United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Betty Jane Soliz seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner”), which denied her
application for disability benefits. For the following
reasons, the Court finds that the administrative law
judge’s (“ALJ”) decision was based on
reversible legal error and remands for further proceedings.
Soliz
is a 55-year-old female who previously worked as a correction
officer, warehouse worker, and document technician. In
January 2012, Soliz filed an application for disability
benefits, alleging a disability onset date in December 2011.
(A.R. 325-326.) The claim was denied initially on July 3,
2012 (A.R. 177) and again upon reconsideration on June 7,
2013 (A.R. 199). Soliz then filed a written request for
hearing on July 5, 2013. (A.R. 239-240.) On June 10, 2014 and
June 17, 2014, she appeared and testified at a hearing at
which an impartial vocational expert also appeared and
testified. (A.R. 42-120.) On September 5, 2014, the ALJ
issued a decision concluding Soliz wasn’t disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (A.R.
200-221.) Soliz requested the Appeals Council review the
decision, and on March 23, 2016, the Appeals Council granted
her request and remanded the case to the ALJ. (A.R. 222-227.)
The ALJ conducted a new hearing on December 15, 2016 (A.R.
121-159) and issued a decision again determining Soliz
wasn’t disabled (A.R. 14-38). Soliz requested review of
the ALJ’s decision, but the Appeals Council denied
review on May 16, 2018. (A.R. 1-6.) At that point, the
ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final
decision.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
Court addresses only the issues raised by the claimant in the
appeal from the ALJ’s decision. Lewis v.
Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).
“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving
ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d
1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh
’g (Aug. 9, 2001). The Court should uphold the
ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or
is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v.
Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but
less than a preponderance.” Id. Put another
way, “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (citation omitted). The Court should uphold the
ALJ’s decision “[w]here evidence is susceptible
to more than one rational interpretation,” but the
Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and
may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of
supporting evidence.” Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
“[H]armless
error principles apply in the Social Security Act
context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ’s error is
harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination.” Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must
“look at the record as a whole to determine whether the
error alters the outcome of the case.” Id.
Importantly, however, the Court may not uphold an ALJ’s
decision on a ground not actually relied on by the ALJ.
Id. at 1121.
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. Id §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant’s impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. pt.
404. Id § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ
assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is
capable of performing past relevant work. Id §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id If not, the ALJ proceeds to the
fifth and final step, which addresses whether the claimant
can perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience. Id §
404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled.
Id If not, the claimant is disabled.
BACKGROUND
At step
one, the ALJ determined that Soliz met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30,
2017 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since December 16, 2011. (A.R. 19.) At step two, the ALJ
found that Soliz had the following severe impairments: status
post lap band procedure, opiate dependence, hypertension,
diverticulitis, fibromyalgia, opioid induced mood disorder,
obesity, lumbar degenerative disc disease, scoliosis,
spondylosis, stenosis, cervical spondylosis, and right medial
epicondylitis status post right knee arthroscopy. (A.R. 20.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Soliz didn’t
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment.
(A.R. 20-22.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Soliz had
the RFC to perform light work, except that she couldn’t
have any exposure to hazards, such as moving machinery or
unprotected heights, she couldn’t have any public
contact, and she could only have occasional contact with
coworkers and supervisors. (A.R. 22-28.) The ALJ found Soliz
wasn’t capable of performing her past relevant work but
could perform the occupations of cleaner/housekeeper, small
parts assembler, and garment handler. (A.R. 28-29.)
In her
opening brief, Soliz argues the ALJ erred by failing to: (1)
provide reasons for rejecting the opinions of the state
agency medical consultants; (2) consider whether carpal
tunnel syndrome was a severe impairment and/or include carpal
tunnel syndrome-related limitations in her RFC; and (3)
adequately explain how she concluded Soliz could perform
light work. Soliz asks the Court to remand for
reconsideration. (Doc. 12.)
