014, Plaintiff had “[n]o
seizure events since starting the PHB [medication]”
after his prior visit on November 19, 2013); R. at 1038-39
(noting Plaintiff's seizures occurred about 5 times per
month and average duration of symptoms was 10 to 30
minutes)). The ALJ also properly cited evidence of Dr. De
Marte's evaluation that there was no delusional theme
surrounding his hallucinations, noting that “these
responses are typically found in individual[s] who exaggerate
their symptoms.” Id. at 26. Furthermore, the
ALJ noted ...