For the
reasons that follow, the Court agrees the ALJ committed
reversible legal error when considering Soliz’s
limitations caused by carpal tunnel syndrome and when
determining Soliz could perform light work. The Court also
acknowledges the ALJ committed error when rejecting the State
agency medical consultants’ opinions, but this error
was harmless.
DISCUSSION
I.
Whether The ALJ Committed Reversible Error By Rejecting
The State Agency
Medical
Consultants’ Opinions Soliz argues the ALJ erred
by failing to give reasons for rejecting the opinions of two
state agency medical consultants. (Doc. 12 at 10.) First,
Mary Downs, Ph.D, opined that Soliz can carry out simple
instructions, sustain a routine, and make simple work-related
decisions. (A.R. 174.) Dr. Downs also determined Soliz would
have difficulty dealing with workplace changes and Soliz
would do better in a job in which tasks were static and
changes could be explained. (Id.) Next, Stephen
Fair, Ph.D, determined Soliz could perform simple, unskilled
work. (A.R. 196.)[1]
“[A]dministrative
law judges must consider findings of State agency medical and
psychological consultants . . . as opinion evidence . . .
.” Chavez v. Astrue, 699 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1136
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (citation omitted). This means that ALJs
“may not ignore these opinions and must explain the
weight given to the opinions in their decisions.”
S.S.R. 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, *2 (S.S.A.).
Here,
the ALJ acknowledged the opinions of the state agency medical
consultants only at step three: “[T]he undersigned
notes that no State agency psychological consultant concluded
that mental listing is medically equaled.” (A.R. 22.)
However, the ALJ didn’t discuss (much less reject) the
mental limitations expressed by Dr. Downs and Dr. Fair when
determining Soliz’s RFC. This was a potentially
significant omission because both doctors appeared to opine
that Soliz can only perform simple, unskilled work, yet the
ALJ didn’t expressly incorporate such a limitation into
the RFC. (“Light work” isn’t necessarily
the same thing as “simple, unskilled work.”) This
was error. To the extent the ALJ may have disagreed with
those opinions, the ALJ was required to explain why. In the
Social Security context, disagreement can’t permissibly
be inferred from silence.
Nevertheless,
an error can’t provide an independent reason to remand
unless the error was harmful. Molina, 674 F.3d at
1115 (“[H]armless error principles apply in the Social
Security Act context.”). And Soliz acknowledges that,
“[a]s the ALJ’s decision stands, failure to
consider these opinions is harmless because . . . the jobs
described by the ALJ were simple, unskilled jobs.”
(Doc. 12 at 11.) Therefore, the ALJ’s failure to
consider the limitations expressed by Dr. Downs and Dr. Fair,
although erroneous, doesn’t provide a basis for remand.
II.
Whether The ALJ’s Consideration of Soliz’s
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Was Reversible Error
A. The
ALJ’s Decision
The
ALJ’s discussion of Soliz’s carpal tunnel
syndrome is sparse. At step two, the ALJ omitted carpal
tunnel syndrome from the list of “severe”
impairments without any mention of the ailment. (A.R. 20.) At
step four, the ALJ acknowledged that Soliz claimed “she
had numbness in her hands.” (A.R. 25.) The ALJ also
recognized that an “EMG [Electromyogram test] showed
bilateral median neuropathy at or distal to the wrist (as in
carpal tunnel syndrome), moderate in degree electrically on
left and mild on the right side.” (Id, citing
A.R. 1307.) Despite these acknowledgments, the ALJ
didn’t include any limitations from Soliz’s
carpal tunnel syndrome in the RFC, finding instead
“[t]he claimant’s course of treatment . . . in
combination with the object[ive] records are not consistent
[with] extreme limitations as asserted by the
claimant.” (A.R. 25.)
B. The
Parties’ Arguments
Soliz
argues the ALJ erred in two ways with regard to evaluating
her symptoms from carpal tunnel syndrome. First, Soliz
contends the ALJ should have determined that her carpal
tunnel syndrome was a “severe impairment” at step
two. (Doc. 12 at 11-13.) Second, Soliz asserts the ALJ
didn’t properly consider her ...